DOCTRINE: The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.
CASE TITLE: Danilo Aluad vs. Zenaido Aluad
GR. No. 176943, October 17, 2008, J. CARPIO MORALES
FACTS
Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin). Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" (Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners’ mother Maria3 covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin.
On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 were issued in Matilde’s name. On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property. Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament, devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her "remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to respondent.
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year.7
On August 21, 1995, Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint, for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against respondent.
Respondent filed an Amended Answer contending, inter alia, that the Deed of Donation is forged and falsified. The trial court, by Decision of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she is having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, it is holding that the Deed of Donation was a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code.
While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot No. 676, it did not so declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as Matilde’s last will and testament had not yet been probated.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed the present Petition for Review. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in favor of petitioners’ mother is in fact a donation mortis causa.
HELD
Yes. The Supreme Court finds the donation to petitioners’ mother one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive.
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners’ mother during her (Matilde’s) lifetime.
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria.42 Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matilde’s) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.
Monday, April 12, 2021
Sunday, April 11, 2021
Antonio Baltazar vs. Lorenzo Laxa, GR. No. 174489, April 11, 2012
DOCTRINE: The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound to render him unfit to execute a Will.
CASE TITLE: Antonio Baltazar vs. Lorenzo Laxa, GR. No. 174489, April 11, 2012, J. DEL CASTILLO
FACTS
Paciencia was a 78-year-old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala" (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa. More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition14 with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his Favor.
Petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.
Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the Regional Trial Court to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will.
Rosie Mateo, one of the petitioners, testified that Paciencia was referred to as “magulyan” or forgetful, because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it.Moments later, hence she was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of its execution.
The RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition and disallowed the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala. The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTC’s conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being ‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound so as to render Paciencia unfit for executing a Will."
ISSUE
Whether or not Pacencia had no testamentary capacity to execute her last will and testament for having been forgetful.
HELD
No. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound to render him unfit to execute a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. As provided under Art. 799 of the Civil Code, to be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury, or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. Furthermore, Rosie’s conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan was only based on her personal assessment in contrast to Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will.
The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent. Lastly, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.
CASE TITLE: Antonio Baltazar vs. Lorenzo Laxa, GR. No. 174489, April 11, 2012, J. DEL CASTILLO
FACTS
Paciencia was a 78-year-old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala" (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa. More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition14 with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his Favor.
Petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.
Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the Regional Trial Court to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will.
Rosie Mateo, one of the petitioners, testified that Paciencia was referred to as “magulyan” or forgetful, because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it.Moments later, hence she was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of its execution.
The RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition and disallowed the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala. The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTC’s conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being ‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound so as to render Paciencia unfit for executing a Will."
ISSUE
Whether or not Pacencia had no testamentary capacity to execute her last will and testament for having been forgetful.
HELD
No. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound to render him unfit to execute a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. As provided under Art. 799 of the Civil Code, to be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury, or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. Furthermore, Rosie’s conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan was only based on her personal assessment in contrast to Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will.
The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent. Lastly, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.
Leticia Valmonte Ortega vs. Josefina C. Valmonte, GR. No. 157451, December 16, 2005
DOCTRINE: According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act.
CASE TITLE: Leticia Valmonte Ortega vs. Josefina C. Valmonte GR. No. 157451, December 16, 2005, J. PANGANIBAN
FACTS
Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement. He finally came home to stay in the Philippines and two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old,
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left-hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left-hand margin.
He gave, devise and bequeath to his wife JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE one half (1/2) portion of the some of his properties and bank accounts in the Philippines and USA.
The petitioner Leticia Valmonte Ortgea declared that respondent Josefina Valmonte should not inherit alone because aside from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticia’s family to live with him, and they took care of him. During that time, the testator’s physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations, and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.
Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidences adduced, reduces the opposition to two grounds, namely:
1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of the will; and
2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state of senility
It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate. Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways" did not make him a person of unsound mind. Hence, this Petition
ISSUE
Whether Placido had mental capacity when he executed his will
HELD
Yes. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise.
It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind.
CASE TITLE: Leticia Valmonte Ortega vs. Josefina C. Valmonte GR. No. 157451, December 16, 2005, J. PANGANIBAN
FACTS
Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement. He finally came home to stay in the Philippines and two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old,
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left-hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left-hand margin.
He gave, devise and bequeath to his wife JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE one half (1/2) portion of the some of his properties and bank accounts in the Philippines and USA.
The petitioner Leticia Valmonte Ortgea declared that respondent Josefina Valmonte should not inherit alone because aside from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticia’s family to live with him, and they took care of him. During that time, the testator’s physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations, and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.
Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidences adduced, reduces the opposition to two grounds, namely:
1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of the will; and
2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state of senility
It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate. Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways" did not make him a person of unsound mind. Hence, this Petition
ISSUE
Whether Placido had mental capacity when he executed his will
HELD
Yes. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise.
It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind.
Fe Floro Valino vs. Rosario Adriano, GR. No. 182894, April 22, 2014
Doctrine: The law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it
Case Title: Fe Floro Valino vs. Rosario D. Adriano, GR. No. 182894, April 22, 2014, J. Mendoza
Facts
Atty. Adriano Adriano was married to respondent Rosario Adriano. Their marriage turned sour and eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano pursued petitioner Fe Floro Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife.
Unfortunately, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. Respondent was in the United States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, petitioner took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days, however her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint of respondents. RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she knew very well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park. Taking into consideration the fact that Rosario left for the United States at the time that he was fighting his illness, the trial court concluded that Rosario did not show love and care for him. Considering also that it was Valino who performed all the duties and responsibilities of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably presumed that he wished to be buried in the Valino family mausoleum.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter the remains of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City. It held that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to decide for the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact. Hence, this petition.
Issue
Whether Rosario has a better right than Valino on the remains of Atty. Adriano.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that Rosario has better right to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 of the Family Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
From the forecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s common law partner.
It is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to decide for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, often, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
On the contention of Valino that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code, it should be noted, however, that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such claim. Further, Rosario equally claimed the same; hence, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish was unclear and indefinite. Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have been created in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.
Under Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to decide for the same, after consulting the other members of the family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of the funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code.
Case Title: Fe Floro Valino vs. Rosario D. Adriano, GR. No. 182894, April 22, 2014, J. Mendoza
Facts
Atty. Adriano Adriano was married to respondent Rosario Adriano. Their marriage turned sour and eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano pursued petitioner Fe Floro Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife.
Unfortunately, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. Respondent was in the United States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, petitioner took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days, however her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint of respondents. RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she knew very well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park. Taking into consideration the fact that Rosario left for the United States at the time that he was fighting his illness, the trial court concluded that Rosario did not show love and care for him. Considering also that it was Valino who performed all the duties and responsibilities of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably presumed that he wished to be buried in the Valino family mausoleum.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter the remains of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City. It held that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to decide for the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact. Hence, this petition.
Issue
Whether Rosario has a better right than Valino on the remains of Atty. Adriano.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that Rosario has better right to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 of the Family Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
From the forecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s common law partner.
It is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to decide for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, often, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
On the contention of Valino that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code, it should be noted, however, that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such claim. Further, Rosario equally claimed the same; hence, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish was unclear and indefinite. Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have been created in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.
Under Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to decide for the same, after consulting the other members of the family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of the funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla vs. CA, GR. No. 113725, June 29, 2000
DOCTRINE: The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the, object of the institution, the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.
CASE TITLE: Dr. Jorge Rabadilla vs. CA , GR. No. 113725, June 29, 2000, J. PURISIMA
FACTS
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre.
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. She alleged that defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to Maria Marlena from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
The RTC dismissed without prejudice the complaint being prematurely filed. On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
Hence this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether there was no modal institution, and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution.
HELD
NO. The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the, object of the institution, the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee, but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally act of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.
CASE TITLE: Dr. Jorge Rabadilla vs. CA , GR. No. 113725, June 29, 2000, J. PURISIMA
FACTS
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre.
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. She alleged that defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to Maria Marlena from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
The RTC dismissed without prejudice the complaint being prematurely filed. On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
Hence this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether there was no modal institution, and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution.
HELD
NO. The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the, object of the institution, the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee, but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally act of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.
Nora B. Calalang-Parulan vs. Rosario Calalang-Garcia, GR. No. 184148, June 9, 2014
Doctrine: It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death.
Case Title: Nora B. Calalang-Parulan vs. Rosario Calalang-Garcia GR. No. 184148, June 9, 2014, J. VILLARAMA JR.
Facts
A Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan by petitioners Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang against the respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S. Calalang.
The respondents asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of land against the petitioners. The said lot with an area of 1,266 square meters and specifically identified as Lot 1132, Cad. 333, Bigaa Cadastre situated in Brgy. Burol 2nd, Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan, was allegedly acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio, through succession as the latter’s compulsory heirs.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The first marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio and second marriage with Elvira Calalang after the 1st marriage was dissolved because of the death of the Encarnacion. During the subsistence of the first marriage, their parents acquired the subject land from their maternal grandmother Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however, their parents failed to register the same.
During his second marriage, Pedro filed an application for free patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands. Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such application by claiming sole and exclusive ownership over the land since 1935 and concealing the fact that he had three children with his first spouse. He then sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by both.
The trial court rendered decision in favor of the respondents. The trial court declared that the parcel of land was jointly acquired by the spouses Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio from the parents of the latter. Thus, it was part of the conjugal property of the first marriage of Pedro Calalang. The trial court then ordered all of Pedro’s share to be given to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan on account of the sale. The trial court also ruled that because the application for free patent filed by Pedro Calalang was attended by fraud and misrepresentation, Pedro Calalang should be considered as a trustee of an implied trust. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals reversed the factual findings of the trial court and held that Pedro Calalang was the sole and exclusive owner of the subject parcel of land. It held that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the disputed property was indeed jointly acquired from the parents of Encarnacion Silverio during the first marriage However, applying the rules of succession, Pedro’s heirs namely, Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, Carlito Calalang, Nora B. Calalang-Parulan, Elvira B. Calalang, and Rolando Calalang, succeeded Pedro to the land in equal shares upon his death. Thus, the CA ordered the petitioners to reconvey in favor of the respondents their rightful shares to the land. The CA ruled that the sale by Pedro Calalang to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was fraudulent and fictitious as the vendee was in bad faith and the respondents were unlawfully deprived of their pro indiviso shares over the disputed property.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration. The CA, however, denied their motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the disputed property prior to its transfer to his daughter Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
HELD
The petition is meritorious.
The Supreme Court carefully reviewed the records of this case and sustain the finding of the CA that Pedro Calalang is the sole and exclusive owner of the disputed property.
As correctly pointed out by the CA, a close perusal of the records of this case would show that the records are bereft of any concrete proof to show that the subject property indeed belonged to respondents’ maternal grandparents. The evidence respondents adduced merely consisted of testimonial evidence such as the declaration of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they have been staying on the property as far as she can remember, and that the property was acquired by her parents through purchase from her maternal grandparents. However, she was unable to produce any document to evidence the said sale, nor was she able to present any documentary evidence such as the tax declaration issued in the name of either of her parents. Moreover, we note that the free patent was issued solely in the name of Pedro Calalang and that it was issued more than 30 years after the death of Encarnacion and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage. Thus, we cannot subscribe to respondents’ submission that the subject property originally belonged to the parents of Encarnacion and was acquired by Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion.
It must likewise be noted that in his application for free patent, applicant Pedro Calalang averred that the land was first occupied and cultivated by him since 1935 and that he had planted mango trees, coconut plants, caimito trees, banana plants and seasonal crops and built his house on the subject lot. Thus, having possessed the subject land in the manner and for the period required by law after the dissolution of the first marriage and before the second marriage, the subject property ipso jure became private property and formed part of Pedro Calalang’s exclusive property. It was therefore excluded from the conjugal partnership of gains of the second marriage.
As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey his property in favor of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan by executing a Deed of Sale on February 17, 1984. The CA therefore erred in ruling that Pedro Calalang deprived his heirs of their respective shares over the disputed property when he alienated the same.
It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious donation inter vivas), the respondents have no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived them of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.
Case Title: Nora B. Calalang-Parulan vs. Rosario Calalang-Garcia GR. No. 184148, June 9, 2014, J. VILLARAMA JR.
Facts
A Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan by petitioners Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang against the respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S. Calalang.
The respondents asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of land against the petitioners. The said lot with an area of 1,266 square meters and specifically identified as Lot 1132, Cad. 333, Bigaa Cadastre situated in Brgy. Burol 2nd, Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan, was allegedly acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio, through succession as the latter’s compulsory heirs.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The first marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio and second marriage with Elvira Calalang after the 1st marriage was dissolved because of the death of the Encarnacion. During the subsistence of the first marriage, their parents acquired the subject land from their maternal grandmother Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however, their parents failed to register the same.
During his second marriage, Pedro filed an application for free patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands. Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such application by claiming sole and exclusive ownership over the land since 1935 and concealing the fact that he had three children with his first spouse. He then sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by both.
The trial court rendered decision in favor of the respondents. The trial court declared that the parcel of land was jointly acquired by the spouses Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio from the parents of the latter. Thus, it was part of the conjugal property of the first marriage of Pedro Calalang. The trial court then ordered all of Pedro’s share to be given to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan on account of the sale. The trial court also ruled that because the application for free patent filed by Pedro Calalang was attended by fraud and misrepresentation, Pedro Calalang should be considered as a trustee of an implied trust. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals reversed the factual findings of the trial court and held that Pedro Calalang was the sole and exclusive owner of the subject parcel of land. It held that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the disputed property was indeed jointly acquired from the parents of Encarnacion Silverio during the first marriage However, applying the rules of succession, Pedro’s heirs namely, Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, Carlito Calalang, Nora B. Calalang-Parulan, Elvira B. Calalang, and Rolando Calalang, succeeded Pedro to the land in equal shares upon his death. Thus, the CA ordered the petitioners to reconvey in favor of the respondents their rightful shares to the land. The CA ruled that the sale by Pedro Calalang to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was fraudulent and fictitious as the vendee was in bad faith and the respondents were unlawfully deprived of their pro indiviso shares over the disputed property.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration. The CA, however, denied their motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the disputed property prior to its transfer to his daughter Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
HELD
The petition is meritorious.
The Supreme Court carefully reviewed the records of this case and sustain the finding of the CA that Pedro Calalang is the sole and exclusive owner of the disputed property.
As correctly pointed out by the CA, a close perusal of the records of this case would show that the records are bereft of any concrete proof to show that the subject property indeed belonged to respondents’ maternal grandparents. The evidence respondents adduced merely consisted of testimonial evidence such as the declaration of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they have been staying on the property as far as she can remember, and that the property was acquired by her parents through purchase from her maternal grandparents. However, she was unable to produce any document to evidence the said sale, nor was she able to present any documentary evidence such as the tax declaration issued in the name of either of her parents. Moreover, we note that the free patent was issued solely in the name of Pedro Calalang and that it was issued more than 30 years after the death of Encarnacion and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage. Thus, we cannot subscribe to respondents’ submission that the subject property originally belonged to the parents of Encarnacion and was acquired by Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion.
It must likewise be noted that in his application for free patent, applicant Pedro Calalang averred that the land was first occupied and cultivated by him since 1935 and that he had planted mango trees, coconut plants, caimito trees, banana plants and seasonal crops and built his house on the subject lot. Thus, having possessed the subject land in the manner and for the period required by law after the dissolution of the first marriage and before the second marriage, the subject property ipso jure became private property and formed part of Pedro Calalang’s exclusive property. It was therefore excluded from the conjugal partnership of gains of the second marriage.
As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey his property in favor of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan by executing a Deed of Sale on February 17, 1984. The CA therefore erred in ruling that Pedro Calalang deprived his heirs of their respective shares over the disputed property when he alienated the same.
It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious donation inter vivas), the respondents have no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived them of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.
Saturday, April 10, 2021
Bernardina P. Bartolome vs. SSS, GR. No. 192531, November 12, 2014
Doctrine: It is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption
Case Title: Bernardina P. Bartolome vs. Social Security System, GR. No. 192531, November 12, 2014, J. Velasco Jr.
Facts:
Petitioner Bernardina Bartolome had submitted a death benefits under Presidential Degree 626 (PD 626) with the respondent agency Social Security Services (SSS). She alleged that she is the biological mother of John Colcol, who was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville before its demise in 2008 due to accident. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. However, the SSS denied the claim stating that the petitioner is no longer considered as the parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol based on the documents that were provided with the SSS.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the pension of the death benefits of her biological child despite adoption.
Held
Yes. When Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition for rescission of adoption is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents, if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the “Social Security Law.” While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary – effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
It is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent
Case Title: Bernardina P. Bartolome vs. Social Security System, GR. No. 192531, November 12, 2014, J. Velasco Jr.
Facts:
Petitioner Bernardina Bartolome had submitted a death benefits under Presidential Degree 626 (PD 626) with the respondent agency Social Security Services (SSS). She alleged that she is the biological mother of John Colcol, who was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville before its demise in 2008 due to accident. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. However, the SSS denied the claim stating that the petitioner is no longer considered as the parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol based on the documents that were provided with the SSS.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the pension of the death benefits of her biological child despite adoption.
Held
Yes. When Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition for rescission of adoption is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents, if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the “Social Security Law.” While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary – effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
It is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent
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