DOCTRINE
The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care."
When an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.
FACTS
Petitioner Jessica Maitim and respondent Maria Theresa P. Aguila were residents of Grand Pacific Manor Townhouse. Their respective townhouse units are approximately nine meters apart, separated only by a driveway jointly used by the townhouse unit owners.
On April 25, 2006, Maitim was on board her vehicle, a Ford W-150 Chateau Wagon registered under her name, which was being driven by Restituto Santos, her driver for 12 years. While they were driving along the common driveway, Angela, the six-year old daughter of Aguila, was sideswiped by Maitim's vehicle. Angela was dragged for about three meters resulting to her right leg being fractured.
Maitim and Santos did not immediately take Angela to the hospital after the incident; she was only brought to St. Luke's Medical Center after the insistence of Angela's grandmother, Lirio Aguila. Angela was diagnosed to have suffered swelling, hematoma,multiple abrasions, and displaced, complete fracture on the right leg. Thus, she underwent operation at Asian Hospital and was in a wheelchair from April 25, 2006 to July 18, 2006.
The incident was referred to the barangay for conciliation but only Aguila appeared. At this point, Aguila's actual expenses amounted to P169,187.32. Aguila then sent demand letters to Maitim and Santos to no avail. Thus, Aguila filed the instant action for damages based on quasi-delict before the RTC.
In her defense, Maitim denied Aguila's accusations and claimed that on, while she was in her vehicle being driven slowly by Santos, Angela suddenly came running and due to this, the latter's right leg was sideswiped and got fractured. Maitim alleged that her vehicle was covered by a comprehensive insurance that included third-party liability, but she was not able to file for insurance claim due to Aguila's refusal to submit the necessary documents, i.e., police report, medical report, and receipts of actual expenses. Furthermore, Maitim maintained that Santos, who was her driver for 12 years, was driving with care at the time of the incident, and thus, Maitim should not be made liable for vicarious liability because she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employee.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Aguila. The RTC held that Santos was presumed to be negligent, applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and that Maitim was vicariously liable for her failure to prove that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employee, Santos.
CA denied Maitim's appeal and affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Maitim and Santos are solidarily liable for damages, and that there was no contributory negligence on the part of Aguila and her daughter. Aguila did not commit any negligence in allowing Angela to exit
their door towards the car garage since they were still within the premises of their residence, and not on the street where vehicles ordinarily drive by. Moreover, the CA cited the case of Jarco Marketing Corporation v. CA which established that children under nine years of age are conclusively presumed in our jurisdiction to be incapable of contributory negligence. This supported its conclusion that Angela, being merely six-years old at the time of the incident, cannot be liable for contributory negligence as she is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence.
1. Whether Maitim is solidarily liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability.
2. Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of Aguila.
RULING
1. YES. First, the RTC correctly applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when it ruled that Santos should be presumed negligent, and thus, had the burden of proving such presumption otherwise.
In UPCB General Insurance Co. v. Pascual Liner, Inc., this Court reiterated the applicability of res ipsa loquitur in vehicular accidents, wherein it is sufficient that the accident itself be established, and once established through the admission of evidence,
whether hearsay or not, the rule on res ipsa loquitur already starts to apply.
As applied in the instant case, the fact that Angela was hit by a moving vehicle owned by Maitim and driven by Santos is undisputed, and the same is supported by the Traffic Accident Investigation Report dated April 25, 2006. The fact that Angela sustained injuries in her collision with Maitim's vehicle is also not in question. Thus, since it is clearly established that there was a vehicular accident that caused injuries, then the rule on res ipsa loquitur shall apply. An inference of negligence on the part of Santos, the person who controls the instrumentality (vehicle) causing the injury, arises, and he has the burden of presenting proof to the contrary.
As will be discussed below, this Court finds that the lower courts justly held that Santos failed to discharge this burden and consequently, the presumption of negligence lodged towards him shall stand. Ordinarily, driving inside a relatively narrow driveway shared by two houses would not result to children being hit and their bones fractured. This is because a reasonably prudent man, especially an alleged experienced driver, would have foreseen that the residents of the houses may exit towards the common driveway anytime, including young and playful children who may suddenly run across or along said driveway. Thus, a reasonably prudent man is expected to drive with utmost caution when traversing the said driveway, even if given a "clear" signal by a guard.
In fact, Maitim herself admits that there is a natural tendency to drive at a slow speed when in a narrow driveway. However, her allegation that Santos was driving at a slow speed, which is admittedly "natural," contradicts the circumstances surrounding Angela's injury. If Santos truly drove slowly and with care, he should have been able to have ample opportunity to brake or otherwise steer the vehicle out of trouble, both of which did not happen in this case.
Sunday, August 6, 2023
Ruperta Palaganas vs. Ernesto Palaganas
GR. No. 169144, January 26, 2011, J. ABAD
DOCTRINE: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution
CASE TITLE: Ruperta Palaganas vs. Ernesto Palaganas GR. No. 169144, January 26, 2011, J. ABAD
FACTS
Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament, she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S. Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.1 On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate. The RTC issued an order:2 (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. The CA rendered a decision, affirming the assailed order of the RTC,5 holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. ISSUE Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed. HELD Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country. Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. Therefore, the rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
CASE TITLE: Ruperta Palaganas vs. Ernesto Palaganas GR. No. 169144, January 26, 2011, J. ABAD
FACTS
Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament, she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S. Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.1 On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate. The RTC issued an order:2 (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. The CA rendered a decision, affirming the assailed order of the RTC,5 holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. ISSUE Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed. HELD Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country. Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. Therefore, the rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
Monday, April 12, 2021
Danilo Aluad vs. Zenaido Aluad GR. No. 176943, October 17, 2008, J. CARPIO MORALES
DOCTRINE: The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.
CASE TITLE: Danilo Aluad vs. Zenaido Aluad GR. No. 176943, October 17, 2008, J. CARPIO MORALES
FACTS
Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin). Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" (Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners’ mother Maria3 covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin.
On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 were issued in Matilde’s name. On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property. Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament, devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her "remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to respondent.
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year.7 On August 21, 1995, Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint, for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against respondent.
Respondent filed an Amended Answer contending, inter alia, that the Deed of Donation is forged and falsified. The trial court, by Decision of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she is having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, it is holding that the Deed of Donation was a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code.
While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot No. 676, it did not so declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as Matilde’s last will and testament had not yet been probated.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed the present Petition for Review. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in favor of petitioners’ mother is in fact a donation mortis causa.
HELD
Yes. The Supreme Court finds the donation to petitioners’ mother one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive. (2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners’ mother during her (Matilde’s) lifetime.
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria.42 Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matilde’s) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.
CASE TITLE: Danilo Aluad vs. Zenaido Aluad GR. No. 176943, October 17, 2008, J. CARPIO MORALES
FACTS
Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin). Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" (Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners’ mother Maria3 covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin.
On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 were issued in Matilde’s name. On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property. Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament, devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her "remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to respondent.
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year.7 On August 21, 1995, Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint, for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against respondent.
Respondent filed an Amended Answer contending, inter alia, that the Deed of Donation is forged and falsified. The trial court, by Decision of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she is having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, it is holding that the Deed of Donation was a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code.
While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot No. 676, it did not so declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as Matilde’s last will and testament had not yet been probated.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed the present Petition for Review. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in favor of petitioners’ mother is in fact a donation mortis causa.
HELD
Yes. The Supreme Court finds the donation to petitioners’ mother one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive. (2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners’ mother during her (Matilde’s) lifetime.
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria.42 Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matilde’s) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.
Sunday, April 11, 2021
Antonio Baltazar vs. Lorenzo Laxa, GR. No. 174489, April 11, 2012
DOCTRINE: The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound to render him unfit to execute a Will.
CASE TITLE: Antonio Baltazar vs. Lorenzo Laxa, GR. No. 174489, April 11, 2012, J. DEL CASTILLO
FACTS
Paciencia was a 78-year-old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala" (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa. More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition14 with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his Favor.
Petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.
Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the Regional Trial Court to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will.
Rosie Mateo, one of the petitioners, testified that Paciencia was referred to as “magulyan” or forgetful, because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it.Moments later, hence she was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of its execution.
The RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition and disallowed the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala. The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTC’s conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being ‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound so as to render Paciencia unfit for executing a Will."
ISSUE
Whether or not Pacencia had no testamentary capacity to execute her last will and testament for having been forgetful.
HELD
No. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound to render him unfit to execute a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. As provided under Art. 799 of the Civil Code, to be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury, or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. Furthermore, Rosie’s conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan was only based on her personal assessment in contrast to Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will.
The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent. Lastly, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.
CASE TITLE: Antonio Baltazar vs. Lorenzo Laxa, GR. No. 174489, April 11, 2012, J. DEL CASTILLO
FACTS
Paciencia was a 78-year-old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala" (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa. More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition14 with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his Favor.
Petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.
Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the Regional Trial Court to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will.
Rosie Mateo, one of the petitioners, testified that Paciencia was referred to as “magulyan” or forgetful, because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it.Moments later, hence she was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of its execution.
The RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition and disallowed the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala. The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTC’s conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being ‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound so as to render Paciencia unfit for executing a Will."
ISSUE
Whether or not Pacencia had no testamentary capacity to execute her last will and testament for having been forgetful.
HELD
No. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound to render him unfit to execute a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. As provided under Art. 799 of the Civil Code, to be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury, or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. Furthermore, Rosie’s conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan was only based on her personal assessment in contrast to Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will.
The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent. Lastly, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.
Leticia Valmonte Ortega vs. Josefina C. Valmonte, GR. No. 157451, December 16, 2005
DOCTRINE: According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act.
CASE TITLE: Leticia Valmonte Ortega vs. Josefina C. Valmonte GR. No. 157451, December 16, 2005, J. PANGANIBAN
FACTS
Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement. He finally came home to stay in the Philippines and two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old,
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left-hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left-hand margin.
He gave, devise and bequeath to his wife JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE one half (1/2) portion of the some of his properties and bank accounts in the Philippines and USA.
The petitioner Leticia Valmonte Ortgea declared that respondent Josefina Valmonte should not inherit alone because aside from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticia’s family to live with him, and they took care of him. During that time, the testator’s physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations, and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.
Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidences adduced, reduces the opposition to two grounds, namely:
1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of the will; and
2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state of senility
It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate. Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways" did not make him a person of unsound mind. Hence, this Petition
ISSUE
Whether Placido had mental capacity when he executed his will
HELD
Yes. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise.
It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind.
CASE TITLE: Leticia Valmonte Ortega vs. Josefina C. Valmonte GR. No. 157451, December 16, 2005, J. PANGANIBAN
FACTS
Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement. He finally came home to stay in the Philippines and two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old,
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left-hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left-hand margin.
He gave, devise and bequeath to his wife JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE one half (1/2) portion of the some of his properties and bank accounts in the Philippines and USA.
The petitioner Leticia Valmonte Ortgea declared that respondent Josefina Valmonte should not inherit alone because aside from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticia’s family to live with him, and they took care of him. During that time, the testator’s physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations, and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.
Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidences adduced, reduces the opposition to two grounds, namely:
1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of the will; and
2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state of senility
It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate. Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways" did not make him a person of unsound mind. Hence, this Petition
ISSUE
Whether Placido had mental capacity when he executed his will
HELD
Yes. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise.
It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind.
Fe Floro Valino vs. Rosario Adriano, GR. No. 182894, April 22, 2014
Doctrine: The law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it
Case Title: Fe Floro Valino vs. Rosario D. Adriano, GR. No. 182894, April 22, 2014, J. Mendoza
Facts
Atty. Adriano Adriano was married to respondent Rosario Adriano. Their marriage turned sour and eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano pursued petitioner Fe Floro Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife.
Unfortunately, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. Respondent was in the United States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, petitioner took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days, however her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint of respondents. RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she knew very well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park. Taking into consideration the fact that Rosario left for the United States at the time that he was fighting his illness, the trial court concluded that Rosario did not show love and care for him. Considering also that it was Valino who performed all the duties and responsibilities of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably presumed that he wished to be buried in the Valino family mausoleum.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter the remains of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City. It held that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to decide for the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact. Hence, this petition.
Issue
Whether Rosario has a better right than Valino on the remains of Atty. Adriano.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that Rosario has better right to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 of the Family Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
From the forecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s common law partner.
It is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to decide for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, often, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
On the contention of Valino that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code, it should be noted, however, that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such claim. Further, Rosario equally claimed the same; hence, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish was unclear and indefinite. Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have been created in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.
Under Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to decide for the same, after consulting the other members of the family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of the funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code.
Case Title: Fe Floro Valino vs. Rosario D. Adriano, GR. No. 182894, April 22, 2014, J. Mendoza
Facts
Atty. Adriano Adriano was married to respondent Rosario Adriano. Their marriage turned sour and eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano pursued petitioner Fe Floro Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife.
Unfortunately, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. Respondent was in the United States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, petitioner took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days, however her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint of respondents. RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she knew very well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park. Taking into consideration the fact that Rosario left for the United States at the time that he was fighting his illness, the trial court concluded that Rosario did not show love and care for him. Considering also that it was Valino who performed all the duties and responsibilities of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably presumed that he wished to be buried in the Valino family mausoleum.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter the remains of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City. It held that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to decide for the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact. Hence, this petition.
Issue
Whether Rosario has a better right than Valino on the remains of Atty. Adriano.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that Rosario has better right to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 of the Family Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
From the forecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s common law partner.
It is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to decide for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, often, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
On the contention of Valino that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code, it should be noted, however, that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such claim. Further, Rosario equally claimed the same; hence, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish was unclear and indefinite. Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have been created in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.
Under Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to decide for the same, after consulting the other members of the family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of the funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla vs. CA, GR. No. 113725, June 29, 2000
DOCTRINE: The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the, object of the institution, the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.
CASE TITLE: Dr. Jorge Rabadilla vs. CA , GR. No. 113725, June 29, 2000, J. PURISIMA
FACTS
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre.
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. She alleged that defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to Maria Marlena from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
The RTC dismissed without prejudice the complaint being prematurely filed. On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
Hence this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether there was no modal institution, and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution.
HELD
NO. The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the, object of the institution, the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee, but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally act of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.
CASE TITLE: Dr. Jorge Rabadilla vs. CA , GR. No. 113725, June 29, 2000, J. PURISIMA
FACTS
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre.
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. She alleged that defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to Maria Marlena from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
The RTC dismissed without prejudice the complaint being prematurely filed. On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
Hence this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether there was no modal institution, and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution.
HELD
NO. The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the, object of the institution, the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee, but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally act of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)