FACTS
The respondents, Spouses Germil and Rebecca Javier offered to purchase a property from the petitioner Victoria Racelis. Since they could not afford to pay the price, they offered to lease the property while they raise enough money which were also agreed to by the petitioner. The respondents tendered a sum of representing "initial payment or goodwill money." They continued to pay rental fees but later on refused to pay when the petitioner had requested them to vacate the property and terminated the lease agreement after the latter had realized that they had no genuine intention of purchasing the property. The respondents refused to vacate and that made the petitioner to disconnect the electrical services of the property and filed an ejectment complaint against the respondents. The Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the complaint and ruled that the respondents were entitled to suspend the payment of rent under Article 1658 of the Civil Code due to petitioner’s act of disconnecting electric service over the property. Also, it declared that the their obligation had been extinguished and that the advanced rent and deposit were sufficient to cover their unpaid rent. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court reversed the lower court’s decision. They ruled that the amount paid by the spouses was not given as an advanced payment for rental but as part of the purchase price of the property. An appeal was file by the spouses in the Court of Appeals where it ruled in favor of them. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed this present petition for review.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not respondents Spouses Germil and Rebecca Javier can invoke their right to suspend the payment of rent under Article 1658 of the Civil Code
RULING
1. No. Article 1658 of the Civil Code allows a lessee to postpone the payment I of rent if the lessor fails to either (1) "make the necessary repairs" on the property or (2) "maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property leased." This provision implements the obligation imposed on lessors under Article 1654(3) of the Civil Code. However, this rule will not apply in the present case because the lease had already expired when petitioner requested for the temporary disconnection of electrical service. Petitioner demanded respondents to vacate the premises however instead of surrendering the premises to petitioner, respondents unlawfully withheld possession of the property. Respondents continued to stay in the premises until they moved to their new residence. At that point, petitioner was no longer obligated to maintain respondents in the "peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract." Therefore, respondents cannot use the disconnection of electrical service as justification to suspend the payment of rent.
Assuming that respondents were entitled to invoke their right under Article 1658 of the Civil Code, this does exonerate them from their obligation under Article 1657 of the Civil Code "to pay the price of the lease according to the terms stipulated." Lessees who exercise their right under Article 1658 of the Civil Code are not freed from the obligations imposed by law or contract. Moreover, respondents' obligation to pay rent was not extinguished when they transferred to their new residence. Respondents are liable for a reasonable amount of rent for the use and continued occupation of the property upon the expiration of the lease. To hold otherwise would unjustly enrich respondents at petitioner's expense.
Monday, May 18, 2020
Monday, November 4, 2019
WILFREDO M. CATU vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA
A.C. No. 5738
February 19, 2008
FACTS
Petitioner is a co-owner of a lot and a building wherein his wife, Elizabeth Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pasto possessed one of the units in the building. His mother and brother contested, and a complaint was initiated against the wife and Pasto in the Lupong Tagapamayapa. Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as Punong barangay.In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD
No. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government Lawyers. Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded,that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service." Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
However, as a civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned as provided in Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent also failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's Oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Petitioner is a co-owner of a lot and a building wherein his wife, Elizabeth Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pasto possessed one of the units in the building. His mother and brother contested, and a complaint was initiated against the wife and Pasto in the Lupong Tagapamayapa. Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as Punong barangay.In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD
No. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government Lawyers. Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded,that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service." Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
However, as a civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned as provided in Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent also failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's Oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY
B.M. No. 1678
December 17, 2007
FACTS
Benjamin M. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1960. He migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments. He renounced his Philippine citizenship and applied for Canadian citizenship to avail its free medical program. Two years after, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003) petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship and intended to resume his law practice. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.
HELD
No. Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court: SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
Benjamin M. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1960. He migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments. He renounced his Philippine citizenship and applied for Canadian citizenship to avail its free medical program. Two years after, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003) petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship and intended to resume his law practice. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.
HELD
No. Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court: SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
Friday, October 18, 2019
MICIANO V BRIMO G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
FACTS
Joseph Brimo, an alien testator (Turk), made his will in the Philippines. Stated in the will that his property should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law, and not that of his nation. The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased filed a scheme of partition. However, one of the brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition and contends that the deceased was a Turkish citizen, which his disposition should be in accordance with the laws of his nationality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws.
RULING:
No, the Turkish law should govern the disposition of his property pursuant to Article 16. According to Article 16 of the Civil Code, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. The provision in the will is not valid. The last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Said condition then is considered unwritten, hence the institution of legatees is unconditional and consequently valid and effective. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions. The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
Joseph Brimo, an alien testator (Turk), made his will in the Philippines. Stated in the will that his property should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law, and not that of his nation. The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased filed a scheme of partition. However, one of the brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition and contends that the deceased was a Turkish citizen, which his disposition should be in accordance with the laws of his nationality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws.
RULING:
No, the Turkish law should govern the disposition of his property pursuant to Article 16. According to Article 16 of the Civil Code, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. The provision in the will is not valid. The last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Said condition then is considered unwritten, hence the institution of legatees is unconditional and consequently valid and effective. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions. The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
DE LA VIÑA v VILLAREAL
G.R. No. L-13982, July 31, 1920
FACTS
Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint of divorce in Court of First Instance in Iloilo against her husband, herein petitioner on the ground of concubinage since 1913. They had acquired properties, real and personal, all of which was under the administration of the petitioner. Because of her husband’s illicit relations, she was ejected from their conjugal home, for which she was obliged to live in Iloilo City, where she had established her habitual residence.
After filing the complaint, she presented a motion for preliminary injunction to restrain her husband from alienating or encumbering the conjugal property. Respondent Judge Antonio Villareal granted the motion. Petitioner, Diego De la Vina filed present case of petition for certiorari on the ground that judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action and exceeded his power and authority in issuing preliminary injuction. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not a married woman ever acquires a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage.
2. In an action for divorce, brought by the wife against her husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, may the wife obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action?
RULING
Yes. It is true, as a general of law, that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband. This rule is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and of interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of the one is that of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail. But the authorities are unanimous in holding that this is not an absolute rule. Although the law fixes the domicile of the wife as being that of her husband, universal jurisprudence recognizes an exception to the rule in the case where the husband's conduct has been such as to furnish lawful ground for a divorce, which justifies her in leaving him, and, therefore, necessarily authorities her to live elsewhere and to acquire a separate domicile. The law making the domicile of the husband that of the wife is applicable only to their relations with third parties and has no application in cases of actual separation and controversy between themselves as to the temporary or permanent severance of the marriage ties by judicial proceedings.
2. No. The power to grant preliminary injunctions, both preventative and mandatory, is a logical and necessary incident of the general powers conferred upon Courts of First Instance in these Islands, as courts of record of general and unlimited original jurisdiction, both legal and equitable. Section 164 of Act No. 190 provides:
A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established, in the manner hereinafter provided, to the satisfaction of the judge granting it:
1. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of either for a limited period or perpetually;
2. That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff;
3. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, on is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
In her motion for a preliminary injunction, Narcisa Geopano alleged that the defendant was about to alienate or encumber the property belonging to the conjugal partnerships, with the object of injuring her interests; and this allegation does not appear to have been controverted by the defendant either in this court or in the court below. In view of this fact, we are of the opinion that under both paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 164 of Act No. 190, above quoted, the respondent judge was empowered and justified in granting the preliminary injunction prayed for by her. It cannot be doubted that, if the defendant should dispose of all or any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action for divorce, and squander or fraudulently conceal the proceeds, that act "would probably work injustice to the plaintiff," or that it would probably be "in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual." In this case the plaintiff's rights sought to be protected by said paragraph 3 is not the right to administer the conjugal property, as counsel for the petitioner believes, but the right to share in the conjugal property upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
Honorable Antonio Villareal, as Auxiliary Judge sitting in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo, had jurisdiction to hear and determine the action for divorce instituted in said court by the respondent Narcisa Geopano, and that he did not exceed his power and authority in issuing a preliminary injunction against the defendant, prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action.
Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint of divorce in Court of First Instance in Iloilo against her husband, herein petitioner on the ground of concubinage since 1913. They had acquired properties, real and personal, all of which was under the administration of the petitioner. Because of her husband’s illicit relations, she was ejected from their conjugal home, for which she was obliged to live in Iloilo City, where she had established her habitual residence.
After filing the complaint, she presented a motion for preliminary injunction to restrain her husband from alienating or encumbering the conjugal property. Respondent Judge Antonio Villareal granted the motion. Petitioner, Diego De la Vina filed present case of petition for certiorari on the ground that judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action and exceeded his power and authority in issuing preliminary injuction. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not a married woman ever acquires a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage.
2. In an action for divorce, brought by the wife against her husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, may the wife obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action?
RULING
Yes. It is true, as a general of law, that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband. This rule is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and of interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of the one is that of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail. But the authorities are unanimous in holding that this is not an absolute rule. Although the law fixes the domicile of the wife as being that of her husband, universal jurisprudence recognizes an exception to the rule in the case where the husband's conduct has been such as to furnish lawful ground for a divorce, which justifies her in leaving him, and, therefore, necessarily authorities her to live elsewhere and to acquire a separate domicile. The law making the domicile of the husband that of the wife is applicable only to their relations with third parties and has no application in cases of actual separation and controversy between themselves as to the temporary or permanent severance of the marriage ties by judicial proceedings.
2. No. The power to grant preliminary injunctions, both preventative and mandatory, is a logical and necessary incident of the general powers conferred upon Courts of First Instance in these Islands, as courts of record of general and unlimited original jurisdiction, both legal and equitable. Section 164 of Act No. 190 provides:
A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established, in the manner hereinafter provided, to the satisfaction of the judge granting it:
1. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of either for a limited period or perpetually;
2. That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff;
3. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, on is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
In her motion for a preliminary injunction, Narcisa Geopano alleged that the defendant was about to alienate or encumber the property belonging to the conjugal partnerships, with the object of injuring her interests; and this allegation does not appear to have been controverted by the defendant either in this court or in the court below. In view of this fact, we are of the opinion that under both paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 164 of Act No. 190, above quoted, the respondent judge was empowered and justified in granting the preliminary injunction prayed for by her. It cannot be doubted that, if the defendant should dispose of all or any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action for divorce, and squander or fraudulently conceal the proceeds, that act "would probably work injustice to the plaintiff," or that it would probably be "in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual." In this case the plaintiff's rights sought to be protected by said paragraph 3 is not the right to administer the conjugal property, as counsel for the petitioner believes, but the right to share in the conjugal property upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
Honorable Antonio Villareal, as Auxiliary Judge sitting in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo, had jurisdiction to hear and determine the action for divorce instituted in said court by the respondent Narcisa Geopano, and that he did not exceed his power and authority in issuing a preliminary injunction against the defendant, prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action.
GALLEGO v VERRA
G.R. No. L-48641
November 24, 1941
FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI-Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner's election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification. Gallego is a native of Abuyog. After his studies, he was employed as a schoolteacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte. In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a plantation of Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in September 1940.Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election for assemblymen held in December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained and paid for his residence certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for one and a half years. Under the foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at the time he was elected mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
RULING:
NO. In the definition of "residence"in the election law, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: (1) When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937; (2) His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the election; (3) He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government; and (5) He visited his family thrice despite the great distance between Leyte and Bukidnon.
The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to "exclude a stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from an elective office to serve that community."
Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality.
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI-Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner's election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification. Gallego is a native of Abuyog. After his studies, he was employed as a schoolteacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte. In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a plantation of Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in September 1940.Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election for assemblymen held in December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained and paid for his residence certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for one and a half years. Under the foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at the time he was elected mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
RULING:
NO. In the definition of "residence"in the election law, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: (1) When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937; (2) His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the election; (3) He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government; and (5) He visited his family thrice despite the great distance between Leyte and Bukidnon.
The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to "exclude a stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from an elective office to serve that community."
Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality.
KOH v CA
G.R. No. L-40428
December 17, 1975
FACTS
Francisco T. Koh (Koh) filed before the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, a complaint of Forcible Entry and Detainer against the Jose Coloma (Coloma) for the possession of a house and lot located at 480, Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal, on which the latter and his family were all residing. To settle the issue, Koh and Coloma entered into a compromise settlement in court whereby Coloma will pay Koh. Coloma failed to pay Koh. And the check that Coloma issued bounced which lead to Koh to file a criminal charge against Coloma in Pasig City and evicted the latter’s family on the house. However, the said criminal charge has been dismissed.
On February 21, 1974, Coloma filed a Complaint for damages against Koh in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. Koh filed a Motion to Dismiss the said Complaint on the grounds that the same fails to state a sufficient cause of action and that venue has been improperly laid. However, it was denied by the court. Filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order reiterating therein the matter stated in his Reply to Opposition, which was not considered by the lower court, but it was also denied. the petitioner herein instituted certiorari proceedings with preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeal the same being but was also denied for failure of the petitioner to attach thereto certified true copies of the Orders appealed from by reason of their unavailability. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Appellate Court erred and thus committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before it and in holding that private respondent Jose P. Coloma is a resident of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and thereby holding that venue of the action before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte was proper, and in finding that the complaint of private respondent Coloma in the trial court recites a sufficient cause of action.
HELD
Yes, CA had committed grave abuse of discretion. It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is likewise undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile, denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the in ten petitions of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
The law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words "resides or may be found," and not "is domiciled," thus:
Sec. 2(b) Personal actions — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
The court is convinced that the misunderstanding between petitioner and private respondent Coloma has gone to such an extent that it would not be surprising for respondent Coloma to be motivated by vengeance when he filed his action for damages against the petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte in order to get even with and impose all kinds of inconveniences on the petitioner. Otherwise,' it would have been easier and very much more convenient for both parties if the civil action for damages against petitioner had been filed either in the C.F.I. of Quezon City or Pasig, Rizal, because both petitioner and private respondent are admittedly residing within the greater Manila area.
Francisco T. Koh (Koh) filed before the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, a complaint of Forcible Entry and Detainer against the Jose Coloma (Coloma) for the possession of a house and lot located at 480, Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal, on which the latter and his family were all residing. To settle the issue, Koh and Coloma entered into a compromise settlement in court whereby Coloma will pay Koh. Coloma failed to pay Koh. And the check that Coloma issued bounced which lead to Koh to file a criminal charge against Coloma in Pasig City and evicted the latter’s family on the house. However, the said criminal charge has been dismissed.
On February 21, 1974, Coloma filed a Complaint for damages against Koh in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. Koh filed a Motion to Dismiss the said Complaint on the grounds that the same fails to state a sufficient cause of action and that venue has been improperly laid. However, it was denied by the court. Filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order reiterating therein the matter stated in his Reply to Opposition, which was not considered by the lower court, but it was also denied. the petitioner herein instituted certiorari proceedings with preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeal the same being but was also denied for failure of the petitioner to attach thereto certified true copies of the Orders appealed from by reason of their unavailability. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Appellate Court erred and thus committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before it and in holding that private respondent Jose P. Coloma is a resident of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and thereby holding that venue of the action before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte was proper, and in finding that the complaint of private respondent Coloma in the trial court recites a sufficient cause of action.
HELD
Yes, CA had committed grave abuse of discretion. It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is likewise undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile, denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the in ten petitions of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
The law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words "resides or may be found," and not "is domiciled," thus:
Sec. 2(b) Personal actions — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
The court is convinced that the misunderstanding between petitioner and private respondent Coloma has gone to such an extent that it would not be surprising for respondent Coloma to be motivated by vengeance when he filed his action for damages against the petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte in order to get even with and impose all kinds of inconveniences on the petitioner. Otherwise,' it would have been easier and very much more convenient for both parties if the civil action for damages against petitioner had been filed either in the C.F.I. of Quezon City or Pasig, Rizal, because both petitioner and private respondent are admittedly residing within the greater Manila area.
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