FACTS
Joseph Brimo, an alien testator (Turk), made his will in the Philippines. Stated in the will that his property should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law, and not that of his nation. The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased filed a scheme of partition. However, one of the brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition and contends that the deceased was a Turkish citizen, which his disposition should be in accordance with the laws of his nationality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws.
RULING:
No, the Turkish law should govern the disposition of his property pursuant to Article 16. According to Article 16 of the Civil Code, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
The provision in the will is not valid. The last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Said condition then is considered unwritten, hence the institution of legatees is unconditional and consequently valid and effective. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
Friday, October 18, 2019
DE LA VIÑA v VILLAREAL
G.R. No. L-13982, July 31, 1920
FACTS
Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint of divorce in Court of First Instance in Iloilo against her husband, herein petitioner on the ground of concubinage since 1913. They had acquired properties, real and personal, all of which was under the administration of the petitioner. Because of her husband’s illicit relations, she was ejected from their conjugal home, for which she was obliged to live in Iloilo City, where she had established her habitual residence.
After filing the complaint, she presented a motion for preliminary injunction to restrain her husband from alienating or encumbering the conjugal property. Respondent Judge Antonio Villareal granted the motion. Petitioner, Diego De la Vina filed present case of petition for certiorari on the ground that judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action and exceeded his power and authority in issuing preliminary injuction. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not a married woman ever acquires a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage.
2. In an action for divorce, brought by the wife against her husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, may the wife obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action?
RULING
Yes. It is true, as a general of law, that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband. This rule is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and of interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of the one is that of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail. But the authorities are unanimous in holding that this is not an absolute rule. Although the law fixes the domicile of the wife as being that of her husband, universal jurisprudence recognizes an exception to the rule in the case where the husband's conduct has been such as to furnish lawful ground for a divorce, which justifies her in leaving him, and, therefore, necessarily authorities her to live elsewhere and to acquire a separate domicile. The law making the domicile of the husband that of the wife is applicable only to their relations with third parties and has no application in cases of actual separation and controversy between themselves as to the temporary or permanent severance of the marriage ties by judicial proceedings.
2. No. The power to grant preliminary injunctions, both preventative and mandatory, is a logical and necessary incident of the general powers conferred upon Courts of First Instance in these Islands, as courts of record of general and unlimited original jurisdiction, both legal and equitable. Section 164 of Act No. 190 provides:
A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established, in the manner hereinafter provided, to the satisfaction of the judge granting it:
1. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of either for a limited period or perpetually;
2. That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff;
3. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, on is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
In her motion for a preliminary injunction, Narcisa Geopano alleged that the defendant was about to alienate or encumber the property belonging to the conjugal partnerships, with the object of injuring her interests; and this allegation does not appear to have been controverted by the defendant either in this court or in the court below. In view of this fact, we are of the opinion that under both paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 164 of Act No. 190, above quoted, the respondent judge was empowered and justified in granting the preliminary injunction prayed for by her. It cannot be doubted that, if the defendant should dispose of all or any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action for divorce, and squander or fraudulently conceal the proceeds, that act "would probably work injustice to the plaintiff," or that it would probably be "in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual." In this case the plaintiff's rights sought to be protected by said paragraph 3 is not the right to administer the conjugal property, as counsel for the petitioner believes, but the right to share in the conjugal property upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
Honorable Antonio Villareal, as Auxiliary Judge sitting in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo, had jurisdiction to hear and determine the action for divorce instituted in said court by the respondent Narcisa Geopano, and that he did not exceed his power and authority in issuing a preliminary injunction against the defendant, prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action.
Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint of divorce in Court of First Instance in Iloilo against her husband, herein petitioner on the ground of concubinage since 1913. They had acquired properties, real and personal, all of which was under the administration of the petitioner. Because of her husband’s illicit relations, she was ejected from their conjugal home, for which she was obliged to live in Iloilo City, where she had established her habitual residence.
After filing the complaint, she presented a motion for preliminary injunction to restrain her husband from alienating or encumbering the conjugal property. Respondent Judge Antonio Villareal granted the motion. Petitioner, Diego De la Vina filed present case of petition for certiorari on the ground that judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action and exceeded his power and authority in issuing preliminary injuction. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not a married woman ever acquires a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage.
2. In an action for divorce, brought by the wife against her husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, may the wife obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action?
RULING
Yes. It is true, as a general of law, that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband. This rule is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and of interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of the one is that of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail. But the authorities are unanimous in holding that this is not an absolute rule. Although the law fixes the domicile of the wife as being that of her husband, universal jurisprudence recognizes an exception to the rule in the case where the husband's conduct has been such as to furnish lawful ground for a divorce, which justifies her in leaving him, and, therefore, necessarily authorities her to live elsewhere and to acquire a separate domicile. The law making the domicile of the husband that of the wife is applicable only to their relations with third parties and has no application in cases of actual separation and controversy between themselves as to the temporary or permanent severance of the marriage ties by judicial proceedings.
2. No. The power to grant preliminary injunctions, both preventative and mandatory, is a logical and necessary incident of the general powers conferred upon Courts of First Instance in these Islands, as courts of record of general and unlimited original jurisdiction, both legal and equitable. Section 164 of Act No. 190 provides:
A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established, in the manner hereinafter provided, to the satisfaction of the judge granting it:
1. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of either for a limited period or perpetually;
2. That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff;
3. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, on is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
In her motion for a preliminary injunction, Narcisa Geopano alleged that the defendant was about to alienate or encumber the property belonging to the conjugal partnerships, with the object of injuring her interests; and this allegation does not appear to have been controverted by the defendant either in this court or in the court below. In view of this fact, we are of the opinion that under both paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 164 of Act No. 190, above quoted, the respondent judge was empowered and justified in granting the preliminary injunction prayed for by her. It cannot be doubted that, if the defendant should dispose of all or any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action for divorce, and squander or fraudulently conceal the proceeds, that act "would probably work injustice to the plaintiff," or that it would probably be "in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual." In this case the plaintiff's rights sought to be protected by said paragraph 3 is not the right to administer the conjugal property, as counsel for the petitioner believes, but the right to share in the conjugal property upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
Honorable Antonio Villareal, as Auxiliary Judge sitting in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo, had jurisdiction to hear and determine the action for divorce instituted in said court by the respondent Narcisa Geopano, and that he did not exceed his power and authority in issuing a preliminary injunction against the defendant, prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action.
GALLEGO v VERRA
G.R. No. L-48641
November 24, 1941
FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI-Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner's election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification. Gallego is a native of Abuyog. After his studies, he was employed as a schoolteacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte. In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a plantation of Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in September 1940.Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election for assemblymen held in December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained and paid for his residence certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for one and a half years. Under the foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at the time he was elected mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
RULING:
NO. In the definition of "residence"in the election law, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: (1) When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937; (2) His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the election; (3) He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government; and (5) He visited his family thrice despite the great distance between Leyte and Bukidnon.
The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to "exclude a stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from an elective office to serve that community."
Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality.
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI-Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner's election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification. Gallego is a native of Abuyog. After his studies, he was employed as a schoolteacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte. In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a plantation of Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in September 1940.Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election for assemblymen held in December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained and paid for his residence certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for one and a half years. Under the foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at the time he was elected mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
RULING:
NO. In the definition of "residence"in the election law, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: (1) When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937; (2) His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the election; (3) He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government; and (5) He visited his family thrice despite the great distance between Leyte and Bukidnon.
The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to "exclude a stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from an elective office to serve that community."
Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality.
KOH v CA
G.R. No. L-40428
December 17, 1975
FACTS
Francisco T. Koh (Koh) filed before the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, a complaint of Forcible Entry and Detainer against the Jose Coloma (Coloma) for the possession of a house and lot located at 480, Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal, on which the latter and his family were all residing. To settle the issue, Koh and Coloma entered into a compromise settlement in court whereby Coloma will pay Koh. Coloma failed to pay Koh. And the check that Coloma issued bounced which lead to Koh to file a criminal charge against Coloma in Pasig City and evicted the latter’s family on the house. However, the said criminal charge has been dismissed.
On February 21, 1974, Coloma filed a Complaint for damages against Koh in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. Koh filed a Motion to Dismiss the said Complaint on the grounds that the same fails to state a sufficient cause of action and that venue has been improperly laid. However, it was denied by the court. Filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order reiterating therein the matter stated in his Reply to Opposition, which was not considered by the lower court, but it was also denied. the petitioner herein instituted certiorari proceedings with preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeal the same being but was also denied for failure of the petitioner to attach thereto certified true copies of the Orders appealed from by reason of their unavailability. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Appellate Court erred and thus committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before it and in holding that private respondent Jose P. Coloma is a resident of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and thereby holding that venue of the action before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte was proper, and in finding that the complaint of private respondent Coloma in the trial court recites a sufficient cause of action.
HELD
Yes, CA had committed grave abuse of discretion. It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is likewise undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile, denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the in ten petitions of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
The law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words "resides or may be found," and not "is domiciled," thus:
Sec. 2(b) Personal actions — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
The court is convinced that the misunderstanding between petitioner and private respondent Coloma has gone to such an extent that it would not be surprising for respondent Coloma to be motivated by vengeance when he filed his action for damages against the petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte in order to get even with and impose all kinds of inconveniences on the petitioner. Otherwise,' it would have been easier and very much more convenient for both parties if the civil action for damages against petitioner had been filed either in the C.F.I. of Quezon City or Pasig, Rizal, because both petitioner and private respondent are admittedly residing within the greater Manila area.
Francisco T. Koh (Koh) filed before the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, a complaint of Forcible Entry and Detainer against the Jose Coloma (Coloma) for the possession of a house and lot located at 480, Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal, on which the latter and his family were all residing. To settle the issue, Koh and Coloma entered into a compromise settlement in court whereby Coloma will pay Koh. Coloma failed to pay Koh. And the check that Coloma issued bounced which lead to Koh to file a criminal charge against Coloma in Pasig City and evicted the latter’s family on the house. However, the said criminal charge has been dismissed.
On February 21, 1974, Coloma filed a Complaint for damages against Koh in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. Koh filed a Motion to Dismiss the said Complaint on the grounds that the same fails to state a sufficient cause of action and that venue has been improperly laid. However, it was denied by the court. Filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order reiterating therein the matter stated in his Reply to Opposition, which was not considered by the lower court, but it was also denied. the petitioner herein instituted certiorari proceedings with preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeal the same being but was also denied for failure of the petitioner to attach thereto certified true copies of the Orders appealed from by reason of their unavailability. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Appellate Court erred and thus committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before it and in holding that private respondent Jose P. Coloma is a resident of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and thereby holding that venue of the action before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte was proper, and in finding that the complaint of private respondent Coloma in the trial court recites a sufficient cause of action.
HELD
Yes, CA had committed grave abuse of discretion. It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is likewise undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile, denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the in ten petitions of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
The law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words "resides or may be found," and not "is domiciled," thus:
Sec. 2(b) Personal actions — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
The court is convinced that the misunderstanding between petitioner and private respondent Coloma has gone to such an extent that it would not be surprising for respondent Coloma to be motivated by vengeance when he filed his action for damages against the petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte in order to get even with and impose all kinds of inconveniences on the petitioner. Otherwise,' it would have been easier and very much more convenient for both parties if the civil action for damages against petitioner had been filed either in the C.F.I. of Quezon City or Pasig, Rizal, because both petitioner and private respondent are admittedly residing within the greater Manila area.
Friday, August 9, 2019
ERNESTO S. MERCADO V EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO
G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999
FACTS
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado (Mercado) and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano (Manzano) were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 1998 elections. Respondent won. A certain Ernesto Mamaril (Mamaril) filed a petition for disqualification against Manzano on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. Commission on Election (COMELEC) granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.
According to COMELEC, respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. Thus, he is considered as dual citizen. And as a law, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.3 The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998. petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent. The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution in favor of Manzano. respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth.
Petitioner contends that COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and cannot run for public office.
HELD
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
The phrase “dual citizenship” in the Local Government Code must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment. The COMELEC en banc’s ruling was that Manzano’s act of registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that “a person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory.” But this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. Nevertheless, our SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado (Mercado) and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano (Manzano) were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 1998 elections. Respondent won. A certain Ernesto Mamaril (Mamaril) filed a petition for disqualification against Manzano on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. Commission on Election (COMELEC) granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.
According to COMELEC, respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. Thus, he is considered as dual citizen. And as a law, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.3 The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998. petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent. The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution in favor of Manzano. respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth.
Petitioner contends that COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and cannot run for public office.
HELD
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
The phrase “dual citizenship” in the Local Government Code must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment. The COMELEC en banc’s ruling was that Manzano’s act of registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that “a person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory.” But this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. Nevertheless, our SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
Friday, July 19, 2019
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION V ASIAVEST
G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015
FACTS
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the incorporation of an associate company known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into contracts to construct rural roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia. In connection with this construction contract, PNCC obtained various guarantees and bonds from Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to guarantee the due performance of its obligations. The four contracts of guaranty stipulate that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad shall guarantee to the State of Pahang "the due performance by PNCC of its construction contracts and the repayment of the temporary advances given to PNCC." These contracts were understood to be governed by the laws of Malaysia.
There was failure to perform the obligations under the construction contract, prompting the State of Pahang to demand payment against Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad's performance bonds. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a Complaint16 for recovery of sum of money against PNCC before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. It based its action on Malaysian laws. Specifically, it invoked Section 9818 of the Malaysian Contracts Act of 1950 and Section 1119 of the Malaysian Civil Law Act of 1956. The trial court declared PNCC in default for failure to file any responsive pleading and allowed Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to present its evidence ex parte and rendered judgment in favor of Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad. The trial court found that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad complied with the requisites for proof of written foreign laws.24 The Malaysian laws invoked were found to be similar with Articles 2066 and 2067 of the Civil Code.
The trial court denied PNCC's Motion to Lift Order of and also denied PNCC's Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam. PNCC brought its case before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed PNCC's appeal for raising pure questions of law exclusively cognizable by this court. It likewise denied reconsideration. Hence, PNCC filed this Petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not our courts have subject matter jurisdiction over an action for recovery of sum of money filed by a Malaysian corporation against a Philippine corporation involving a contract executed and performed in Malaysia, and the applicability of the forum non conveniens principle.
RATIO
Yes. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is one such law that provides for the jurisdiction of our courts. A plain reading of Section 19 shows that civil actions for payment of sum of money are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of trial courts:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. -Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above mentioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000).
These jurisdictional amounts were adjusted to P300,000.00, and P400,000.00 in the case of Metro Manila. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig has jurisdiction over respondent's complaint for recovery of the sum of Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) 3,915,053.54.
"Forum non conveniens literally translates to 'the forum is inconvenient.' This doctrine applies in conflicts of law cases. It gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it appears that it is not the most convenient forum and the parties may seek redress in another one.97 It is a device "designed to frustrate illicit means for securing advantages and vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible if the venue of litigation (or dispute resolution) were left entirely to the whim of either party.
In the case of Puyat v. Zabarte, the court enumerated practical reasons when courts may refuse to entertain a case even though the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law:
1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there;
2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum, a practice known as forum shopping merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;
3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or aliens when the docket may already be overcrowded;
4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be maintained; and
5) The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.
On the other hand, courts may choose to assume jurisdiction subject to the following requisites: "(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision." The determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which must carefully consider the facts of the particular case. A mere invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens or an easy averment that foreign elements exist cannot operate to automatically divest a court of its jurisdiction. It is crucial for courts to determine first if facts were established such that special circumstances exist to warrant its desistance from assuming jurisdiction.
The trial court assumed jurisdiction and explained in its Order dated August 11, 1995 that on the contrary, to try the case in the Philippines, it is believed, would be more convenient to defendant corporation as its principal office is located in the Philippines, its records will be more accessible, witnesses would be readily available and entail less expenses in terms of legal services."
Petitioner is a domestic corporation with its main office in the Philippines. It is safe to assume that all of its pertinent documents in relation to its business would be available in its main office. Most of petitioner's officers and employees who were involved in the construction contract in Malaysia could most likely also be found in the Philippines. Thus, it is unexpected that a Philippine corporation would rather engage this civil suit before Malaysian courts. Our courts would be "better positioned to enforce [the] judgment and, ultimately, to dispense" in this case against petitioner. Also, petitioner failed to plead and show real and present danger that another jurisdiction commenced litigation and the foreign tribunal chose to exercise jurisdiction.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the incorporation of an associate company known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into contracts to construct rural roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia. In connection with this construction contract, PNCC obtained various guarantees and bonds from Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to guarantee the due performance of its obligations. The four contracts of guaranty stipulate that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad shall guarantee to the State of Pahang "the due performance by PNCC of its construction contracts and the repayment of the temporary advances given to PNCC." These contracts were understood to be governed by the laws of Malaysia.
There was failure to perform the obligations under the construction contract, prompting the State of Pahang to demand payment against Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad's performance bonds. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a Complaint16 for recovery of sum of money against PNCC before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. It based its action on Malaysian laws. Specifically, it invoked Section 9818 of the Malaysian Contracts Act of 1950 and Section 1119 of the Malaysian Civil Law Act of 1956. The trial court declared PNCC in default for failure to file any responsive pleading and allowed Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to present its evidence ex parte and rendered judgment in favor of Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad. The trial court found that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad complied with the requisites for proof of written foreign laws.24 The Malaysian laws invoked were found to be similar with Articles 2066 and 2067 of the Civil Code.
The trial court denied PNCC's Motion to Lift Order of and also denied PNCC's Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam. PNCC brought its case before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed PNCC's appeal for raising pure questions of law exclusively cognizable by this court. It likewise denied reconsideration. Hence, PNCC filed this Petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not our courts have subject matter jurisdiction over an action for recovery of sum of money filed by a Malaysian corporation against a Philippine corporation involving a contract executed and performed in Malaysia, and the applicability of the forum non conveniens principle.
RATIO
Yes. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is one such law that provides for the jurisdiction of our courts. A plain reading of Section 19 shows that civil actions for payment of sum of money are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of trial courts:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. -Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above mentioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000).
These jurisdictional amounts were adjusted to P300,000.00, and P400,000.00 in the case of Metro Manila. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig has jurisdiction over respondent's complaint for recovery of the sum of Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) 3,915,053.54.
"Forum non conveniens literally translates to 'the forum is inconvenient.' This doctrine applies in conflicts of law cases. It gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it appears that it is not the most convenient forum and the parties may seek redress in another one.97 It is a device "designed to frustrate illicit means for securing advantages and vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible if the venue of litigation (or dispute resolution) were left entirely to the whim of either party.
In the case of Puyat v. Zabarte, the court enumerated practical reasons when courts may refuse to entertain a case even though the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law:
1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there;
2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum, a practice known as forum shopping merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;
3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or aliens when the docket may already be overcrowded;
4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be maintained; and
5) The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.
On the other hand, courts may choose to assume jurisdiction subject to the following requisites: "(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision." The determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which must carefully consider the facts of the particular case. A mere invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens or an easy averment that foreign elements exist cannot operate to automatically divest a court of its jurisdiction. It is crucial for courts to determine first if facts were established such that special circumstances exist to warrant its desistance from assuming jurisdiction.
The trial court assumed jurisdiction and explained in its Order dated August 11, 1995 that on the contrary, to try the case in the Philippines, it is believed, would be more convenient to defendant corporation as its principal office is located in the Philippines, its records will be more accessible, witnesses would be readily available and entail less expenses in terms of legal services."
Petitioner is a domestic corporation with its main office in the Philippines. It is safe to assume that all of its pertinent documents in relation to its business would be available in its main office. Most of petitioner's officers and employees who were involved in the construction contract in Malaysia could most likely also be found in the Philippines. Thus, it is unexpected that a Philippine corporation would rather engage this civil suit before Malaysian courts. Our courts would be "better positioned to enforce [the] judgment and, ultimately, to dispense" in this case against petitioner. Also, petitioner failed to plead and show real and present danger that another jurisdiction commenced litigation and the foreign tribunal chose to exercise jurisdiction.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V REBESENCIO
G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015
FACTS
Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation established and existing under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Respondents were recruited and hired by Saudia as Flight Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from service on various dates in 2006. The respondents contended that the termination of their employment was illegal.
They alleged that the termination was made solely because they were pregnant. As respondents alleged, they had informed Saudia of their respective pregnancies and had gone through the necessary procedures to process their maternity leaves. Initially, Saudia had given its approval but later on informed respondents that its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had disapproved their maternity leaves. In addition, it required respondents to file their resignation letters. Respondents were told that if they did not resign, Saudia would terminate them all the same. The threat of termination entailed the loss of benefits, such as separation pay and ticket discount entitlements. The respondents were required to report to the office one month into their maternity leave.
Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents' maternity leaves and demand for their resignation on its "Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants" (Unified Contract) which provides that if the Air Hostess becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this shall render her employment contract as void and she will be terminated due to lack of medical fitness. The respondents averred that the Unified Contract took effect after the approval of their maternity leaves. Rather than comply and tender resignation letters, respondents filed separate appeal letters that were all rejected. Faced with the dilemma of resigning or totally losing their benefits, respondents executed handwritten resignation letters.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the respondents voluntarily resigned or were illegally terminated.
2. Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case
RATIO
1. Yes, the respondents were illegally dismissed. The petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi law does not allow the termination of employment of women who take maternity leaves Under the Labor Laws of Saudi Arabia and the Philippines, it is illegal and unlawful to terminate the employment of any woman by virtue of pregnancy. The law in Saudi Arabia is even more harsh and strict in that no employer can terminate the employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the same while on Maternity Leave, the specific provision of Saudi Labor Laws on the matter is hereto quoted as follows: “An employer may not terminate the employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the same while on maternity leave.” (Article 155, Labor Law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree No. M/51.)
2. Yes, the Philippine court has jurisdiction over the case. Saudia asserts that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the need to comply with these stipulations calls into operation the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, in turn, makes it necessary for Philippine tribunals to refrain from exercising jurisdiction. Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata, is a means of addressing the problem of parallel litigation. While the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata are designed to address the problem of parallel litigation within a single jurisdiction, forum non conveniens is a means devised to address parallel litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions. On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, the court state the rule, thus: Forum non conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.
It further stated: Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law. Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the stipulations of the Cabin Attendant contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia.
As argued by respondents, Saudia’s policy entails the termination of employment of flight attendants who become pregnant. At the risk of stating the obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that pertains specifically to women. Saudia’s policy excludes from and restricts employment on the basis of no other consideration but sex.
The court do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present physical limitations that may render difficult the performance of functions associated with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it would be the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so permanent and immutable that it must entail the termination of one’s employment. It is clear that any individual, regardless of gender, may be subject to exigencies that limit the performance of functions. However, they fail to appreciate how pregnancy could be such an impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but the complete termination of the means through which a woman earns a living. Oddly enough, the petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi law does not allow the termination of employment of women who take maternity leaves;
Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and practicable (i.e., “to make an intelligent decision”), Philippine tribunals may apply the foreign law selected by the parties. In fact, (albeit without meaning to make a pronouncement on the accuracy and reliability of respondents’ citation) in this case, respondents themselves have made averments as to the laws of Saudi Arabia.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner Brenda J. Betia is not solidarily liable with petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines, and second, that petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is liable for moral and exemplary damages. The June 16, 2011 Decision and the September 13, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006 are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. Accordingly, petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is ordered to pay respondents:
(1) Full backwages and all other benefits computed from the respective dates in which each of the respondents were illegally terminated until the finality of this Decision;
(2) Separation pay computed from the respective dates in which each of the respondents commenced employment until the finality of this Decision at the rate of one ( 1) month's salary for every year of service, with a fraction of a year of at least six ( 6) months being counted as one ( 1) whole year;
(3) Moral damages in the amount of Pl00,000.00 per respondent;
(4) Exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 per respondent; and
(5) Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award. Interest of 6% per annum shall likewise be imposed on the total judgment award from the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction thereof.
This case is REMANDED. to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed computation of the amounts due to respondents which petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines should pay without delay.
Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation established and existing under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Respondents were recruited and hired by Saudia as Flight Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from service on various dates in 2006. The respondents contended that the termination of their employment was illegal.
They alleged that the termination was made solely because they were pregnant. As respondents alleged, they had informed Saudia of their respective pregnancies and had gone through the necessary procedures to process their maternity leaves. Initially, Saudia had given its approval but later on informed respondents that its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had disapproved their maternity leaves. In addition, it required respondents to file their resignation letters. Respondents were told that if they did not resign, Saudia would terminate them all the same. The threat of termination entailed the loss of benefits, such as separation pay and ticket discount entitlements. The respondents were required to report to the office one month into their maternity leave.
Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents' maternity leaves and demand for their resignation on its "Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants" (Unified Contract) which provides that if the Air Hostess becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this shall render her employment contract as void and she will be terminated due to lack of medical fitness. The respondents averred that the Unified Contract took effect after the approval of their maternity leaves. Rather than comply and tender resignation letters, respondents filed separate appeal letters that were all rejected. Faced with the dilemma of resigning or totally losing their benefits, respondents executed handwritten resignation letters.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the respondents voluntarily resigned or were illegally terminated.
2. Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case
RATIO
1. Yes, the respondents were illegally dismissed. The petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi law does not allow the termination of employment of women who take maternity leaves Under the Labor Laws of Saudi Arabia and the Philippines, it is illegal and unlawful to terminate the employment of any woman by virtue of pregnancy. The law in Saudi Arabia is even more harsh and strict in that no employer can terminate the employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the same while on Maternity Leave, the specific provision of Saudi Labor Laws on the matter is hereto quoted as follows: “An employer may not terminate the employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the same while on maternity leave.” (Article 155, Labor Law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree No. M/51.)
2. Yes, the Philippine court has jurisdiction over the case. Saudia asserts that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the need to comply with these stipulations calls into operation the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, in turn, makes it necessary for Philippine tribunals to refrain from exercising jurisdiction. Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata, is a means of addressing the problem of parallel litigation. While the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata are designed to address the problem of parallel litigation within a single jurisdiction, forum non conveniens is a means devised to address parallel litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions. On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, the court state the rule, thus: Forum non conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.
It further stated: Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law. Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the stipulations of the Cabin Attendant contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia.
As argued by respondents, Saudia’s policy entails the termination of employment of flight attendants who become pregnant. At the risk of stating the obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that pertains specifically to women. Saudia’s policy excludes from and restricts employment on the basis of no other consideration but sex.
The court do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present physical limitations that may render difficult the performance of functions associated with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it would be the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so permanent and immutable that it must entail the termination of one’s employment. It is clear that any individual, regardless of gender, may be subject to exigencies that limit the performance of functions. However, they fail to appreciate how pregnancy could be such an impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but the complete termination of the means through which a woman earns a living. Oddly enough, the petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi law does not allow the termination of employment of women who take maternity leaves;
Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and practicable (i.e., “to make an intelligent decision”), Philippine tribunals may apply the foreign law selected by the parties. In fact, (albeit without meaning to make a pronouncement on the accuracy and reliability of respondents’ citation) in this case, respondents themselves have made averments as to the laws of Saudi Arabia.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner Brenda J. Betia is not solidarily liable with petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines, and second, that petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is liable for moral and exemplary damages. The June 16, 2011 Decision and the September 13, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006 are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. Accordingly, petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is ordered to pay respondents:
(1) Full backwages and all other benefits computed from the respective dates in which each of the respondents were illegally terminated until the finality of this Decision;
(2) Separation pay computed from the respective dates in which each of the respondents commenced employment until the finality of this Decision at the rate of one ( 1) month's salary for every year of service, with a fraction of a year of at least six ( 6) months being counted as one ( 1) whole year;
(3) Moral damages in the amount of Pl00,000.00 per respondent;
(4) Exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 per respondent; and
(5) Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award. Interest of 6% per annum shall likewise be imposed on the total judgment award from the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction thereof.
This case is REMANDED. to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed computation of the amounts due to respondents which petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines should pay without delay.
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