DOCTRINE: The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.
CASE TITLE: Danilo Aluad vs. Zenaido Aluad
GR. No. 176943, October 17, 2008, J. CARPIO MORALES
FACTS
Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin). Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" (Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners’ mother Maria3 covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin.
On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 were issued in Matilde’s name. On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property. Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament, devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her "remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to respondent.
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year.7
On August 21, 1995, Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint, for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against respondent.
Respondent filed an Amended Answer contending, inter alia, that the Deed of Donation is forged and falsified. The trial court, by Decision of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she is having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, it is holding that the Deed of Donation was a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code.
While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot No. 676, it did not so declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as Matilde’s last will and testament had not yet been probated.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed the present Petition for Review. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in favor of petitioners’ mother is in fact a donation mortis causa.
HELD
Yes. The Supreme Court finds the donation to petitioners’ mother one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive.
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners’ mother during her (Matilde’s) lifetime.
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria.42 Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matilde’s) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.
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