BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v SANCHEZ G.R. No. 179518, November 19, 2014

FACTS Vicente Victor C. Sanchez (Vicente), Kenneth Nereo Sanchez and Imelda C. V da. De Sanchez owned a 900 square meter parcel of land and duly registered with Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Jesus V. Garcia, doing business under the name TransAmerican Sales and Exposition, Inc. (TSEI), wrote a letter to Vicente offering to buy the Subject Property for One Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱1,800,000). The offer was good for only seven (7) days. The period elapsed with the parties failing to come to an agreement. Sometime in the third week of October 1988, Felisa Yap, the widow of Kenneth Nereo Sanchez, and Garcia agreed to the sale of the subject property under Garcia shall buy the property for ₱1.850 million payable in cash immediately after the occupants shall have vacated the property and that he shall cause the demolition of the old house standing on the property and shall sell the scrap materials thereof for not less than ₱50,000.00. All proceeds to be realized on account of said demolition shall be turned over to the Sanchezes. Pursuant to this agreement, Yap turned over to Garcia the original owner’s copy of Transfer Certificate of Title, the copy of the filed Application for Restitution of Title to the property, and copies of all receipts for the payment of real estate taxes on the property, while Garcia paid Yap 50,000 as earnest money. Afterwards, Yap required the occupants of the subject property to vacate the same. Immediately after it was vacated, Garcia, without Yap’s knowledge and consent, took possession of the lot and installed his own caretaker thereon with strict instructions not to allow anyone to enter the property. Yap later learned that Garcia had also demolished the house on the property and advertised the construction and sale of "Trans American Townhouse V". The foregoing developments notwithstanding and despite numerous demands, Garcia failed to pay the balance of the purchase price as agreed upon. Yap was informed that the checks representing the purchase price of the subject property were ready but that Vicente must pick up his checks personally. Out of the six checks that were issued by Garcia, the first four (4) checks were deposited with no issue. However, the last two (2) checks, amounting to ₱400,000 each, were dishonored for the reason of "DAIF" or drawn against insufficient funds. Yap wrote a letter to Garcia informing him that the two (2) checks were dishonored and asking that the checks be replaced within five (5) days from receipt of the letter. Since the request was left unheeded, the petitioners informed Garcia in a letter that they were rescinding the Agreement. This prompted Garcia to offer two (2) manager’s checks in the aggregate amount of ₱300,000 which Yap flatly refused, reiterating the rescission of their Agreement and demanding for the return of all documents entrusted to him. The latter effectively refused to return the documents and to vacate the subject property. Later on, the petitioners discovered that Garcia is selling units at the Trans American Townhouse V situated at the subject property. Petitioners counsel wrote the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) informing the latter of the existing public advertisement of TSEI offering for sale townhouses illegally constructed on the subject property and urging the HLURB to cancel any existing permit or license to sell the said townhouse units or to deny any application therefor. The HLURB issued a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) enjoining TSEI and Garcia from further developing and selling the townhouses. Respondents Garcia and TSEI were directed to immediately stop from further developing the project. Additionally, such cease and desist order as well as warnings to possible buyers of the townhouses were published with the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Manila Bulletin. In a delayed response to the CDO, TSEI wrote a letter to the HLURB alleging that only ground leveling works were being undertaken on the project. This was rebuffed by the HLURB in a letter dated May 8, 1989 stating that ocular inspections of the project revealed that 2nd floor construction on the townhouses were already being undertaken. Thus, the HLURB ordered TSEI to explain in writing why administrative sanctions should not be meted out against it and reiterating its earlier cease and desist order. Undeterred, TSEI continued its construction and selling activities for the townhouses. Thus, the HLURB issued an Order dated June 1, 1989 fining TSEI in the amount of ₱10,000. Yap and Vicente, in his own behalf and representing the heirs of Imelda C.Vda De Sanchez, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City, for the rescission of contract, restitution and damages with prayer for TRO/preliminary injunction against TSEI and Garcia. Meanwhile, Garcia managed to cause the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title and replaced it in the name of TSEI. The records also revealed that a portion of the land was already sold to different buyers. TSEI left the townhouse units unfinished, leaving these intervenors to finish their townhouses by themselves. Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) entered into a Loan Agreement 44 dated May 22, 1989 with TSEI secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over TCT 156254.FEBTC later merged with the Bank of the Philippine with the latter as the surviving bank. Garcia explained to FEBTC that the parties were still in the process of transferring the title. Afterwards, Garcia submitted a copy of TCT 383697 in TSEI’s name. Upon default, FEBTC (now BPI) foreclosed the subject lot and had the Foreclosure Certificate of Sale annotated on TCT 383697. The RTC declared that the Sanchezes have the right to rescind the Agreement they entered into with Garcia and TSEI under proviso no. 6 of the Agreement. In fact, the RTC enunciated that because the Agreement is in the nature of a contract to sell, the ownership over the subject property remained with the Sanchezes as the suspensive condition––that the check payments shall be honored––was not complied with. Thus, the RTC concluded that there was not even any need for rescission in this case. Moreover, the RTC found that TSEI and Garcia were builders in bad faith as the Sanchezes never consented to the construction of the townhouses. Furthermore, the presentation by Garcia and TSEI to the intervenors of TCT 383697 in TSEI’s name sufficiently shows their bad faith. Anent the rights of intervenors, the RTC found the Sanchezes to have a better right over the subject property considering that the transactions between Garcia/TSEI and the intervenors suffered from several irregularities, which they, the intervenors, in bad faith, ignored. Upon appeal by the intervenors-appellants, the CA rendered, on November 6, 2006, the assailed Decision affirming the RTC Decision with modifications. Thus, the CA ordered the cancellation of TCT 383697 in TSEI’s name and the reinstatement of TCT 156254 in the names of the Sanchezes. However, the appellate court found the Sanchezes equally in bad faith with TSEI and Garcia, and gave the Sanchezes the option either to appropriate the townhouses by paying for them or to oblige TSEI and Garcia to pay the price of the land, unless the subject lot’s value is considerably more than that of the structures built thereon in which case TSEI and Garcia would have to pay the Sanchezes reasonable rent for the use of the subject property. Hence, these petitions under Rule 45 separately interposed by the intervenors. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not there’s negligence on the part of the Sanchezes when they turned over the owner’s original duplicate copy of TCT 156254 despite receiving only the ₱50,000 earnest money, which led to the fraudulent transfer of title over the subject lot by Garcia and the issuance of TCT 383697 in the name of TSEI. 2. Whether or not the intervenors are buyers in bad faith. 3. WON BPI can be considered a mortgagee in good faith RULING: 1. No, the Sanchezes are not guilty of negligence. It must be stated that the CA already ruled that the issue of the Sanchezes’ negligence was never raised at the pre-trial. As such, it can no longer be raised on appeal. Nevertheless, even if such issue were to be passed upon, the Sanchezes cannot be considered negligent, much less in bad faith. It must be noted that defendant Garcia committed himself that, upon full payment of the purchase price, he would personally undertake the preparation and execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale as well as the reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 156254 on file with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Thus, it was inevitably for plaintiff-appellant/appellee Felisa Yap to surrender to defendant Garcia the owner’s duplicate copy of the aforesaid title as well as the other documents pertinent for such documentation and reconstitution. The records would disclose that the plaintiffs appellants/appellees did not voluntarily surrender possession thereof to defendants. On the contrary, it was defendant Garcia who took possession of the subject property, without plaintiffs-appellants/appellees knowledge, posted his own caretaker therein with strict instructions not to allow anyone to enter the same. The latter also caused the demolition of the old house standing thereon and advertised the same for sale by placing a large billboard in front of the subject property. In fact, had it not been for persistent efforts of plaintiffs-appellants/appellees, the Agreement which eventually protected the latter’s rights over the subject property, could not have been executed. 2. The factual milieu of the case reveals that intervenors are buyers in bad faith. The following are the reasons why the acted in bad faith: 1. They should have gone to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City (RD) to verify if in fact TCT No. 156254 had already been cancelled and a new title has been issued to TSEI or Garcia. They should have asked for the deed of absolute sale filed and registered with the RD to find out if the Sanchezes indeed sold the lot in question to TSEI. They could have verified from the primary entry book of said office if the deed of absolute sale from the Sanchezes in favor of TSEI was registered in said book, which, under the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529), is considered as an effective and legal notice to third persons and the whole world of such transfer. Evidently, the intervenors failed to do so. 2. The intervenors know, based on the contract of sale or contract to sell, that the property isregistered under TCT No. 156254 in the name of the Sanchezes. As such, they should have insisted that they talk to the Sanchezes before executing said conveyances. Had they done so, they would have known that the Sanchezes have not executed a written deed of absolute sale in favor of TSEI for the latter’s failure to pay the consideration in full. Having failed to ferret out the truth from the Sanchezes, intervenors cannot be considered innocent purchasers for failure to exercise utmost caution and extra diligence in determining the true owner of the property. 3. Thirdly, the intervenors should havebeen suspicious of the explanation of Garcia that TCT No. 383697, reflecting TSEI as the owner of the property, has been burned and that he is in the process of reconstituting the title. Before signing the contract of sale or contract to sell, they should have asked Garcia where the reconstitution case has been filed or is pending and proceeded to verify with the said court the status of the reconstitution. Had they done so, they would have known that neither Garcia nor TSEI had a deed of absolute sale executed in their favor over the lot in question. The truth of the matter is that it is the duplicate certificate of title of TCT No. 156254 that has been lost or misplaced, and is being sought to be reconstituted, not TCT No. 383697. Had intervenors been prudent enough to verify with the court the status of the alleged TCT No. 383697, they would have known that Garcia planned to deceive them in the sale of the subject property. 4. Fourthly, the intervenors knew that they were buying a townhouse over a subdivision lot from TSEI and Garcia. Such being the case, they should have verified with the HLURB whether said project is registered with said housing agency and if a license to sell has been issued to TSEI or Garcia. Had they made such an inquiry, they would have known that instead of a permit for the project and a license to sell the property, a cease and desist order was issued by the HLURB precisely to enjoin TSEI and Garcia from selling said property to the public. Similarly, they could have inquired from the City Building Official of Quezon City if a building permit was issued to TSEI and Garcia for the construction of the townhouses, which would have yielded the same negative result. 3. Even as the intervenors have been found to be in bad faith, BPI, the successor of FEBTC, cannot be considered a mortgagee in good faith, considering the glaring anomalies in the loan transaction between TSEI and FEBTC. A. when Garcia gave TCT 156254 to FEBTC for the processing of a loan secured by a mortgage, it indubitably showed that Garcia/TSEI did not yet own the subject property as said title was in the name of the Sanchezes. But FEBTC did not require Garcia/TSEI to submit a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in their favor authorizing them to mortgage the subject property covered by TCT 156254. b. considering that Garcia/TSEI were already selling the townhouse units to the public as early as January 1989, FEBTC was also remiss in not requiring Garcia/TSEI to submit a written approval from the HLURB for the mortgage of the subject property where the townhouse units were being constructed as required under Sec. 18 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957. c. considering further that Garcia presented the Agreement between the Sanchezes and Garcia/TSEI asbasis for ownership of the subject property covered by TCT 156254, FEBTC was remiss in neither ascertaining whether the full payment of the ₱1.8 million covered by six (6) checks in view of the proviso number 6 of the Agreement nor requiring the presentment of the EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE WITH SALE from the Sanchezes in favor of Garcia/TSEI. d. FEBTC was again negligent in not scrutinizing the TCT 383697 considering that the title has the purported issuance date of June 9, 1988 way before the December Agreement was executed and when the loan was negotiated. More, the purported issuance of TCT 383697 was made more than six (6) months before Garcia/TSEI approached the bank for the loan. Thus, FEBTC should have been placed on guard as to why Garcia/TSEI initially gave it TCT 156254 in the name of the Sanchezes when TCTC 383697 was purportedly already issued and in Garcia’s possession way before the bank loan was negotiated. Again, FEBTC did not exercise the due diligence required of banks. e. the Court notes that FEBTC released portions of the loan proceeds in April even before it approved the loan secured by a real estate mortgage on May 22, 1989. And more anomalous is the fact that FEBTC had TCT 383697 verified for its veracity and genuineness way after it approved the loan to Garcia/TSEI. The Certification from the Register of Deeds was issued only on June 13, 1989 upon the request of GarciA.

San Diego v. Hernandez

San Diego v. Hernandez FACTS: After investigating an alleged mauling of one Manuel Abella, in Quezon City, on October 3, 1964, Benjamin M. Grecia, as Assistant Fiscal of said City, filed, in connection therewith, with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch — hereinafter referred to as CFI — presided over by Hon. Lourdes P. San Diego, Judge, an information for frustrated murder, against Juancho G. Gutierrez, Celedonio P. Cayado alias Tony Cayado, Alfonso D. Tagle alias Panchito Alba, Benjamin A. Johnson, Eliseo C. Estanislao and three (3) other persons designated in said pleading as John Doe, Richard Doe and Peter Doe. The defendant designated in the information by their true names were arraigned before the CFI. On this occasion, Judge San Diego asked Assistant Fiscal Grecia about the identity of the persons referred to in said pleading as John Doe, Richard Doe and Peter Doe. Grecia replied that the first two (2) were Assistant City Fiscal Modesto Obispo and Patrolman Cipriano Valeriano, respectively — hereinafter referred to collectively as the respondents. Thereupon, Judge San Diego authorized Grecia to cross out the conventional names John Doe and Richard Doe, in the information, and write, instead, "Fiscal Modesto Obispo" and "Patrolman Cipriano Valerians", which Grecia did. Then, the warrants for their arrest were issued, on motion of Grecia. Respondents forthwith moved to set aside said warrants of arrest, but, the motion was denied on October 20, 1964; whereupon, respondents posted their respective bail bonds, and moved to quash the information, upon the ground of absence of a preliminary investigation and the consequent lack of authority to file said pleading. After listening to the argument of respondents' counsel, when said motion was heard on October 31, 1964, Judge San Diego stated that, "not being founded on the grounds provided by the Rules of Court," the motion would "have to be denied." Respondents alleged in their petition therein that the amended information against them is null and void: (1) because they were given no preliminary investigation, before being included in said pleading, and (2) because Grecia allegedly "lost all authority to amend the information" by including therein respondents herein. ISSUE: WON respondents were denied due process. RULING: No, with respect to the first ground, it is worthy of notice that the Constitution does not require the holding of preliminary investigations. The right thereto exists only, if and when created by statute. When so created, the absence of a preliminary investigation — if it is not waived — may amount to a denial of due process. In this connection, Section 38 of the Revised Charter of Quezon City1 reads: Every person arrested shall, without unnecessary delay, be brought before the City Attorney, the municipal court, or the Court of First instance for preliminary hearing, release on bail, or trial. ...In case triable only in the Court of First Instance the defendant shall not be entitled as of right to preliminary examination in any case where the Fiscal of the city, after a due investigation of the facts, shall have presented an information against him in proper form. But the Court of First Instance may make such summary investigation into the case as it may deem necessary to enable it to fix the bail or to determine whether the offense is bailable. Thus, the defendant in a case "triable only in the Court of First Instance" of Quezon City, "shall not be entitled as of right to preliminary investigation . . . where the Fiscal of the City, after due investigation of the facts, shall have presented an information against him in proper form." In the case at bar, such investigation had been conducted and said "information in proper form" was filed by the "Fiscal of the City." Hence, the action of Assistant Fiscal Grecia in inserting, in the information in Criminal Case No. Q-6029, the true names of those accused therein as John Doe and Richard Doe, and the authority given therefor by Judge San Diego, are violative of neither the Fundamental Law nor the statutes, and do not constitute a denial of due process. In the case of respondents herein, Assistant Fiscal Grecia had conducted an investigation, and had not dismissed, either expressly or impliedly, the charges against them. What is more, he included them in the information, although under the conventional names of John Doe and Richard Doe, and their true names were not revealed until the arraignment of their co-defendants, on October 31, 1964. Lastly, none of the aforementioned cases involved the application of a provision analogous to that of the Revised Charter of Quezon City, explicitly denying the right to a preliminary investigation in cases triable only in the Court of First Instance thereof, where the prosecutor, after due investigation of the facts, shall have filed an information against him in proper form.

Beltran v. Ramos

FACTS: The petitioner, Juan Y. Beltran, was charged before the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro with the crime of malversation of public funds, alleged in the information to have been committed in the municipality of San Jose, province of Occidental Mindoro. The trial commenced in the municipalities of San Jose, Mamburao, and Lubang, all of Occidental Mindoro. The continuation of the trial was transferred to the municipality of Calapan, province of Oriental Mindoro. The defendant Beltran, herein petitioner, objected to the continuation of the trial in Calapan on the ground that it is outside of the territorial boundaries of the province of Occidental Mindoro where the crime was committed. The trial court overruled the objection and ordered the trial to proceed in Calapan. The petitioner filed in this Court a petition for a writ of prohibition to enjoin the trial court from continuing the trial in Calapan. The respondent contends that the provinces of Occidental and Oriental Mindoro constitute the Eighth Judicial District under the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296). There being no separate court for the province of Occidental Mindoro, it is claimed that the judge of the district may hold his sessions in either of the two provinces. ISSUE: WON the contention of the respondent is correct. RULING: The contention is untenable. A criminal case should be instituted and tried in the municipality or province where the offense was committed or any of its essential ingredients took place. This is a fundamental principle, the purpose being not to compel the defendant to move to, and appear in a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed, as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place. Although the judge of a district may hold sessions in any part of said district, yet he should hold the trial in any particular case subject to the specific provisions, or section 14 (a), Rule 106, in order not to violate the Rules of Court and disregard the fundamental rights of the accused.The respondent judge is enjoined from continuing the trial of the above-mentioned case in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, and ordered to continue it in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, without pronouncement as to costs.

Beltran v. Ramos

FACTS: The petitioner, Juan Y. Beltran, was charged before the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro with the crime of malversation of public funds, alleged in the information to have been committed in the municipality of San Jose, province of Occidental Mindoro. The trial commenced in the municipalities of San Jose, Mamburao, and Lubang, all of Occidental Mindoro. The continuation of the trial was transferred to the municipality of Calapan, province of Oriental Mindoro. The defendant Beltran, herein petitioner, objected to the continuation of the trial in Calapan on the ground that it is outside of the territorial boundaries of the province of Occidental Mindoro where the crime was committed. The trial court overruled the objection and ordered the trial to proceed in Calapan. The petitioner filed in this Court a petition for a writ of prohibition to enjoin the trial court from continuing the trial in Calapan. The respondent contends that the provinces of Occidental and Oriental Mindoro constitute the Eighth Judicial District under the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296). There being no separate court for the province of Occidental Mindoro, it is claimed that the judge of the district may hold his sessions in either of the two provinces. ISSUE: WON the contention of the respondent is correct. RULING: The contention is untenable for the reason that the Rules of Court expressly provide that a criminal case should be instituted and tried in the municipality or province where the offense was committed or any of its essential ingredients took place. This is a fundamental principle, the purpose being not to compel the defendant to move to, and appear in a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed, as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place. Although the judge of a district may hold sessions in any part of said district, yet he should hold the trial in any particular case subject to the specific provisions, or section 14 (a), Rule 106, in order not to violate the Rules of Court and disregard the fundamental rights of the accused. Sometimes a judicial district includes provinces far distant from each other. Under the theory of the respondent, the accused may be subjected to the great inconvenience of going to a far distant province with all his witnesses to attend the trial there. This is prohibited by the Rules of Court as being unfair to the defendant. The respondent judge is enjoined from continuing the trial of the above-mentioned case in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, and ordered to continue it in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, without pronouncement as to costs.

BALTAZAR V PANTIG

FACTS: This case is an offshoot of a property dispute between Jose S. Baltazar, petitioner, and the above-named respondents. In Pantig vs. Baltazar this Court declared respondents the rightful owners of a 139,126 hectare fishpond located at Sasmuan, Pampanga. After they had been placed in possession of the fishpond, they started cleaning it and had it resurveyed. They rebuilt the destroyed dikes which separate their fishpond from petitioner’s property. Alleging that respondents stole fish and other marine products from his property, petitioner filed a complaint for qualified theft against them with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sasmuan, Pampanga. After conducting a preliminary investigation, the MTC found probable cause against all the accused (now respondents) and forwarded the records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of that province and filed an Information for qualified theft against respondents. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for certiorari based on the following grounds: a) Petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies; b) He failed to appeal to the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Department Order No. 223; and c) Petitioner lacks the legal capacity to sue. ISSUE: WON CA erred in its decision. RULING: We hold that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in affirming the Decision of the RTC dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. When the RTC dismissed the Information for qualified theft on the basis of the Provincial Prosecutors Resolutions, petitioners remedy was to file a motion for reconsideration. If it were granted, then the Information could have been reinstated. If not, he could have elevated the matter to a higher court. In other words, the remedies then available to him were within the courts, not elsewhere. This is basic. It bears emphasis that the case was no longer in the Provincial Prosecutors Office. The Information had been filed and pending in the RTC. Therefore, the discretion whether to dismiss the Information lay in the same court, as what it did, as well as the discretion to reverse its order of dismissal. We simply cannot understand why the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner should have interposed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice. This is a gross procedural infirmity that the Appellate Court Justices concerned are expected to know. While the RTC correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari, however, the ground relied upon (non-exhaustion of administrative remedies) is utterly misplaced. Worse, the Court of Appeals erroneously upheld such procedural lapse.

PEOPLE V TUDTUD

FACTS: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area. On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. Two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton. PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. They were informed that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which 2 bundles were, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another 890 grams. Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. The defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them. The accused, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up. Swayed by the prosecution’s evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. ISSUE: 1. WON the Police violated Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. 2. WON the police in this case had probable cause to arrest appellants. RULING: 1. Yes, The police officers who conducted such surveillance did not identify who these assets were or the basis of the latter’s information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal knowledge. The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes “unreasonable” within the meaning of the above-cited constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby, will be inadmissible in evidence “for any purpose in any proceeding.” The proscription in Section 2, Article III, however, covers only “unreasonable” searches and seizures. The following instances are not deemed “unreasonable” even in the absence of a warrant: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence); 2. Search of evidence in “plain view.” The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediate apparent; (d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. There is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures if the following requisites are present: 1. It must appear that the rights exist; 2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; 3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested appellant that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist and opened the box himself. The fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these circumstances to constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto. As the search of appellant’s box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. The right of the accused to be secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. 2. Yes. It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Probable cause has been defined as: an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making the arrest. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that “reliable information” alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he “has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the essence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone insufficient.

Torres v. Aguinaldo

FACTS: Respondent-spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila, a complaint against petitioner Artemio T. Torres, Jr. (Torres) for falsification of public document. They alleged that titles to their properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-93596, T-87764, and T-87765, were transferred without their knowledge and consent in the name of Torres through a forged Deed of Sale dated July 21, 1979. Torres denied the allegations of forgery and claimed that Aguinaldo sold the subject properties to him as evidenced by the March 10, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale. Finding probable cause, the OCP recommended the filing of an information for Falsification of public document against Torres, which was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MTC), Branch 8, on October 3, 2001. Torres moved for reconsideration but was denied. On appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed the findings of the investigating prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of the information. The motion for reconsideration filed by Aguinaldo was denied. A Motion to Withdraw Information was filed which the MTC granted on June 11, 2003. It should be noted that petitioner has not been arraigned. ISSUES: I. Whether the order of the MTC-Manila dated June 11, 2003 granting the motion to withdraw the information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed by Aguinaldo for the purpose of reinstating the April 30, 2001 resolution of the OCP of Manila; and in the alternative, whether the rule on provisional dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 applies. II. Whether Aguinaldo committed forum shopping. III. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in reinstating the April 30, 2001 order of the OCP of Manila finding probable cause against petitioner. RULING: 1. An order granting the withdrawal of the information attains finality after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, without prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon reinvestigation; An order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order achieves finality. In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed and not a motion to dismiss. Hence, Bañares II v. Balising would not apply. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to withdraw information is not time-barred and does not fall within the ambit of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the law on provisional dismissal becomes operative once the judge dismisses, with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party: (a) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived; or (b) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment of more than six (6) years, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. There is provisional dismissal when a motion filed expressly for that purpose complies with the following requisites, viz.: (1) It must be with the express consent of the accused; and (2) There must be notice to the offended party. Section 8, Rule 117 contemplates the filing of a motion to dismiss, and not a motion to withdraw information. Thus, the law on provisional dismissal does not apply in the present case. 2. Respondent-spouses are not guilty of forum shopping. The cases they filed against petitioner are based on distinct causes of action. Besides, a certificate of non-forum shopping is required only in civil complaints under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In People v. Ferrer, we held that such certificate is not even necessary in criminal cases and distinct causes of action. 3. The Secretary of Justice did not whimsically and capriciously exercise his discretion. His findings was grounded on sound statutory and factual basis. Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure defines preliminary investigation as an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. It is essentially an inquisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of ascertaining who may be reasonably charged with a crime. It is not a trial on the merits and has no purpose except to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. The officers authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation are the: (a) Provincial or city fiscals and their assistants; (b) Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts Judges; (c) National and Regional state prosecutors; and (d) Such other officers as may be authorized by law. In determining the existence or absence of probable cause, the investigating officer shall examine the complaint and documents in support thereof as well as the controverting evidence presented by the defense It is well to note that Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure not only requires the submission of the complaint and the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents, but also directs the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. Section 4 thereof also mandates the investigating prosecutor to certify under oath in the information that the accused was informed of the complaint and the evidence against him, and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Thus, in determining the existence or absence of probable cause, the investigating officer shall examine the complaint and documents in support thereof as well as the controverting evidence presented by the defense. While the validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation and the admissibility of the testimonies and evidence are best ventilated in a full blown trial, still, in a preliminary investigation, a proper consideration of the complaint and supporting evidence as well as the controverting evidence, is warranted to determine the persons who may be reasonably charged with the crime. The determination must be based on the totality of evidence presented by both parties.