Leticia Valmonte Ortega vs. Josefina C. Valmonte, GR. No. 157451, December 16, 2005

DOCTRINE: According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act.

CASE TITLE: Leticia Valmonte Ortega vs. Josefina C. Valmonte GR. No. 157451, December 16, 2005, J. PANGANIBAN

FACTS

Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement. He finally came home to stay in the Philippines and two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old,

Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left-hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left-hand margin.

He gave, devise and bequeath to his wife JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE one half (1/2) portion of the some of his properties and bank accounts in the Philippines and USA.

The petitioner Leticia Valmonte Ortgea declared that respondent Josefina Valmonte should not inherit alone because aside from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticia’s family to live with him, and they took care of him. During that time, the testator’s physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations, and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.

Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidences adduced, reduces the opposition to two grounds, namely:

1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of the will; and

2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state of senility

It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate. Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways" did not make him a person of unsound mind. Hence, this Petition

ISSUE

Whether Placido had mental capacity when he executed his will

HELD

Yes. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."

According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.

It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, which held thus:

"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise.

It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind.