DOCTRINE: The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.
CASE TITLE: Danilo Aluad vs. Zenaido Aluad
GR. No. 176943, October 17, 2008, J. CARPIO MORALES
FACTS
Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin). Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" (Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners’ mother Maria3 covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin.
On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 were issued in Matilde’s name. On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property. Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament, devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her "remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to respondent.
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year.7
On August 21, 1995, Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint, for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against respondent.
Respondent filed an Amended Answer contending, inter alia, that the Deed of Donation is forged and falsified. The trial court, by Decision of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she is having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, it is holding that the Deed of Donation was a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code.
While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot No. 676, it did not so declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as Matilde’s last will and testament had not yet been probated.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed the present Petition for Review. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in favor of petitioners’ mother is in fact a donation mortis causa.
HELD
Yes. The Supreme Court finds the donation to petitioners’ mother one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive.
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners’ mother during her (Matilde’s) lifetime.
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria.42 Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matilde’s) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.
Monday, April 12, 2021
Sunday, April 11, 2021
Antonio Baltazar vs. Lorenzo Laxa, GR. No. 174489, April 11, 2012
DOCTRINE: The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound to render him unfit to execute a Will.
CASE TITLE: Antonio Baltazar vs. Lorenzo Laxa, GR. No. 174489, April 11, 2012, J. DEL CASTILLO
FACTS
Paciencia was a 78-year-old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala" (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa. More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition14 with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his Favor.
Petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.
Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the Regional Trial Court to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will.
Rosie Mateo, one of the petitioners, testified that Paciencia was referred to as “magulyan” or forgetful, because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it.Moments later, hence she was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of its execution.
The RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition and disallowed the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala. The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTC’s conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being ‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound so as to render Paciencia unfit for executing a Will."
ISSUE
Whether or not Pacencia had no testamentary capacity to execute her last will and testament for having been forgetful.
HELD
No. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound to render him unfit to execute a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. As provided under Art. 799 of the Civil Code, to be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury, or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. Furthermore, Rosie’s conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan was only based on her personal assessment in contrast to Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will.
The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent. Lastly, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.
CASE TITLE: Antonio Baltazar vs. Lorenzo Laxa, GR. No. 174489, April 11, 2012, J. DEL CASTILLO
FACTS
Paciencia was a 78-year-old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala" (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa. More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition14 with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his Favor.
Petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.
Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the Regional Trial Court to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will.
Rosie Mateo, one of the petitioners, testified that Paciencia was referred to as “magulyan” or forgetful, because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it.Moments later, hence she was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of its execution.
The RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition and disallowed the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala. The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTC’s conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being ‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound so as to render Paciencia unfit for executing a Will."
ISSUE
Whether or not Pacencia had no testamentary capacity to execute her last will and testament for having been forgetful.
HELD
No. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound to render him unfit to execute a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. As provided under Art. 799 of the Civil Code, to be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury, or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. Furthermore, Rosie’s conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan was only based on her personal assessment in contrast to Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will.
The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent. Lastly, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.
Leticia Valmonte Ortega vs. Josefina C. Valmonte, GR. No. 157451, December 16, 2005
DOCTRINE: According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act.
CASE TITLE: Leticia Valmonte Ortega vs. Josefina C. Valmonte GR. No. 157451, December 16, 2005, J. PANGANIBAN
FACTS
Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement. He finally came home to stay in the Philippines and two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old,
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left-hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left-hand margin.
He gave, devise and bequeath to his wife JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE one half (1/2) portion of the some of his properties and bank accounts in the Philippines and USA.
The petitioner Leticia Valmonte Ortgea declared that respondent Josefina Valmonte should not inherit alone because aside from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticia’s family to live with him, and they took care of him. During that time, the testator’s physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations, and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.
Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidences adduced, reduces the opposition to two grounds, namely:
1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of the will; and
2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state of senility
It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate. Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways" did not make him a person of unsound mind. Hence, this Petition
ISSUE
Whether Placido had mental capacity when he executed his will
HELD
Yes. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise.
It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind.
CASE TITLE: Leticia Valmonte Ortega vs. Josefina C. Valmonte GR. No. 157451, December 16, 2005, J. PANGANIBAN
FACTS
Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement. He finally came home to stay in the Philippines and two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old,
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left-hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left-hand margin.
He gave, devise and bequeath to his wife JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE one half (1/2) portion of the some of his properties and bank accounts in the Philippines and USA.
The petitioner Leticia Valmonte Ortgea declared that respondent Josefina Valmonte should not inherit alone because aside from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticia’s family to live with him, and they took care of him. During that time, the testator’s physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations, and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.
Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidences adduced, reduces the opposition to two grounds, namely:
1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of the will; and
2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state of senility
It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate. Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways" did not make him a person of unsound mind. Hence, this Petition
ISSUE
Whether Placido had mental capacity when he executed his will
HELD
Yes. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise.
It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind.
Fe Floro Valino vs. Rosario Adriano, GR. No. 182894, April 22, 2014
Doctrine: The law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it
Case Title: Fe Floro Valino vs. Rosario D. Adriano, GR. No. 182894, April 22, 2014, J. Mendoza
Facts
Atty. Adriano Adriano was married to respondent Rosario Adriano. Their marriage turned sour and eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano pursued petitioner Fe Floro Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife.
Unfortunately, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. Respondent was in the United States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, petitioner took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days, however her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint of respondents. RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she knew very well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park. Taking into consideration the fact that Rosario left for the United States at the time that he was fighting his illness, the trial court concluded that Rosario did not show love and care for him. Considering also that it was Valino who performed all the duties and responsibilities of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably presumed that he wished to be buried in the Valino family mausoleum.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter the remains of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City. It held that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to decide for the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact. Hence, this petition.
Issue
Whether Rosario has a better right than Valino on the remains of Atty. Adriano.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that Rosario has better right to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 of the Family Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
From the forecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s common law partner.
It is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to decide for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, often, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
On the contention of Valino that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code, it should be noted, however, that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such claim. Further, Rosario equally claimed the same; hence, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish was unclear and indefinite. Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have been created in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.
Under Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to decide for the same, after consulting the other members of the family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of the funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code.
Case Title: Fe Floro Valino vs. Rosario D. Adriano, GR. No. 182894, April 22, 2014, J. Mendoza
Facts
Atty. Adriano Adriano was married to respondent Rosario Adriano. Their marriage turned sour and eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano pursued petitioner Fe Floro Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife.
Unfortunately, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. Respondent was in the United States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, petitioner took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days, however her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint of respondents. RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she knew very well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park. Taking into consideration the fact that Rosario left for the United States at the time that he was fighting his illness, the trial court concluded that Rosario did not show love and care for him. Considering also that it was Valino who performed all the duties and responsibilities of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably presumed that he wished to be buried in the Valino family mausoleum.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter the remains of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City. It held that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to decide for the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact. Hence, this petition.
Issue
Whether Rosario has a better right than Valino on the remains of Atty. Adriano.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that Rosario has better right to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 of the Family Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
From the forecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s common law partner.
It is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to decide for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, often, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
On the contention of Valino that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code, it should be noted, however, that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such claim. Further, Rosario equally claimed the same; hence, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish was unclear and indefinite. Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have been created in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.
Under Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to decide for the same, after consulting the other members of the family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of the funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla vs. CA, GR. No. 113725, June 29, 2000
DOCTRINE: The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the, object of the institution, the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.
CASE TITLE: Dr. Jorge Rabadilla vs. CA , GR. No. 113725, June 29, 2000, J. PURISIMA
FACTS
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre.
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. She alleged that defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to Maria Marlena from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
The RTC dismissed without prejudice the complaint being prematurely filed. On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
Hence this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether there was no modal institution, and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution.
HELD
NO. The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the, object of the institution, the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee, but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally act of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.
CASE TITLE: Dr. Jorge Rabadilla vs. CA , GR. No. 113725, June 29, 2000, J. PURISIMA
FACTS
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre.
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. She alleged that defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to Maria Marlena from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
The RTC dismissed without prejudice the complaint being prematurely filed. On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
Hence this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether there was no modal institution, and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution.
HELD
NO. The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the, object of the institution, the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee, but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally act of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.
Nora B. Calalang-Parulan vs. Rosario Calalang-Garcia, GR. No. 184148, June 9, 2014
Doctrine: It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death.
Case Title: Nora B. Calalang-Parulan vs. Rosario Calalang-Garcia GR. No. 184148, June 9, 2014, J. VILLARAMA JR.
Facts
A Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan by petitioners Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang against the respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S. Calalang.
The respondents asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of land against the petitioners. The said lot with an area of 1,266 square meters and specifically identified as Lot 1132, Cad. 333, Bigaa Cadastre situated in Brgy. Burol 2nd, Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan, was allegedly acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio, through succession as the latter’s compulsory heirs.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The first marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio and second marriage with Elvira Calalang after the 1st marriage was dissolved because of the death of the Encarnacion. During the subsistence of the first marriage, their parents acquired the subject land from their maternal grandmother Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however, their parents failed to register the same.
During his second marriage, Pedro filed an application for free patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands. Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such application by claiming sole and exclusive ownership over the land since 1935 and concealing the fact that he had three children with his first spouse. He then sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by both.
The trial court rendered decision in favor of the respondents. The trial court declared that the parcel of land was jointly acquired by the spouses Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio from the parents of the latter. Thus, it was part of the conjugal property of the first marriage of Pedro Calalang. The trial court then ordered all of Pedro’s share to be given to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan on account of the sale. The trial court also ruled that because the application for free patent filed by Pedro Calalang was attended by fraud and misrepresentation, Pedro Calalang should be considered as a trustee of an implied trust. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals reversed the factual findings of the trial court and held that Pedro Calalang was the sole and exclusive owner of the subject parcel of land. It held that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the disputed property was indeed jointly acquired from the parents of Encarnacion Silverio during the first marriage However, applying the rules of succession, Pedro’s heirs namely, Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, Carlito Calalang, Nora B. Calalang-Parulan, Elvira B. Calalang, and Rolando Calalang, succeeded Pedro to the land in equal shares upon his death. Thus, the CA ordered the petitioners to reconvey in favor of the respondents their rightful shares to the land. The CA ruled that the sale by Pedro Calalang to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was fraudulent and fictitious as the vendee was in bad faith and the respondents were unlawfully deprived of their pro indiviso shares over the disputed property.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration. The CA, however, denied their motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the disputed property prior to its transfer to his daughter Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
HELD
The petition is meritorious.
The Supreme Court carefully reviewed the records of this case and sustain the finding of the CA that Pedro Calalang is the sole and exclusive owner of the disputed property.
As correctly pointed out by the CA, a close perusal of the records of this case would show that the records are bereft of any concrete proof to show that the subject property indeed belonged to respondents’ maternal grandparents. The evidence respondents adduced merely consisted of testimonial evidence such as the declaration of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they have been staying on the property as far as she can remember, and that the property was acquired by her parents through purchase from her maternal grandparents. However, she was unable to produce any document to evidence the said sale, nor was she able to present any documentary evidence such as the tax declaration issued in the name of either of her parents. Moreover, we note that the free patent was issued solely in the name of Pedro Calalang and that it was issued more than 30 years after the death of Encarnacion and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage. Thus, we cannot subscribe to respondents’ submission that the subject property originally belonged to the parents of Encarnacion and was acquired by Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion.
It must likewise be noted that in his application for free patent, applicant Pedro Calalang averred that the land was first occupied and cultivated by him since 1935 and that he had planted mango trees, coconut plants, caimito trees, banana plants and seasonal crops and built his house on the subject lot. Thus, having possessed the subject land in the manner and for the period required by law after the dissolution of the first marriage and before the second marriage, the subject property ipso jure became private property and formed part of Pedro Calalang’s exclusive property. It was therefore excluded from the conjugal partnership of gains of the second marriage.
As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey his property in favor of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan by executing a Deed of Sale on February 17, 1984. The CA therefore erred in ruling that Pedro Calalang deprived his heirs of their respective shares over the disputed property when he alienated the same.
It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious donation inter vivas), the respondents have no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived them of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.
Case Title: Nora B. Calalang-Parulan vs. Rosario Calalang-Garcia GR. No. 184148, June 9, 2014, J. VILLARAMA JR.
Facts
A Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan by petitioners Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang against the respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S. Calalang.
The respondents asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of land against the petitioners. The said lot with an area of 1,266 square meters and specifically identified as Lot 1132, Cad. 333, Bigaa Cadastre situated in Brgy. Burol 2nd, Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan, was allegedly acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio, through succession as the latter’s compulsory heirs.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The first marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio and second marriage with Elvira Calalang after the 1st marriage was dissolved because of the death of the Encarnacion. During the subsistence of the first marriage, their parents acquired the subject land from their maternal grandmother Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however, their parents failed to register the same.
During his second marriage, Pedro filed an application for free patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands. Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such application by claiming sole and exclusive ownership over the land since 1935 and concealing the fact that he had three children with his first spouse. He then sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by both.
The trial court rendered decision in favor of the respondents. The trial court declared that the parcel of land was jointly acquired by the spouses Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio from the parents of the latter. Thus, it was part of the conjugal property of the first marriage of Pedro Calalang. The trial court then ordered all of Pedro’s share to be given to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan on account of the sale. The trial court also ruled that because the application for free patent filed by Pedro Calalang was attended by fraud and misrepresentation, Pedro Calalang should be considered as a trustee of an implied trust. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals reversed the factual findings of the trial court and held that Pedro Calalang was the sole and exclusive owner of the subject parcel of land. It held that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the disputed property was indeed jointly acquired from the parents of Encarnacion Silverio during the first marriage However, applying the rules of succession, Pedro’s heirs namely, Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, Carlito Calalang, Nora B. Calalang-Parulan, Elvira B. Calalang, and Rolando Calalang, succeeded Pedro to the land in equal shares upon his death. Thus, the CA ordered the petitioners to reconvey in favor of the respondents their rightful shares to the land. The CA ruled that the sale by Pedro Calalang to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was fraudulent and fictitious as the vendee was in bad faith and the respondents were unlawfully deprived of their pro indiviso shares over the disputed property.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration. The CA, however, denied their motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the disputed property prior to its transfer to his daughter Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
HELD
The petition is meritorious.
The Supreme Court carefully reviewed the records of this case and sustain the finding of the CA that Pedro Calalang is the sole and exclusive owner of the disputed property.
As correctly pointed out by the CA, a close perusal of the records of this case would show that the records are bereft of any concrete proof to show that the subject property indeed belonged to respondents’ maternal grandparents. The evidence respondents adduced merely consisted of testimonial evidence such as the declaration of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they have been staying on the property as far as she can remember, and that the property was acquired by her parents through purchase from her maternal grandparents. However, she was unable to produce any document to evidence the said sale, nor was she able to present any documentary evidence such as the tax declaration issued in the name of either of her parents. Moreover, we note that the free patent was issued solely in the name of Pedro Calalang and that it was issued more than 30 years after the death of Encarnacion and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage. Thus, we cannot subscribe to respondents’ submission that the subject property originally belonged to the parents of Encarnacion and was acquired by Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion.
It must likewise be noted that in his application for free patent, applicant Pedro Calalang averred that the land was first occupied and cultivated by him since 1935 and that he had planted mango trees, coconut plants, caimito trees, banana plants and seasonal crops and built his house on the subject lot. Thus, having possessed the subject land in the manner and for the period required by law after the dissolution of the first marriage and before the second marriage, the subject property ipso jure became private property and formed part of Pedro Calalang’s exclusive property. It was therefore excluded from the conjugal partnership of gains of the second marriage.
As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey his property in favor of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan by executing a Deed of Sale on February 17, 1984. The CA therefore erred in ruling that Pedro Calalang deprived his heirs of their respective shares over the disputed property when he alienated the same.
It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious donation inter vivas), the respondents have no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived them of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.
Saturday, April 10, 2021
Bernardina P. Bartolome vs. SSS, GR. No. 192531, November 12, 2014
Doctrine: It is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption
Case Title: Bernardina P. Bartolome vs. Social Security System, GR. No. 192531, November 12, 2014, J. Velasco Jr.
Facts:
Petitioner Bernardina Bartolome had submitted a death benefits under Presidential Degree 626 (PD 626) with the respondent agency Social Security Services (SSS). She alleged that she is the biological mother of John Colcol, who was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville before its demise in 2008 due to accident. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. However, the SSS denied the claim stating that the petitioner is no longer considered as the parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol based on the documents that were provided with the SSS.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the pension of the death benefits of her biological child despite adoption.
Held
Yes. When Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition for rescission of adoption is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents, if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the “Social Security Law.” While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary – effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
It is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent
Case Title: Bernardina P. Bartolome vs. Social Security System, GR. No. 192531, November 12, 2014, J. Velasco Jr.
Facts:
Petitioner Bernardina Bartolome had submitted a death benefits under Presidential Degree 626 (PD 626) with the respondent agency Social Security Services (SSS). She alleged that she is the biological mother of John Colcol, who was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville before its demise in 2008 due to accident. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. However, the SSS denied the claim stating that the petitioner is no longer considered as the parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol based on the documents that were provided with the SSS.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the pension of the death benefits of her biological child despite adoption.
Held
Yes. When Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition for rescission of adoption is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents, if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the “Social Security Law.” While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary – effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
It is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent
Tadeo-Matias vs. Republic, GR. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
Doctrine: A reading of Article 41 of the Family Code shows that the presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law.
Case Title: Estrellita Tadeo-Matias vs. Republic GR. No. 230751; April 25, 2018, J. Velasco Jr.
Facts
On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wilfredo N. Matias.
She alleged that Wilfredo continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their conjugal home to again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary and that it never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or communicated with the petitioner nor to his relatives; according to the service record of Wilfredo issued by the National Police Commission, Wilfredo was already declared missing since 1979. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding her beloved husband Wilfredo, but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts, neither did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army.
She further alleged that Weeks became years and years became decades, but the petitioner never gave up hope, and after more than three (3) decades of awaiting, the petitioner is still hopeful, but the times had been tough on her, especially with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive. According to her, the reason why she filed the petition is to claim for the benefits under P.D. 1638 which requires is for a proof of death or at least declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court.
The RTC issued a Decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the petition. On the other hand, the Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiorari. On November 28, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition of the Republic and setting aside the decision of the RTC. According to CA, the RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead based on Article 41 of the Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC does not apply to the instant petition as it was clear that petitioner does not seek to remarry.
In further held that be that as it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC is without authority to take cognizance of a petition whose sole purpose is to have a person declared presumptively dead under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code. As been held by jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391 of theCivil Code merely express rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead — which presumption may be invoked in any action or proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject of an independent action or proceeding. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence, this appeal.
Issue
Whether Petitioner can validly be granted the judicial declaration of presumptive death.
Held
No. Petitioner erred in filing for judicial declaration of presumptive death which is not a viable suit. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner is not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's decision must, therefore, be set aside. Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.
Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any authority to take cognizance of the same.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following guidelines-culled from relevant law and jurisprudential pronouncements-to aid the public, PVAO and the AFP in making or dealing with claims of death benefits which are similar to that of the petitioner:
1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier without requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of such soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make their own determination, based on the evidence presented by the claimant, whether the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not.
It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of law, without need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions mentioned in the said articles are established. Hence, requiring the claimant to further secure a court declaration to establish the presumptive death of a missing soldier is not proper and contravenes established jurisprudence on the matter.
2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the PVAO or the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may be, any "evidence"21 which shows that the concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and or under the circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the "evidence" referred to excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.
3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence submitted by the claimant and determine their sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions specified under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the presumption of death to arise. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is sufficient, they should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay the latter's claim.
4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not sufficient to invoke the presumption of death under the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by reason thereof, the claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Court. And finally, should such recourse still fail, the claimant may file an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Case Title: Estrellita Tadeo-Matias vs. Republic GR. No. 230751; April 25, 2018, J. Velasco Jr.
Facts
On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wilfredo N. Matias.
She alleged that Wilfredo continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their conjugal home to again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary and that it never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or communicated with the petitioner nor to his relatives; according to the service record of Wilfredo issued by the National Police Commission, Wilfredo was already declared missing since 1979. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding her beloved husband Wilfredo, but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts, neither did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army.
She further alleged that Weeks became years and years became decades, but the petitioner never gave up hope, and after more than three (3) decades of awaiting, the petitioner is still hopeful, but the times had been tough on her, especially with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive. According to her, the reason why she filed the petition is to claim for the benefits under P.D. 1638 which requires is for a proof of death or at least declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court.
The RTC issued a Decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the petition. On the other hand, the Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiorari. On November 28, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition of the Republic and setting aside the decision of the RTC. According to CA, the RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead based on Article 41 of the Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC does not apply to the instant petition as it was clear that petitioner does not seek to remarry.
In further held that be that as it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC is without authority to take cognizance of a petition whose sole purpose is to have a person declared presumptively dead under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code. As been held by jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391 of theCivil Code merely express rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead — which presumption may be invoked in any action or proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject of an independent action or proceeding. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence, this appeal.
Issue
Whether Petitioner can validly be granted the judicial declaration of presumptive death.
Held
No. Petitioner erred in filing for judicial declaration of presumptive death which is not a viable suit. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner is not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's decision must, therefore, be set aside. Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.
Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any authority to take cognizance of the same.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following guidelines-culled from relevant law and jurisprudential pronouncements-to aid the public, PVAO and the AFP in making or dealing with claims of death benefits which are similar to that of the petitioner:
1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier without requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of such soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make their own determination, based on the evidence presented by the claimant, whether the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not.
It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of law, without need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions mentioned in the said articles are established. Hence, requiring the claimant to further secure a court declaration to establish the presumptive death of a missing soldier is not proper and contravenes established jurisprudence on the matter.
2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the PVAO or the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may be, any "evidence"21 which shows that the concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and or under the circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the "evidence" referred to excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.
3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence submitted by the claimant and determine their sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions specified under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the presumption of death to arise. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is sufficient, they should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay the latter's claim.
4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not sufficient to invoke the presumption of death under the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by reason thereof, the claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Court. And finally, should such recourse still fail, the claimant may file an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Salitico vs. Heirs of Felix, GR. No. 240199, April 10, 2019
DOCTRINE: Article 777 operates at the very moment of the decedent’s death meaning that the transmission by succession occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore, at that precise time, the heir is already legally deemed to have acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance, “and not at the time of declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution.”
CASE TITLE: Salitico vs. Heirs of Felix GR. No. 240199, April 10, 2019, J. CAGUIOA
FACTS
Amanda Burgos is the registered owner of a 1,413-square-meter parcel of land registered in her name under Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) P-1908, located in Bambang, Bulacan (subject property). By virtue of a document entitled Huling Habilin ni Amanda H. Burgos dated May 7, 1986 (Huling Habilin), the subject property was inherited by the niece of Amanda, Resurreccion Martinez-Felix, as a devisee.
Thereafter, Resurreccion, as the new owner of the subject property, executed a document entitled Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa dated November 10, 1998, which transferred ownership over the parcel of land in favor of the petitioners Isidro and Conrada Salitico (Sps Salitico). The latter then took physical possession of the subject property.
Subsequently, a proceeding for the probate of the Huling Habilin was undertaken before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The probate was granted. Thereafter, the petitioners Sps. Salitico received a demand letter requiring them to vacate the subject property and surrender possession over it to the respondents’ heirs. To protect their interest over the subject property, the petitioners Sps. Salitico executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated March 17, 2009, which was however denied registration by the respondent RD on November 3, 2009.
Spouses Salitico file a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against respondents Heirs of Resurreccion Martinez Felix before the RTC. However,RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. The RTC held that the action filed by the petitioners Sps. Salitico is premature on the ground that it was not shown that the Probate Court had already fully settled the Estate of Amanda, even as it was not disputed that the Huling Habilin had already been allowed and certified. Hence, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for the sole reason that the petitioners Sps. Salitico's cause of action had supposedly not yet accrued, as the Estate of Amanda has not yet been fully settled by the Probate Court.
Petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in the RTC. Hence, the petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal, which was granted by the RTC on June 18, 2015. The appeal was given due course by the Court of Appeal (CA). The CA dismissed the appeal due to the pendency of the probate proceedings before the Probate Court, citing Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states that no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. The CA also cited Rule 90, Section 1, which states that no distribution shall be allowed until the payment of debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax have been made, unless the distributees or any of them give a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned on the payment of the said obligations.
Hence, this appeal via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Spouse Salitico can compel the heirs to transfer the certificate of title to their name by virtue of the valid sale that they have with Resurrecion.
HELD
The instant Petition is partly meritorious.
It is not disputed that by virtue of the decedent Amanda's will, i.e., Huling Habilin, Resurreccion inherited the subject property as the designated devisee. The respondents’ heirs themselves admit that Resurreccion is a testamentary heir of Amanda. It is likewise not disputed that Resurreccion sold her interest over the subject property by executing a document entitled Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico who then proceeded to take physical possession of the subject property.
Article 777 of the Civil Code, which is substantive law, states that the rights of the inheritance are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Article 777 operates at the very moment of the decedent's death ¬ meaning that the transmission by succession occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore, at that precise time, the heir is already legally deemed to have acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance, "and not at the time of declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution." Thus, there is no legal bar to an heir disposing of his/her hereditary share immediately after such death.
As applied to the instant case, upon the death of Amanda, Resurreccion became the absolute owner of the devised subject property, subject to a resolutory condition that upon settlement of Amanda's Estate, the devise is not declared inofficious or excessive. Hence, there was no legal bar preventing Resurreccion from entering a contract of sale with the petitioners Sps. Salitico with respect to the former's share or interest over the subject property.
In a contract of sale, the parties' obligations are plain and simple. The law obliges the vendor to transfer the ownership of and to deliver the thing that is the object of sale to the vendee. Therefore, considering that a valid sale has been entered into in the instant case, there is no reason for the respondents’ heirs to withhold from the petitioners Sps. Salitico the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908. However, the existence of a valid sale in the instant case does not necessarily mean that the Registry of Deeds may already be compelled to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
According to Section 92 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, with respect to the transfer of properties subject of testate or intestate proceedings, a new certificate of title in the name of the transferee shall be issued by the Register of Deeds (RD) only upon the submission of a certified copy of the partition and distribution, together with the final judgment or order of the court approving the same or otherwise making final distribution, supported by evidence of payment of estate tax or exemption therefrom, as the case may be.
Hence, under the applicable provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of Court, it is only upon the issuance by the testate or intestate court of the final order of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of the final distribution that the certificate of title covering the subject property may be issued in the name of the distributees.
In the instant case, there is no showing that, in the pendency of the settlement of the Estate of Amanda, the Probate Court had issued an order of final distribution or an order in anticipation of a final distribution, both of which the law deems as requirements before the Registry of Deeds can issue a new certificate of title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
To clarify, this holding does not go against Article 777 of the Civil Code whatsoever. What the aforesaid Civil Code provision signifies is that there is no legal bar preventing an heir from disposing his/her hereditary share and transferring such share to another person, since the right thereto is vested or transmitted to the heir from the moment of the death of the decedent or testator. The rule, however, does not state that the transferee may already compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering the specific property in his/her name.
Hence, reading Article 777 of the Civil Code together with the pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of Court, while an heir may dispose and transfer his/her hereditary share to another person, before the transferee may compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering specific property in his/her name, a final order of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of the final distribution issued by the testate or intestate court must first be had.
Therefore, despite the existence of a valid contract of sale between Resurreccion and the petitioners Sps. Salitico, which ordinarily would warrant the delivery of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 in favor of the latter, pending the final settlement of the Estate of Amanda, and absent any order of final distribution or an order in anticipation of a final distribution from the Probate Court, the RD cannot be compelled at this time to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new certificate of title in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
CASE TITLE: Salitico vs. Heirs of Felix GR. No. 240199, April 10, 2019, J. CAGUIOA
FACTS
Amanda Burgos is the registered owner of a 1,413-square-meter parcel of land registered in her name under Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) P-1908, located in Bambang, Bulacan (subject property). By virtue of a document entitled Huling Habilin ni Amanda H. Burgos dated May 7, 1986 (Huling Habilin), the subject property was inherited by the niece of Amanda, Resurreccion Martinez-Felix, as a devisee.
Thereafter, Resurreccion, as the new owner of the subject property, executed a document entitled Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa dated November 10, 1998, which transferred ownership over the parcel of land in favor of the petitioners Isidro and Conrada Salitico (Sps Salitico). The latter then took physical possession of the subject property.
Subsequently, a proceeding for the probate of the Huling Habilin was undertaken before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The probate was granted. Thereafter, the petitioners Sps. Salitico received a demand letter requiring them to vacate the subject property and surrender possession over it to the respondents’ heirs. To protect their interest over the subject property, the petitioners Sps. Salitico executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated March 17, 2009, which was however denied registration by the respondent RD on November 3, 2009.
Spouses Salitico file a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against respondents Heirs of Resurreccion Martinez Felix before the RTC. However,RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. The RTC held that the action filed by the petitioners Sps. Salitico is premature on the ground that it was not shown that the Probate Court had already fully settled the Estate of Amanda, even as it was not disputed that the Huling Habilin had already been allowed and certified. Hence, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for the sole reason that the petitioners Sps. Salitico's cause of action had supposedly not yet accrued, as the Estate of Amanda has not yet been fully settled by the Probate Court.
Petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in the RTC. Hence, the petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal, which was granted by the RTC on June 18, 2015. The appeal was given due course by the Court of Appeal (CA). The CA dismissed the appeal due to the pendency of the probate proceedings before the Probate Court, citing Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states that no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. The CA also cited Rule 90, Section 1, which states that no distribution shall be allowed until the payment of debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax have been made, unless the distributees or any of them give a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned on the payment of the said obligations.
Hence, this appeal via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Spouse Salitico can compel the heirs to transfer the certificate of title to their name by virtue of the valid sale that they have with Resurrecion.
HELD
The instant Petition is partly meritorious.
It is not disputed that by virtue of the decedent Amanda's will, i.e., Huling Habilin, Resurreccion inherited the subject property as the designated devisee. The respondents’ heirs themselves admit that Resurreccion is a testamentary heir of Amanda. It is likewise not disputed that Resurreccion sold her interest over the subject property by executing a document entitled Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico who then proceeded to take physical possession of the subject property.
Article 777 of the Civil Code, which is substantive law, states that the rights of the inheritance are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Article 777 operates at the very moment of the decedent's death ¬ meaning that the transmission by succession occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore, at that precise time, the heir is already legally deemed to have acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance, "and not at the time of declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution." Thus, there is no legal bar to an heir disposing of his/her hereditary share immediately after such death.
As applied to the instant case, upon the death of Amanda, Resurreccion became the absolute owner of the devised subject property, subject to a resolutory condition that upon settlement of Amanda's Estate, the devise is not declared inofficious or excessive. Hence, there was no legal bar preventing Resurreccion from entering a contract of sale with the petitioners Sps. Salitico with respect to the former's share or interest over the subject property.
In a contract of sale, the parties' obligations are plain and simple. The law obliges the vendor to transfer the ownership of and to deliver the thing that is the object of sale to the vendee. Therefore, considering that a valid sale has been entered into in the instant case, there is no reason for the respondents’ heirs to withhold from the petitioners Sps. Salitico the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908. However, the existence of a valid sale in the instant case does not necessarily mean that the Registry of Deeds may already be compelled to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
According to Section 92 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, with respect to the transfer of properties subject of testate or intestate proceedings, a new certificate of title in the name of the transferee shall be issued by the Register of Deeds (RD) only upon the submission of a certified copy of the partition and distribution, together with the final judgment or order of the court approving the same or otherwise making final distribution, supported by evidence of payment of estate tax or exemption therefrom, as the case may be.
Hence, under the applicable provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of Court, it is only upon the issuance by the testate or intestate court of the final order of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of the final distribution that the certificate of title covering the subject property may be issued in the name of the distributees.
In the instant case, there is no showing that, in the pendency of the settlement of the Estate of Amanda, the Probate Court had issued an order of final distribution or an order in anticipation of a final distribution, both of which the law deems as requirements before the Registry of Deeds can issue a new certificate of title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
To clarify, this holding does not go against Article 777 of the Civil Code whatsoever. What the aforesaid Civil Code provision signifies is that there is no legal bar preventing an heir from disposing his/her hereditary share and transferring such share to another person, since the right thereto is vested or transmitted to the heir from the moment of the death of the decedent or testator. The rule, however, does not state that the transferee may already compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering the specific property in his/her name.
Hence, reading Article 777 of the Civil Code together with the pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of Court, while an heir may dispose and transfer his/her hereditary share to another person, before the transferee may compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering specific property in his/her name, a final order of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of the final distribution issued by the testate or intestate court must first be had.
Therefore, despite the existence of a valid contract of sale between Resurreccion and the petitioners Sps. Salitico, which ordinarily would warrant the delivery of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 in favor of the latter, pending the final settlement of the Estate of Amanda, and absent any order of final distribution or an order in anticipation of a final distribution from the Probate Court, the RD cannot be compelled at this time to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new certificate of title in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
Dolores Hacbang vs. Atty. Basilio Alo
GR.No. 191031
October 5, 2015
DOCTRINE: A person without compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate, either in part or in its entirety, in favor of anyone capacitated to succeed him; if the testator has compulsory heirs, he can dispose of his property provided he does not impair their legitimes.
CASE TITLE: Dolores Hacbang vs. Atty. Basilio Alo, GR.No. 191031, October 5, 2015, J. Brio
FACTS
On 3 April 1937, Bishop Sofronio Hacbang (Bishop Sofronio) died leaving several properties behind. Among these was a Lot located at España Street, San Juan, Rizal. Bishop Sofronio was survived by his parents, Basilio and Maria Hacbang, and his siblings. The respondent Basilio Alo (Basilio) is the son of petitioner Dolores Hacbang who is Bishop Sofronio’s sister.
Bishop Sofronio left a will denominated as Ultima Voluntad y Testamento. He left one-half of his properties to his parents and devised the other half — including the subject lot — to his sister Dolores. His last will and testament were probated and a transfer certificate of title to the subject land has been issued to respondent.
Petitioners filed a petition to cancel title issued to respondent on the ground that it was fraudulently secured. Basilio denied all allegations of irregularity and wrongdoing. He also moved to dismiss the petition because the petitioners were neither heirs nor devisees of Bishop Sofronio and had no legal interest in the subject lot.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the petition because the petitioners had no right to prosecute the case on the subject lot. The RTC noted that Bishop Sofronio’s will have already been admitted into probate in 1937; thus, the intrinsic validity of the will is no longer in question. Though the settlement proceedings were archived, Bishop Sofronio already designated his heirs: Bishop Sofronio’s parents were compulsory heirs entitled to half of his estate while the respondent’s mother, Dolores Hacbang Alo, was devised the remaining half (the free portion). Thus, the petitioners, who are neither compulsory nor testamentary heirs, are not real parties-in-interest.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that: (1) Bishop Sofronio’s will did not validly transfer the subject property to Dolores Hacbang Alo; (2) the probate of the will is not conclusive as to the validity of its intrinsic provisions; and (3) only a final decree of distribution of the estate vests title on the properties from the estate on the distributees.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s order of dismissal. The CA held that the admission of Bishop Sofronio’s will to probate precluded intestate succession unless the will was intrinsically invalid or failed to completely dispose of his estate. Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the settlement proceedings were not dismissed but archived; the will did not lose its validity merely because the proceedings were archived. Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate.
The CA denied the petitioners’ claim to a right of inheritance by representation. It held that the presence of Bishop Sofronio’s parents during his death excluded his brothers and sisters from being compulsory heirs; the petitioners cannot represent those who are not entitled to succeed. Considering that they are neither compulsory nor testamentary heirs, petitioners have no legal interest in the subject property.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the CA denied on 21 January 2010. The denial paved the way for the petitioners to file the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not Bishop Sofronio died intestate.
HELD
No. Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. He left a will that was probated in 1937. He left half of his properties to his parents and the remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang Alo. The admission of his will to probate is conclusive with respect to its due execution and extrinsic validity.
Our jurisdiction has always respected a decedent's freedom to dispose of his estate, whether under the Spanish Civil Code or under the present Civil Code.
This provision states that a person without compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate, either in part or in its entirety, in favor of anyone capacitated to succeed him; if the testator has compulsory heirs, he can dispose of his property provided he does not impair their legitimes. This provision was later translated and adopted as Article 842 of our Civil Code.
Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition. Hence, testate succession has always been preferred over intestacy. As much as possible, a testator's will is treated and interpreted in a way that would render all of its provisions operative. Hence, there is no basis to apply the provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently applies.
CASE TITLE: Dolores Hacbang vs. Atty. Basilio Alo, GR.No. 191031, October 5, 2015, J. Brio
FACTS
On 3 April 1937, Bishop Sofronio Hacbang (Bishop Sofronio) died leaving several properties behind. Among these was a Lot located at España Street, San Juan, Rizal. Bishop Sofronio was survived by his parents, Basilio and Maria Hacbang, and his siblings. The respondent Basilio Alo (Basilio) is the son of petitioner Dolores Hacbang who is Bishop Sofronio’s sister.
Bishop Sofronio left a will denominated as Ultima Voluntad y Testamento. He left one-half of his properties to his parents and devised the other half — including the subject lot — to his sister Dolores. His last will and testament were probated and a transfer certificate of title to the subject land has been issued to respondent.
Petitioners filed a petition to cancel title issued to respondent on the ground that it was fraudulently secured. Basilio denied all allegations of irregularity and wrongdoing. He also moved to dismiss the petition because the petitioners were neither heirs nor devisees of Bishop Sofronio and had no legal interest in the subject lot.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the petition because the petitioners had no right to prosecute the case on the subject lot. The RTC noted that Bishop Sofronio’s will have already been admitted into probate in 1937; thus, the intrinsic validity of the will is no longer in question. Though the settlement proceedings were archived, Bishop Sofronio already designated his heirs: Bishop Sofronio’s parents were compulsory heirs entitled to half of his estate while the respondent’s mother, Dolores Hacbang Alo, was devised the remaining half (the free portion). Thus, the petitioners, who are neither compulsory nor testamentary heirs, are not real parties-in-interest.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that: (1) Bishop Sofronio’s will did not validly transfer the subject property to Dolores Hacbang Alo; (2) the probate of the will is not conclusive as to the validity of its intrinsic provisions; and (3) only a final decree of distribution of the estate vests title on the properties from the estate on the distributees.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s order of dismissal. The CA held that the admission of Bishop Sofronio’s will to probate precluded intestate succession unless the will was intrinsically invalid or failed to completely dispose of his estate. Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the settlement proceedings were not dismissed but archived; the will did not lose its validity merely because the proceedings were archived. Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate.
The CA denied the petitioners’ claim to a right of inheritance by representation. It held that the presence of Bishop Sofronio’s parents during his death excluded his brothers and sisters from being compulsory heirs; the petitioners cannot represent those who are not entitled to succeed. Considering that they are neither compulsory nor testamentary heirs, petitioners have no legal interest in the subject property.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the CA denied on 21 January 2010. The denial paved the way for the petitioners to file the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not Bishop Sofronio died intestate.
HELD
No. Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. He left a will that was probated in 1937. He left half of his properties to his parents and the remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang Alo. The admission of his will to probate is conclusive with respect to its due execution and extrinsic validity.
Our jurisdiction has always respected a decedent's freedom to dispose of his estate, whether under the Spanish Civil Code or under the present Civil Code.
This provision states that a person without compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate, either in part or in its entirety, in favor of anyone capacitated to succeed him; if the testator has compulsory heirs, he can dispose of his property provided he does not impair their legitimes. This provision was later translated and adopted as Article 842 of our Civil Code.
Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition. Hence, testate succession has always been preferred over intestacy. As much as possible, a testator's will is treated and interpreted in a way that would render all of its provisions operative. Hence, there is no basis to apply the provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently applies.
Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc v Military Shrine Services - Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, Department of National Defense
Doctrines: The requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided.
Case Title: Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc v Military Shrine Services - Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, Department of National Defense, G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013, CJ Sereno
Facts:
By virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
Later, this proclamation has been amended by Proclamation No. 2476 which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730. At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum that the new proclamation includes Western Bicutan. Unfortunately, when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette, this handwritten addendum was not included.
To prevent the increasing number of informal settlers who are occupying some areas of Fort Bonifacio including some portion of the Libingan ng mga Bayani, General Order No. 1323 was promulgated which created Task Force Bantay (TFB). Demolition of illegal structures existed to prevent the area from the increasing number of informal settlers.
Members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) and Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed for a Petition with Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) praying for the reclassification of the areas they are occupying as is already alienable and disposable and for the distribution and sale by the Land Management Bureau’s of the subject lands to its bona fide occupants.
COSLAP ruled that the portion of lands in question are inalienable and disposable even though the handwritten addendum was not included on the publication. According to them, the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. NMSMI and WBLOAI filed Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Hence this present petition.
Issue/s:
Whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos in Proclamation No.2476 has the force and effect of law even if it is not included in the publication of the said law which classifies the questioned lands as alienable and disposable.
Held:
The handwritten addendum does not have the force and effect of law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. The requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication in the Official Gazette but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with.
The Supreme Court hold that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, the Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect. Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority."
Thus, whether President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.
Case Title: Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc v Military Shrine Services - Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, Department of National Defense, G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013, CJ Sereno
Facts:
By virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
Later, this proclamation has been amended by Proclamation No. 2476 which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730. At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum that the new proclamation includes Western Bicutan. Unfortunately, when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette, this handwritten addendum was not included.
To prevent the increasing number of informal settlers who are occupying some areas of Fort Bonifacio including some portion of the Libingan ng mga Bayani, General Order No. 1323 was promulgated which created Task Force Bantay (TFB). Demolition of illegal structures existed to prevent the area from the increasing number of informal settlers.
Members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) and Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed for a Petition with Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) praying for the reclassification of the areas they are occupying as is already alienable and disposable and for the distribution and sale by the Land Management Bureau’s of the subject lands to its bona fide occupants.
COSLAP ruled that the portion of lands in question are inalienable and disposable even though the handwritten addendum was not included on the publication. According to them, the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. NMSMI and WBLOAI filed Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Hence this present petition.
Issue/s:
Whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos in Proclamation No.2476 has the force and effect of law even if it is not included in the publication of the said law which classifies the questioned lands as alienable and disposable.
Held:
The handwritten addendum does not have the force and effect of law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. The requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication in the Official Gazette but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with.
The Supreme Court hold that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, the Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect. Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority."
Thus, whether President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.
Orion Savings Bank vs. Suzuki,
GR No. 205487
November 12, 2014,
J.Brion
Doctrine: Real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. (Lex Loci Rei Sitae)
Case Title: Orion Savings Bank vs. Suzuki, GR No. 205487 November 12, 2014, J.Brion
Facts:
Respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki) purchased a condominium unit and a parking lot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder. After paying the full amount, he demanded Kang for the delivery of the titles to the properties which during that time were allegedly in possession of Orion Bank’s Loans Officer Alexander Perez. Despite his demands, the titles were not delivered to him. He found out that Kang had left the country. It prompted him to check on the status of the properties. He learned that the documents representing the title to the properties had no existing encumbrance, except for an annotation which provided that any conveyance or encumbrance of the property shall be subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA). Aside from these annotations, it also contained a cancelled entry for a mortgage loan with petitioner, Orion Savings Bank for one million pesos.
Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez. To protect his interests, Suzuki then executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and demanded delivery of the titles, but Perez refused.
Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Kang and Orion. According to Perez, Kang had obtained another loan and when he failed to pay, a Dacion en Pago has been executed in favor of petitioner. However, the Dacion en Pago was not duly registered not until it has to the knowledge of Suzuki.
The court ruled in favor of Suzuki and ordered petitioner to deliver the titles. The court found that Suzuki was an innocent purchaser for value whose rights over the properties prevailed over Orion’s and that Suzuki has exerted efforts to verify the status of the properties, but he did not find any existing encumbrance in the titles. Although Orion claims to have purchased the property by way of a Dacion en Pago, they never bothered to register or annotate it.
On their appeal, the petitioner contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void because under the Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses.
The CA upheld Suzuki’s right over the properties. Petitioner filed then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Hence this present petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Korean Law should be applied in conveying the conjugal property of spouses Kang.
Held:
Korean law cannot be applied on this case. The Supreme Court ruled that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the
laws of the country or state where it is located. The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility. This general principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other conveyances.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by their national laws. According to the Supreme Court the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the same to the court. Applying the words of the Supreme Court in this case, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated by the seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Since the South Korean law was not properly pleaded and proven, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play in this case. The doctrine provides that where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.
The Supreme Court has held in numerous cases that registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community property. In those cases, however, there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community properties. Accordingly, they see no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.
Case Title: Orion Savings Bank vs. Suzuki, GR No. 205487 November 12, 2014, J.Brion
Facts:
Respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki) purchased a condominium unit and a parking lot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder. After paying the full amount, he demanded Kang for the delivery of the titles to the properties which during that time were allegedly in possession of Orion Bank’s Loans Officer Alexander Perez. Despite his demands, the titles were not delivered to him. He found out that Kang had left the country. It prompted him to check on the status of the properties. He learned that the documents representing the title to the properties had no existing encumbrance, except for an annotation which provided that any conveyance or encumbrance of the property shall be subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA). Aside from these annotations, it also contained a cancelled entry for a mortgage loan with petitioner, Orion Savings Bank for one million pesos.
Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez. To protect his interests, Suzuki then executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and demanded delivery of the titles, but Perez refused.
Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Kang and Orion. According to Perez, Kang had obtained another loan and when he failed to pay, a Dacion en Pago has been executed in favor of petitioner. However, the Dacion en Pago was not duly registered not until it has to the knowledge of Suzuki.
The court ruled in favor of Suzuki and ordered petitioner to deliver the titles. The court found that Suzuki was an innocent purchaser for value whose rights over the properties prevailed over Orion’s and that Suzuki has exerted efforts to verify the status of the properties, but he did not find any existing encumbrance in the titles. Although Orion claims to have purchased the property by way of a Dacion en Pago, they never bothered to register or annotate it.
On their appeal, the petitioner contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void because under the Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses.
The CA upheld Suzuki’s right over the properties. Petitioner filed then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Hence this present petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Korean Law should be applied in conveying the conjugal property of spouses Kang.
Held:
Korean law cannot be applied on this case. The Supreme Court ruled that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the
laws of the country or state where it is located. The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility. This general principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other conveyances.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by their national laws. According to the Supreme Court the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the same to the court. Applying the words of the Supreme Court in this case, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated by the seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Since the South Korean law was not properly pleaded and proven, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play in this case. The doctrine provides that where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.
The Supreme Court has held in numerous cases that registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community property. In those cases, however, there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community properties. Accordingly, they see no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.
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