BAKER V CARR (369 U.S. 186, 1962)

FACTS: Appellants are persons allegedly qualified to vote for members of the General Assembly of Tennessee representing the counties in which they reside. They brought suit in a Federal District Court in Tennessee on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, to redress the alleged deprivation of their federal constitutional rights by legislation classifying voters with respect to representation in the General Assembly. They alleged that, by means of a 1901 statute of Tennessee arbitrarily and capriciously apportioning the seats in the General Assembly among the State's 95 counties, and a failure to reapportion them subsequently notwithstanding substantial growth and redistribution of the State's population, they suffer a "debasement of their votes," and were thereby denied the equal protection of the laws guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the 1901 statute is unconstitutional and an injunction restraining certain state officers from conducting any further elections under it. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that no claim was because it belonged to the state legislature. More precisely, the court held that the question before the court was a political one and was not justifiable. Plaintiff appealed. ISSUE: Where a case involves legislative apportionment, is the issue a political one such that it is not appropriately heard by the courts? HELD: No, but for this case they had a special exception. From a review of numerous Supreme Court decisions, there can be no doubt that the federal rule, as enunciated and applied by the Supreme Court, is that the federal courts, whether from a lack of jurisdiction or from the inappropriateness of the subject matter for judicial consideration, will not intervene in cases of this type to compel legislative reapportionment, they made an exception on for this case. In light of the District Court's treatment of the case, they hold (only for this case): (a) That the court possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter; (b) That a justiciable cause of action is stated upon which appellants would be entitled to appropriate relief, (c) Because appellees raise the issue before this Court, that the appellants have standing to challenge the Tennessee apportionment statutes. Beyond noting that we have no cause at this stage to doubt the District Court will be able to fashion relief if violations of constitutional rights are found, it is improper now to consider what remedy would be most appropriate if appellants prevail at the trial. Federal courts consistently refuse to exercise their equity powers in cases posing political issues arising from a state's geographical distribution of electoral strength among its political subdivisions. A federal court cannot pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the United States, void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies. Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.

DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT, also known as GERMAN AGENCY FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION, (GTZ). V HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARIEL CADIENTE SANTOS (G.R. No. 152318, April 16, 2009)

FACTS: The governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified an Agreement concerning Technical Co-operation (Agreement) in Bonn, West Germany. The Agreement affirmed the countries’ common interest in promoting the technical and economic development of their States, and recognized the benefits to be derived by both States from closer technical co-operation," and allowed for the conclusion of "arrangements concerning individual projects of technical co-operation." While the Agreement provided for a limited term of effective of five (5) years, it nonetheless was stated that "the Agreement shall be tacitly extended for successive periods of one year unless either of the two Contracting Parties denounces it in writing three months prior to its expiry," and that even upon the Agreement’s expiry, its provisions would "continue to apply to any projects agreed until their completion." On 10 December 1999, the Philippine government, through then Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon, and the German government, agreed to an Arrangement in furtherance of the 1971 Agreement, which affirmed the common commitment of both governments to promote jointly a project called Social Health Insurance Networking and Empowerment (SHINE) which was designed to "enable Philippine families especially poor ones and to maintain their health and secure health care of sustainable quality." The Republic of Germany assigned the GTZ as the implementing corporation for the program while the Philippines designated the Department of Health and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH). Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to work for SHINE. But in September of 1999, Anne Nicolay (Nicolay), a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE Project Manager. Private respondents' had a misunderstanding with the Project Manager of SHINE. It was claimed that SHINE under Nicolay had veered away from its original purpose to facilitate the development of social health insurance by shoring up the national health insurance program and strengthening local initiatives, as Nicolay had refused to support local partners and new initiatives on the premise that community and local government unit schemes were not sustainable a philosophy that supposedly betrayed Nicolay’s lack of understanding of the purpose of the project. This lead to an exchange of letters which was interpreted to be the resignation of the private respondents. Private respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to the labor arbiter. GTZ, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case, as its acts were undertaken in the discharge of the governmental functions and sovereign acts of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This was opposed by private respondents with the arguments that GTZ had failed to secure a certification that it was immune from suit from the Department of Foreign Affairs, and that it was GTZ and not the German government which had implemented the SHINE Project and entered into the contracts of employment. The Labor Arbiter issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. The Order cited, among others, that GTZ was a private corporation which entered into an employment contract; and that GTZ had failed to secure from the DFA a certification as to its diplomatic status. GTZ did not file a motion for reconsideration to the Labor Arbiters Decision or elevate said decision for appeal to the NLRC. Instead, GTZ opted to assail the decision by way of a special civil action for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution dismissing GTZs petition, finding that judicial recourse at this stage of the case is uncalled for, the appropriate remedy of the petitioners being an appeal to the NLRC. Thus, the present petition for review under Rule 45, assailing the decision and resolutions of the Court of Appeals and of the Labor Arbiter. ISSUE: 1. WON GTZ can invoke State immunity from suit. HELD: NO, GTZ cannot invoke State immunity from suit even if their activities performed pertaining to SHINE project are government in nature. The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign state, is reflected in Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that the State may not be sued without its consent. In this case, GTZ’s counsel described GTZ as the implementing agency of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, however it does not automatically mean that it has the ability to invoke State immunity from suit. They had failed to adduce evidence, a certification from Department of Foreign Affairs which could have been their factual basis for its claim of immunity. At the same time, it appears that GTZ was actually organized not through a legislative public charter, but under private law, in the same way that Philippine corporations can be organized under the Corporation Code even if fully owned by the Philippine government. The apparent equivalent under Philippine law is that of a corporation organized under the Corporation Code but owned by the Philippine government, or a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) without original charter. And it bears notice that Section 36 of the Corporate Code states that every corporation incorporated under this Code has the power and capacity to sue and be sued in its corporate name. The Court is thus holds and so rules that GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal Republic of Germany. The nature of the acts performed by the entity invoking immunity remains the most important barometer for testing whether the privilege of State immunity from suit should apply. At the same time, our Constitution stipulates that a State immunity from suit is conditional on its withholding of consent; hence, the laws and circumstances pertaining to the creation and legal personality of an instrumentality or agency invoking immunity remain relevant. Consent to be sued, as exhibited in this decision, is often conferred by the very same statute or general law creating the instrumentality or agency

KILOSBAYAN INCORPORATED VS. GUINGONA (GR No. 113375, May 5 1994)

FACTS: Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. After learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad- a multinational company became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors, a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be the medium through which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO. PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO and a bidding was made. The bids submitted by PGMC were evaluated by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office of the President. PGMC won the bid and a contract of lease was awarded to them. On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Presidential Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of the following grounds: 1.PGMC does not meet the nationality requirement because it is 75% foreign owned (owned by a Malaysian firm Berjaya Group Berhad); 2.PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), is prohibited from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity”; 3.The network system sought to be built by PGMC for PCSO is a telecommunications network. Under the law (Act No. 3846), a franchise is needed to be granted by the Congress before any person may be allowed to set up such; 4.PGMC’s articles of incorporation, as well as the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) does not allow it to install, establish and operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications systems. Petitioners also submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic." PGMC and PCSO, through Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Renato Corona, Executive Secretary and Asst. Executive Secretary respectively, alleged that PGMC is not a collaborator but merely a contractor for a piece of work,( i.e., the building of the network;) and that PGMC is a mere lessor of the network it will build as evidenced by the nature of the contract agreed upon, (i.e., Contract of Lease.) Petitioner seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on- line lottery system, also known as "lotto." ISSUE: WON the oppositions made by the petitioner was valid. HELD: The Court agrees with the petitioners and the challenged Contract of Lease executed by respondent PCSO and respondent PGMC is declared to be contrary to law and invalid. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners which was raised by the respondents should be resolved in their favor. The Court finds this petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. On the substantive issue regarding the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by B.P. Blg. 42, is indisputably clear with respect to its franchise or privilege "to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities." Meaning, the PCSO cannot exercise it "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party. Thus, the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law.