BALTAZAR V PANTIG

FACTS: This case is an offshoot of a property dispute between Jose S. Baltazar, petitioner, and the above-named respondents. In Pantig vs. Baltazar this Court declared respondents the rightful owners of a 139,126 hectare fishpond located at Sasmuan, Pampanga. After they had been placed in possession of the fishpond, they started cleaning it and had it resurveyed. They rebuilt the destroyed dikes which separate their fishpond from petitioner’s property. Alleging that respondents stole fish and other marine products from his property, petitioner filed a complaint for qualified theft against them with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sasmuan, Pampanga. After conducting a preliminary investigation, the MTC found probable cause against all the accused (now respondents) and forwarded the records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of that province and filed an Information for qualified theft against respondents. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for certiorari based on the following grounds: a) Petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies; b) He failed to appeal to the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Department Order No. 223; and c) Petitioner lacks the legal capacity to sue. ISSUE: WON CA erred in its decision. RULING: We hold that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in affirming the Decision of the RTC dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. When the RTC dismissed the Information for qualified theft on the basis of the Provincial Prosecutors Resolutions, petitioners remedy was to file a motion for reconsideration. If it were granted, then the Information could have been reinstated. If not, he could have elevated the matter to a higher court. In other words, the remedies then available to him were within the courts, not elsewhere. This is basic. It bears emphasis that the case was no longer in the Provincial Prosecutors Office. The Information had been filed and pending in the RTC. Therefore, the discretion whether to dismiss the Information lay in the same court, as what it did, as well as the discretion to reverse its order of dismissal. We simply cannot understand why the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner should have interposed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice. This is a gross procedural infirmity that the Appellate Court Justices concerned are expected to know. While the RTC correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari, however, the ground relied upon (non-exhaustion of administrative remedies) is utterly misplaced. Worse, the Court of Appeals erroneously upheld such procedural lapse.