PEOPLE V TUDTUD

FACTS: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area. On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. Two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton. PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. They were informed that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which 2 bundles were, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another 890 grams. Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. The defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them. The accused, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up. Swayed by the prosecution’s evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. ISSUE: 1. WON the Police violated Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. 2. WON the police in this case had probable cause to arrest appellants. RULING: 1. Yes, The police officers who conducted such surveillance did not identify who these assets were or the basis of the latter’s information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal knowledge. The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes “unreasonable” within the meaning of the above-cited constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby, will be inadmissible in evidence “for any purpose in any proceeding.” The proscription in Section 2, Article III, however, covers only “unreasonable” searches and seizures. The following instances are not deemed “unreasonable” even in the absence of a warrant: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence); 2. Search of evidence in “plain view.” The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediate apparent; (d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. There is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures if the following requisites are present: 1. It must appear that the rights exist; 2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; 3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested appellant that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist and opened the box himself. The fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these circumstances to constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto. As the search of appellant’s box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. The right of the accused to be secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. 2. Yes. It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Probable cause has been defined as: an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making the arrest. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that “reliable information” alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he “has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the essence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone insufficient.