KOH v CA G.R. No. L-40428 December 17, 1975

FACTS

Francisco T. Koh (Koh) filed before the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, a complaint of Forcible Entry and Detainer against the Jose Coloma (Coloma) for the possession of a house and lot located at 480, Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal, on which the latter and his family were all residing. To settle the issue, Koh and Coloma entered into a compromise settlement in court whereby Coloma will pay Koh. Coloma failed to pay Koh. And the check that Coloma issued bounced which lead to Koh to file a criminal charge against Coloma in Pasig City and evicted the latter’s family on the house. However, the said criminal charge has been dismissed.

On February 21, 1974, Coloma filed a Complaint for damages against Koh in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. Koh filed a Motion to Dismiss the said Complaint on the grounds that the same fails to state a sufficient cause of action and that venue has been improperly laid. However, it was denied by the court. Filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order reiterating therein the matter stated in his Reply to Opposition, which was not considered by the lower court, but it was also denied. the petitioner herein instituted certiorari proceedings with preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeal the same being but was also denied for failure of the petitioner to attach thereto certified true copies of the Orders appealed from by reason of their unavailability. Hence this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent Appellate Court erred and thus committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before it and in holding that private respondent Jose P. Coloma is a resident of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and thereby holding that venue of the action before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte was proper, and in finding that the complaint of private respondent Coloma in the trial court recites a sufficient cause of action.

HELD

Yes, CA had committed grave abuse of discretion. It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is likewise undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.

There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile, denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the in ten petitions of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

The law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words "resides or may be found," and not "is domiciled," thus:

Sec. 2(b) Personal actions — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

The court is convinced that the misunderstanding between petitioner and private respondent Coloma has gone to such an extent that it would not be surprising for respondent Coloma to be motivated by vengeance when he filed his action for damages against the petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte in order to get even with and impose all kinds of inconveniences on the petitioner. Otherwise,' it would have been easier and very much more convenient for both parties if the civil action for damages against petitioner had been filed either in the C.F.I. of Quezon City or Pasig, Rizal, because both petitioner and private respondent are admittedly residing within the greater Manila area.