FACTS
Petitioner is a co-owner of a lot and a building wherein his wife, Elizabeth Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pasto possessed one of the units in the building. His mother and brother contested, and a complaint was initiated against the wife and Pasto in the Lupong Tagapamayapa. Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as Punong barangay.In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD
No. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government Lawyers. Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded,that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service." Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
However, as a civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned as provided in Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not
impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of
directors.
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent also failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's Oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Monday, November 4, 2019
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY
B.M. No. 1678
December 17, 2007
FACTS
Benjamin M. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1960. He migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments. He renounced his Philippine citizenship and applied for Canadian citizenship to avail its free medical program. Two years after, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003) petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship and intended to resume his law practice. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.
HELD
No. Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court: SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
Benjamin M. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1960. He migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments. He renounced his Philippine citizenship and applied for Canadian citizenship to avail its free medical program. Two years after, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003) petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship and intended to resume his law practice. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.
HELD
No. Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court: SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
Friday, October 18, 2019
MICIANO V BRIMO G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
FACTS
Joseph Brimo, an alien testator (Turk), made his will in the Philippines. Stated in the will that his property should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law, and not that of his nation. The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased filed a scheme of partition. However, one of the brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition and contends that the deceased was a Turkish citizen, which his disposition should be in accordance with the laws of his nationality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws.
RULING:
No, the Turkish law should govern the disposition of his property pursuant to Article 16. According to Article 16 of the Civil Code, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. The provision in the will is not valid. The last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Said condition then is considered unwritten, hence the institution of legatees is unconditional and consequently valid and effective. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions. The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
Joseph Brimo, an alien testator (Turk), made his will in the Philippines. Stated in the will that his property should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law, and not that of his nation. The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased filed a scheme of partition. However, one of the brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition and contends that the deceased was a Turkish citizen, which his disposition should be in accordance with the laws of his nationality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws.
RULING:
No, the Turkish law should govern the disposition of his property pursuant to Article 16. According to Article 16 of the Civil Code, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. The provision in the will is not valid. The last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Said condition then is considered unwritten, hence the institution of legatees is unconditional and consequently valid and effective. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions. The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
DE LA VIÑA v VILLAREAL
G.R. No. L-13982, July 31, 1920
FACTS
Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint of divorce in Court of First Instance in Iloilo against her husband, herein petitioner on the ground of concubinage since 1913. They had acquired properties, real and personal, all of which was under the administration of the petitioner. Because of her husband’s illicit relations, she was ejected from their conjugal home, for which she was obliged to live in Iloilo City, where she had established her habitual residence.
After filing the complaint, she presented a motion for preliminary injunction to restrain her husband from alienating or encumbering the conjugal property. Respondent Judge Antonio Villareal granted the motion. Petitioner, Diego De la Vina filed present case of petition for certiorari on the ground that judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action and exceeded his power and authority in issuing preliminary injuction. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not a married woman ever acquires a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage.
2. In an action for divorce, brought by the wife against her husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, may the wife obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action?
RULING
Yes. It is true, as a general of law, that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband. This rule is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and of interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of the one is that of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail. But the authorities are unanimous in holding that this is not an absolute rule. Although the law fixes the domicile of the wife as being that of her husband, universal jurisprudence recognizes an exception to the rule in the case where the husband's conduct has been such as to furnish lawful ground for a divorce, which justifies her in leaving him, and, therefore, necessarily authorities her to live elsewhere and to acquire a separate domicile. The law making the domicile of the husband that of the wife is applicable only to their relations with third parties and has no application in cases of actual separation and controversy between themselves as to the temporary or permanent severance of the marriage ties by judicial proceedings.
2. No. The power to grant preliminary injunctions, both preventative and mandatory, is a logical and necessary incident of the general powers conferred upon Courts of First Instance in these Islands, as courts of record of general and unlimited original jurisdiction, both legal and equitable. Section 164 of Act No. 190 provides:
A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established, in the manner hereinafter provided, to the satisfaction of the judge granting it:
1. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of either for a limited period or perpetually;
2. That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff;
3. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, on is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
In her motion for a preliminary injunction, Narcisa Geopano alleged that the defendant was about to alienate or encumber the property belonging to the conjugal partnerships, with the object of injuring her interests; and this allegation does not appear to have been controverted by the defendant either in this court or in the court below. In view of this fact, we are of the opinion that under both paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 164 of Act No. 190, above quoted, the respondent judge was empowered and justified in granting the preliminary injunction prayed for by her. It cannot be doubted that, if the defendant should dispose of all or any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action for divorce, and squander or fraudulently conceal the proceeds, that act "would probably work injustice to the plaintiff," or that it would probably be "in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual." In this case the plaintiff's rights sought to be protected by said paragraph 3 is not the right to administer the conjugal property, as counsel for the petitioner believes, but the right to share in the conjugal property upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
Honorable Antonio Villareal, as Auxiliary Judge sitting in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo, had jurisdiction to hear and determine the action for divorce instituted in said court by the respondent Narcisa Geopano, and that he did not exceed his power and authority in issuing a preliminary injunction against the defendant, prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action.
Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint of divorce in Court of First Instance in Iloilo against her husband, herein petitioner on the ground of concubinage since 1913. They had acquired properties, real and personal, all of which was under the administration of the petitioner. Because of her husband’s illicit relations, she was ejected from their conjugal home, for which she was obliged to live in Iloilo City, where she had established her habitual residence.
After filing the complaint, she presented a motion for preliminary injunction to restrain her husband from alienating or encumbering the conjugal property. Respondent Judge Antonio Villareal granted the motion. Petitioner, Diego De la Vina filed present case of petition for certiorari on the ground that judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action and exceeded his power and authority in issuing preliminary injuction. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not a married woman ever acquires a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage.
2. In an action for divorce, brought by the wife against her husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, may the wife obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action?
RULING
Yes. It is true, as a general of law, that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband. This rule is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and of interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of the one is that of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail. But the authorities are unanimous in holding that this is not an absolute rule. Although the law fixes the domicile of the wife as being that of her husband, universal jurisprudence recognizes an exception to the rule in the case where the husband's conduct has been such as to furnish lawful ground for a divorce, which justifies her in leaving him, and, therefore, necessarily authorities her to live elsewhere and to acquire a separate domicile. The law making the domicile of the husband that of the wife is applicable only to their relations with third parties and has no application in cases of actual separation and controversy between themselves as to the temporary or permanent severance of the marriage ties by judicial proceedings.
2. No. The power to grant preliminary injunctions, both preventative and mandatory, is a logical and necessary incident of the general powers conferred upon Courts of First Instance in these Islands, as courts of record of general and unlimited original jurisdiction, both legal and equitable. Section 164 of Act No. 190 provides:
A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established, in the manner hereinafter provided, to the satisfaction of the judge granting it:
1. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of either for a limited period or perpetually;
2. That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff;
3. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, on is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
In her motion for a preliminary injunction, Narcisa Geopano alleged that the defendant was about to alienate or encumber the property belonging to the conjugal partnerships, with the object of injuring her interests; and this allegation does not appear to have been controverted by the defendant either in this court or in the court below. In view of this fact, we are of the opinion that under both paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 164 of Act No. 190, above quoted, the respondent judge was empowered and justified in granting the preliminary injunction prayed for by her. It cannot be doubted that, if the defendant should dispose of all or any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action for divorce, and squander or fraudulently conceal the proceeds, that act "would probably work injustice to the plaintiff," or that it would probably be "in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual." In this case the plaintiff's rights sought to be protected by said paragraph 3 is not the right to administer the conjugal property, as counsel for the petitioner believes, but the right to share in the conjugal property upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
Honorable Antonio Villareal, as Auxiliary Judge sitting in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo, had jurisdiction to hear and determine the action for divorce instituted in said court by the respondent Narcisa Geopano, and that he did not exceed his power and authority in issuing a preliminary injunction against the defendant, prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action.
GALLEGO v VERRA
G.R. No. L-48641
November 24, 1941
FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI-Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner's election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification. Gallego is a native of Abuyog. After his studies, he was employed as a schoolteacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte. In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a plantation of Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in September 1940.Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election for assemblymen held in December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained and paid for his residence certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for one and a half years. Under the foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at the time he was elected mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
RULING:
NO. In the definition of "residence"in the election law, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: (1) When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937; (2) His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the election; (3) He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government; and (5) He visited his family thrice despite the great distance between Leyte and Bukidnon.
The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to "exclude a stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from an elective office to serve that community."
Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality.
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI-Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner's election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification. Gallego is a native of Abuyog. After his studies, he was employed as a schoolteacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte. In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a plantation of Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in September 1940.Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election for assemblymen held in December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained and paid for his residence certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for one and a half years. Under the foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at the time he was elected mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
RULING:
NO. In the definition of "residence"in the election law, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: (1) When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937; (2) His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the election; (3) He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government; and (5) He visited his family thrice despite the great distance between Leyte and Bukidnon.
The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to "exclude a stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from an elective office to serve that community."
Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality.
KOH v CA
G.R. No. L-40428
December 17, 1975
FACTS
Francisco T. Koh (Koh) filed before the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, a complaint of Forcible Entry and Detainer against the Jose Coloma (Coloma) for the possession of a house and lot located at 480, Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal, on which the latter and his family were all residing. To settle the issue, Koh and Coloma entered into a compromise settlement in court whereby Coloma will pay Koh. Coloma failed to pay Koh. And the check that Coloma issued bounced which lead to Koh to file a criminal charge against Coloma in Pasig City and evicted the latter’s family on the house. However, the said criminal charge has been dismissed.
On February 21, 1974, Coloma filed a Complaint for damages against Koh in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. Koh filed a Motion to Dismiss the said Complaint on the grounds that the same fails to state a sufficient cause of action and that venue has been improperly laid. However, it was denied by the court. Filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order reiterating therein the matter stated in his Reply to Opposition, which was not considered by the lower court, but it was also denied. the petitioner herein instituted certiorari proceedings with preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeal the same being but was also denied for failure of the petitioner to attach thereto certified true copies of the Orders appealed from by reason of their unavailability. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Appellate Court erred and thus committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before it and in holding that private respondent Jose P. Coloma is a resident of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and thereby holding that venue of the action before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte was proper, and in finding that the complaint of private respondent Coloma in the trial court recites a sufficient cause of action.
HELD
Yes, CA had committed grave abuse of discretion. It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is likewise undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile, denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the in ten petitions of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
The law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words "resides or may be found," and not "is domiciled," thus:
Sec. 2(b) Personal actions — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
The court is convinced that the misunderstanding between petitioner and private respondent Coloma has gone to such an extent that it would not be surprising for respondent Coloma to be motivated by vengeance when he filed his action for damages against the petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte in order to get even with and impose all kinds of inconveniences on the petitioner. Otherwise,' it would have been easier and very much more convenient for both parties if the civil action for damages against petitioner had been filed either in the C.F.I. of Quezon City or Pasig, Rizal, because both petitioner and private respondent are admittedly residing within the greater Manila area.
Francisco T. Koh (Koh) filed before the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, a complaint of Forcible Entry and Detainer against the Jose Coloma (Coloma) for the possession of a house and lot located at 480, Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal, on which the latter and his family were all residing. To settle the issue, Koh and Coloma entered into a compromise settlement in court whereby Coloma will pay Koh. Coloma failed to pay Koh. And the check that Coloma issued bounced which lead to Koh to file a criminal charge against Coloma in Pasig City and evicted the latter’s family on the house. However, the said criminal charge has been dismissed.
On February 21, 1974, Coloma filed a Complaint for damages against Koh in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. Koh filed a Motion to Dismiss the said Complaint on the grounds that the same fails to state a sufficient cause of action and that venue has been improperly laid. However, it was denied by the court. Filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order reiterating therein the matter stated in his Reply to Opposition, which was not considered by the lower court, but it was also denied. the petitioner herein instituted certiorari proceedings with preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeal the same being but was also denied for failure of the petitioner to attach thereto certified true copies of the Orders appealed from by reason of their unavailability. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Appellate Court erred and thus committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before it and in holding that private respondent Jose P. Coloma is a resident of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and thereby holding that venue of the action before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte was proper, and in finding that the complaint of private respondent Coloma in the trial court recites a sufficient cause of action.
HELD
Yes, CA had committed grave abuse of discretion. It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is likewise undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile, denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the in ten petitions of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
The law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words "resides or may be found," and not "is domiciled," thus:
Sec. 2(b) Personal actions — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
The court is convinced that the misunderstanding between petitioner and private respondent Coloma has gone to such an extent that it would not be surprising for respondent Coloma to be motivated by vengeance when he filed his action for damages against the petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte in order to get even with and impose all kinds of inconveniences on the petitioner. Otherwise,' it would have been easier and very much more convenient for both parties if the civil action for damages against petitioner had been filed either in the C.F.I. of Quezon City or Pasig, Rizal, because both petitioner and private respondent are admittedly residing within the greater Manila area.
Friday, August 9, 2019
ERNESTO S. MERCADO V EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO
G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999
FACTS
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado (Mercado) and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano (Manzano) were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 1998 elections. Respondent won. A certain Ernesto Mamaril (Mamaril) filed a petition for disqualification against Manzano on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. Commission on Election (COMELEC) granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.
According to COMELEC, respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. Thus, he is considered as dual citizen. And as a law, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.3 The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998. petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent. The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution in favor of Manzano. respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth.
Petitioner contends that COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and cannot run for public office.
HELD
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
The phrase “dual citizenship” in the Local Government Code must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment. The COMELEC en banc’s ruling was that Manzano’s act of registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that “a person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory.” But this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. Nevertheless, our SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado (Mercado) and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano (Manzano) were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 1998 elections. Respondent won. A certain Ernesto Mamaril (Mamaril) filed a petition for disqualification against Manzano on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. Commission on Election (COMELEC) granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.
According to COMELEC, respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. Thus, he is considered as dual citizen. And as a law, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.3 The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998. petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent. The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution in favor of Manzano. respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth.
Petitioner contends that COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and cannot run for public office.
HELD
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
The phrase “dual citizenship” in the Local Government Code must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment. The COMELEC en banc’s ruling was that Manzano’s act of registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that “a person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory.” But this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. Nevertheless, our SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
Friday, July 19, 2019
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION V ASIAVEST
G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015
FACTS
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the incorporation of an associate company known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into contracts to construct rural roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia. In connection with this construction contract, PNCC obtained various guarantees and bonds from Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to guarantee the due performance of its obligations. The four contracts of guaranty stipulate that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad shall guarantee to the State of Pahang "the due performance by PNCC of its construction contracts and the repayment of the temporary advances given to PNCC." These contracts were understood to be governed by the laws of Malaysia.
There was failure to perform the obligations under the construction contract, prompting the State of Pahang to demand payment against Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad's performance bonds. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a Complaint16 for recovery of sum of money against PNCC before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. It based its action on Malaysian laws. Specifically, it invoked Section 9818 of the Malaysian Contracts Act of 1950 and Section 1119 of the Malaysian Civil Law Act of 1956. The trial court declared PNCC in default for failure to file any responsive pleading and allowed Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to present its evidence ex parte and rendered judgment in favor of Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad. The trial court found that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad complied with the requisites for proof of written foreign laws.24 The Malaysian laws invoked were found to be similar with Articles 2066 and 2067 of the Civil Code.
The trial court denied PNCC's Motion to Lift Order of and also denied PNCC's Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam. PNCC brought its case before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed PNCC's appeal for raising pure questions of law exclusively cognizable by this court. It likewise denied reconsideration. Hence, PNCC filed this Petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not our courts have subject matter jurisdiction over an action for recovery of sum of money filed by a Malaysian corporation against a Philippine corporation involving a contract executed and performed in Malaysia, and the applicability of the forum non conveniens principle.
RATIO
Yes. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is one such law that provides for the jurisdiction of our courts. A plain reading of Section 19 shows that civil actions for payment of sum of money are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of trial courts:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. -Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above mentioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000).
These jurisdictional amounts were adjusted to P300,000.00, and P400,000.00 in the case of Metro Manila. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig has jurisdiction over respondent's complaint for recovery of the sum of Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) 3,915,053.54.
"Forum non conveniens literally translates to 'the forum is inconvenient.' This doctrine applies in conflicts of law cases. It gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it appears that it is not the most convenient forum and the parties may seek redress in another one.97 It is a device "designed to frustrate illicit means for securing advantages and vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible if the venue of litigation (or dispute resolution) were left entirely to the whim of either party.
In the case of Puyat v. Zabarte, the court enumerated practical reasons when courts may refuse to entertain a case even though the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law:
1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there;
2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum, a practice known as forum shopping merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;
3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or aliens when the docket may already be overcrowded;
4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be maintained; and
5) The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.
On the other hand, courts may choose to assume jurisdiction subject to the following requisites: "(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision." The determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which must carefully consider the facts of the particular case. A mere invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens or an easy averment that foreign elements exist cannot operate to automatically divest a court of its jurisdiction. It is crucial for courts to determine first if facts were established such that special circumstances exist to warrant its desistance from assuming jurisdiction.
The trial court assumed jurisdiction and explained in its Order dated August 11, 1995 that on the contrary, to try the case in the Philippines, it is believed, would be more convenient to defendant corporation as its principal office is located in the Philippines, its records will be more accessible, witnesses would be readily available and entail less expenses in terms of legal services."
Petitioner is a domestic corporation with its main office in the Philippines. It is safe to assume that all of its pertinent documents in relation to its business would be available in its main office. Most of petitioner's officers and employees who were involved in the construction contract in Malaysia could most likely also be found in the Philippines. Thus, it is unexpected that a Philippine corporation would rather engage this civil suit before Malaysian courts. Our courts would be "better positioned to enforce [the] judgment and, ultimately, to dispense" in this case against petitioner. Also, petitioner failed to plead and show real and present danger that another jurisdiction commenced litigation and the foreign tribunal chose to exercise jurisdiction.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the incorporation of an associate company known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into contracts to construct rural roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia. In connection with this construction contract, PNCC obtained various guarantees and bonds from Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to guarantee the due performance of its obligations. The four contracts of guaranty stipulate that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad shall guarantee to the State of Pahang "the due performance by PNCC of its construction contracts and the repayment of the temporary advances given to PNCC." These contracts were understood to be governed by the laws of Malaysia.
There was failure to perform the obligations under the construction contract, prompting the State of Pahang to demand payment against Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad's performance bonds. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a Complaint16 for recovery of sum of money against PNCC before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. It based its action on Malaysian laws. Specifically, it invoked Section 9818 of the Malaysian Contracts Act of 1950 and Section 1119 of the Malaysian Civil Law Act of 1956. The trial court declared PNCC in default for failure to file any responsive pleading and allowed Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to present its evidence ex parte and rendered judgment in favor of Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad. The trial court found that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad complied with the requisites for proof of written foreign laws.24 The Malaysian laws invoked were found to be similar with Articles 2066 and 2067 of the Civil Code.
The trial court denied PNCC's Motion to Lift Order of and also denied PNCC's Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam. PNCC brought its case before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed PNCC's appeal for raising pure questions of law exclusively cognizable by this court. It likewise denied reconsideration. Hence, PNCC filed this Petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not our courts have subject matter jurisdiction over an action for recovery of sum of money filed by a Malaysian corporation against a Philippine corporation involving a contract executed and performed in Malaysia, and the applicability of the forum non conveniens principle.
RATIO
Yes. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is one such law that provides for the jurisdiction of our courts. A plain reading of Section 19 shows that civil actions for payment of sum of money are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of trial courts:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. -Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above mentioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000).
These jurisdictional amounts were adjusted to P300,000.00, and P400,000.00 in the case of Metro Manila. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig has jurisdiction over respondent's complaint for recovery of the sum of Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) 3,915,053.54.
"Forum non conveniens literally translates to 'the forum is inconvenient.' This doctrine applies in conflicts of law cases. It gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it appears that it is not the most convenient forum and the parties may seek redress in another one.97 It is a device "designed to frustrate illicit means for securing advantages and vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible if the venue of litigation (or dispute resolution) were left entirely to the whim of either party.
In the case of Puyat v. Zabarte, the court enumerated practical reasons when courts may refuse to entertain a case even though the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law:
1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there;
2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum, a practice known as forum shopping merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;
3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or aliens when the docket may already be overcrowded;
4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be maintained; and
5) The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.
On the other hand, courts may choose to assume jurisdiction subject to the following requisites: "(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision." The determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which must carefully consider the facts of the particular case. A mere invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens or an easy averment that foreign elements exist cannot operate to automatically divest a court of its jurisdiction. It is crucial for courts to determine first if facts were established such that special circumstances exist to warrant its desistance from assuming jurisdiction.
The trial court assumed jurisdiction and explained in its Order dated August 11, 1995 that on the contrary, to try the case in the Philippines, it is believed, would be more convenient to defendant corporation as its principal office is located in the Philippines, its records will be more accessible, witnesses would be readily available and entail less expenses in terms of legal services."
Petitioner is a domestic corporation with its main office in the Philippines. It is safe to assume that all of its pertinent documents in relation to its business would be available in its main office. Most of petitioner's officers and employees who were involved in the construction contract in Malaysia could most likely also be found in the Philippines. Thus, it is unexpected that a Philippine corporation would rather engage this civil suit before Malaysian courts. Our courts would be "better positioned to enforce [the] judgment and, ultimately, to dispense" in this case against petitioner. Also, petitioner failed to plead and show real and present danger that another jurisdiction commenced litigation and the foreign tribunal chose to exercise jurisdiction.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V REBESENCIO
G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015
FACTS
Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation established and existing under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Respondents were recruited and hired by Saudia as Flight Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from service on various dates in 2006. The respondents contended that the termination of their employment was illegal.
They alleged that the termination was made solely because they were pregnant. As respondents alleged, they had informed Saudia of their respective pregnancies and had gone through the necessary procedures to process their maternity leaves. Initially, Saudia had given its approval but later on informed respondents that its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had disapproved their maternity leaves. In addition, it required respondents to file their resignation letters. Respondents were told that if they did not resign, Saudia would terminate them all the same. The threat of termination entailed the loss of benefits, such as separation pay and ticket discount entitlements. The respondents were required to report to the office one month into their maternity leave.
Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents' maternity leaves and demand for their resignation on its "Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants" (Unified Contract) which provides that if the Air Hostess becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this shall render her employment contract as void and she will be terminated due to lack of medical fitness. The respondents averred that the Unified Contract took effect after the approval of their maternity leaves. Rather than comply and tender resignation letters, respondents filed separate appeal letters that were all rejected. Faced with the dilemma of resigning or totally losing their benefits, respondents executed handwritten resignation letters.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the respondents voluntarily resigned or were illegally terminated.
2. Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case
RATIO
1. Yes, the respondents were illegally dismissed. The petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi law does not allow the termination of employment of women who take maternity leaves Under the Labor Laws of Saudi Arabia and the Philippines, it is illegal and unlawful to terminate the employment of any woman by virtue of pregnancy. The law in Saudi Arabia is even more harsh and strict in that no employer can terminate the employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the same while on Maternity Leave, the specific provision of Saudi Labor Laws on the matter is hereto quoted as follows: “An employer may not terminate the employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the same while on maternity leave.” (Article 155, Labor Law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree No. M/51.)
2. Yes, the Philippine court has jurisdiction over the case. Saudia asserts that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the need to comply with these stipulations calls into operation the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, in turn, makes it necessary for Philippine tribunals to refrain from exercising jurisdiction. Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata, is a means of addressing the problem of parallel litigation. While the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata are designed to address the problem of parallel litigation within a single jurisdiction, forum non conveniens is a means devised to address parallel litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions. On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, the court state the rule, thus: Forum non conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.
It further stated: Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law. Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the stipulations of the Cabin Attendant contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia.
As argued by respondents, Saudia’s policy entails the termination of employment of flight attendants who become pregnant. At the risk of stating the obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that pertains specifically to women. Saudia’s policy excludes from and restricts employment on the basis of no other consideration but sex.
The court do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present physical limitations that may render difficult the performance of functions associated with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it would be the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so permanent and immutable that it must entail the termination of one’s employment. It is clear that any individual, regardless of gender, may be subject to exigencies that limit the performance of functions. However, they fail to appreciate how pregnancy could be such an impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but the complete termination of the means through which a woman earns a living. Oddly enough, the petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi law does not allow the termination of employment of women who take maternity leaves;
Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and practicable (i.e., “to make an intelligent decision”), Philippine tribunals may apply the foreign law selected by the parties. In fact, (albeit without meaning to make a pronouncement on the accuracy and reliability of respondents’ citation) in this case, respondents themselves have made averments as to the laws of Saudi Arabia.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner Brenda J. Betia is not solidarily liable with petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines, and second, that petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is liable for moral and exemplary damages. The June 16, 2011 Decision and the September 13, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006 are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. Accordingly, petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is ordered to pay respondents:
(1) Full backwages and all other benefits computed from the respective dates in which each of the respondents were illegally terminated until the finality of this Decision;
(2) Separation pay computed from the respective dates in which each of the respondents commenced employment until the finality of this Decision at the rate of one ( 1) month's salary for every year of service, with a fraction of a year of at least six ( 6) months being counted as one ( 1) whole year;
(3) Moral damages in the amount of Pl00,000.00 per respondent;
(4) Exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 per respondent; and
(5) Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award. Interest of 6% per annum shall likewise be imposed on the total judgment award from the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction thereof.
This case is REMANDED. to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed computation of the amounts due to respondents which petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines should pay without delay.
Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation established and existing under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Respondents were recruited and hired by Saudia as Flight Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from service on various dates in 2006. The respondents contended that the termination of their employment was illegal.
They alleged that the termination was made solely because they were pregnant. As respondents alleged, they had informed Saudia of their respective pregnancies and had gone through the necessary procedures to process their maternity leaves. Initially, Saudia had given its approval but later on informed respondents that its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had disapproved their maternity leaves. In addition, it required respondents to file their resignation letters. Respondents were told that if they did not resign, Saudia would terminate them all the same. The threat of termination entailed the loss of benefits, such as separation pay and ticket discount entitlements. The respondents were required to report to the office one month into their maternity leave.
Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents' maternity leaves and demand for their resignation on its "Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants" (Unified Contract) which provides that if the Air Hostess becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this shall render her employment contract as void and she will be terminated due to lack of medical fitness. The respondents averred that the Unified Contract took effect after the approval of their maternity leaves. Rather than comply and tender resignation letters, respondents filed separate appeal letters that were all rejected. Faced with the dilemma of resigning or totally losing their benefits, respondents executed handwritten resignation letters.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the respondents voluntarily resigned or were illegally terminated.
2. Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case
RATIO
1. Yes, the respondents were illegally dismissed. The petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi law does not allow the termination of employment of women who take maternity leaves Under the Labor Laws of Saudi Arabia and the Philippines, it is illegal and unlawful to terminate the employment of any woman by virtue of pregnancy. The law in Saudi Arabia is even more harsh and strict in that no employer can terminate the employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the same while on Maternity Leave, the specific provision of Saudi Labor Laws on the matter is hereto quoted as follows: “An employer may not terminate the employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the same while on maternity leave.” (Article 155, Labor Law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree No. M/51.)
2. Yes, the Philippine court has jurisdiction over the case. Saudia asserts that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the need to comply with these stipulations calls into operation the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, in turn, makes it necessary for Philippine tribunals to refrain from exercising jurisdiction. Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata, is a means of addressing the problem of parallel litigation. While the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata are designed to address the problem of parallel litigation within a single jurisdiction, forum non conveniens is a means devised to address parallel litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions. On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, the court state the rule, thus: Forum non conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.
It further stated: Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law. Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the stipulations of the Cabin Attendant contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia.
As argued by respondents, Saudia’s policy entails the termination of employment of flight attendants who become pregnant. At the risk of stating the obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that pertains specifically to women. Saudia’s policy excludes from and restricts employment on the basis of no other consideration but sex.
The court do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present physical limitations that may render difficult the performance of functions associated with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it would be the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so permanent and immutable that it must entail the termination of one’s employment. It is clear that any individual, regardless of gender, may be subject to exigencies that limit the performance of functions. However, they fail to appreciate how pregnancy could be such an impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but the complete termination of the means through which a woman earns a living. Oddly enough, the petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi law does not allow the termination of employment of women who take maternity leaves;
Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and practicable (i.e., “to make an intelligent decision”), Philippine tribunals may apply the foreign law selected by the parties. In fact, (albeit without meaning to make a pronouncement on the accuracy and reliability of respondents’ citation) in this case, respondents themselves have made averments as to the laws of Saudi Arabia.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner Brenda J. Betia is not solidarily liable with petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines, and second, that petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is liable for moral and exemplary damages. The June 16, 2011 Decision and the September 13, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006 are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. Accordingly, petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is ordered to pay respondents:
(1) Full backwages and all other benefits computed from the respective dates in which each of the respondents were illegally terminated until the finality of this Decision;
(2) Separation pay computed from the respective dates in which each of the respondents commenced employment until the finality of this Decision at the rate of one ( 1) month's salary for every year of service, with a fraction of a year of at least six ( 6) months being counted as one ( 1) whole year;
(3) Moral damages in the amount of Pl00,000.00 per respondent;
(4) Exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 per respondent; and
(5) Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award. Interest of 6% per annum shall likewise be imposed on the total judgment award from the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction thereof.
This case is REMANDED. to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed computation of the amounts due to respondents which petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines should pay without delay.
Tuesday, July 16, 2019
PEDRO ARCE V CAPITAL INSURANCE
G.R. No. L-28501 September 30, 1982
FACTS
The Petitioner (insured) is the owner of a residential house in Tondo, Manila, which had been insured with the respondent insurance company since 1961. In November 1965, the respondent sent to the petitioner a Renewal Certificate to cover the period from December 5, 1965 to December 5,1966 and requested payment of the corresponding premium. Anticipating that the premium could not be paid on time, the petitioner asked for an extension which was granted by the respondent. After the lapse of the requested extension, petitioner still failed to pay the premium.
Thereafter, the house of the petitioner was totally destroyed by fire. Upon petitioner’s presentation of claim for indemnity, he was told that no indemnity was due because the premium was not paid. Nonetheless the respondent tendered a check for P300.00 as financial aid which was received by his daughter. The petitioner sued the respondent for indemnity. The trial court held the respondent liable to indemnify the petitioner on the ground that since the Insurance company could have demanded payment of the premium, mutuality of obligation required that it should be liable on the policy. Hence, this appeal by the respondent on question of law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to claim from their policy despite non-payment of their premium.
RATIO
No. The parties in this case had stipulated that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the policy, the insurance will be deemed valid and binding upon the Company only when the premium and documentary stamps therefor have actually been paid in full and duly acknowledged in an official receipt signed by an authorized official/representative of the Company.
It is obvious from both the Insurance Act, as amended, and the stipulation of the parties that time is of the essence in respect of the payment of the insurance premium so that if it is not paid the contract does not take effect unless there is still another stipulation to the contrary. In the instant case, the INSURED was given a grace period to pay the premium but the period having expired with no payment made, he cannot insist that the COMPANY is nonetheless obligated to him.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is reversed; the appellee's complaint is dismissed. No special pronouncement as to costs.
The Petitioner (insured) is the owner of a residential house in Tondo, Manila, which had been insured with the respondent insurance company since 1961. In November 1965, the respondent sent to the petitioner a Renewal Certificate to cover the period from December 5, 1965 to December 5,1966 and requested payment of the corresponding premium. Anticipating that the premium could not be paid on time, the petitioner asked for an extension which was granted by the respondent. After the lapse of the requested extension, petitioner still failed to pay the premium.
Thereafter, the house of the petitioner was totally destroyed by fire. Upon petitioner’s presentation of claim for indemnity, he was told that no indemnity was due because the premium was not paid. Nonetheless the respondent tendered a check for P300.00 as financial aid which was received by his daughter. The petitioner sued the respondent for indemnity. The trial court held the respondent liable to indemnify the petitioner on the ground that since the Insurance company could have demanded payment of the premium, mutuality of obligation required that it should be liable on the policy. Hence, this appeal by the respondent on question of law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to claim from their policy despite non-payment of their premium.
RATIO
No. The parties in this case had stipulated that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the policy, the insurance will be deemed valid and binding upon the Company only when the premium and documentary stamps therefor have actually been paid in full and duly acknowledged in an official receipt signed by an authorized official/representative of the Company.
It is obvious from both the Insurance Act, as amended, and the stipulation of the parties that time is of the essence in respect of the payment of the insurance premium so that if it is not paid the contract does not take effect unless there is still another stipulation to the contrary. In the instant case, the INSURED was given a grace period to pay the premium but the period having expired with no payment made, he cannot insist that the COMPANY is nonetheless obligated to him.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is reversed; the appellee's complaint is dismissed. No special pronouncement as to costs.
TRANSIMEX CO v. MAFRE ASIAN INSURANCE CORP
G.R. No. 190271, September 14, 2016
FACTS
On 21 May 1996, M/V Meryem Ana received a shipment of Prilled Urea Fertilizer from Helm Duengemittel GMBH at Odessa, Ukraine. The shipment was covered by two separate bills of lading and consigned to Fertiphil for delivery to two ports - one in Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union; and the other in Tabaco, Albay. Fertiphil insured the cargo against all risks under Marine Risk Note issued by respondent.
The present controversy involves only this second delivery. When the cargo was subsequently weighed, it was discovered that there is an alleged shortage of 349.65 metric tons. In line with this, Fertiphil filed a claim with respondent for P1,617,527.37 which was found compensable. After paying the claim of Fertiphil, respondent demanded reimbursement from petitioner based on the right of subrogation. The claim was denied, prompting respondent to file a Complaint with the RTC for recovery of sum of money. In support of its claim, respondent presented a Report of Survey and a Certification from David Cargo Survey Services to prove the shortage. In the report, the adjuster also stated that the shortage was attributable to the melting of the fertilizer while inside the hatches, when the vessel took on water because of the bad weather experienced at sea.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to pay the claim based on the reason that there was indeed a shortage in the cargo delivered, for which the common carrier must be held responsible under Article 1734 of the Civil Code. To excuse a common carrier fully of any liability, Article 1739 of the Civil Code requires that the fortuitous event must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. Moreover, it should have exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after the occurrence of the fortuitous event.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but was denied and it affirmed the ruling of the RTC. In the present case, defendants-appellants did not present proof that the "bad weather" they encountered was a "storm" as contemplated by Article 1734(1). Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision, but the motion was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether the transaction is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers or by the provisions of Carriage of Goods at Sea Act (COGSA)
2. Whether petitioner is liable for the loss or damage sustained by the cargo because of bad weather.
RATIO
1. The provision of the Civil Code governs. Supreme Court upholds the ruling of the CA with respect to the applicable law. As expressly provided in Article 1753 of the Civil Code, "[t]he law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration." Since the cargo in this case was transported from Odessa, Ukraine, to Tabaco, Albay, the liability of petitioner for the alleged shortage must be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers.
2. Yes,petitioner is liable for the shortage incurred by the shipment. petitioner failed to prove the existence of a storm or a peril of the sea within the context of Article 1734(1) of the Civil Code or Section 4(2)(c) of COGSA. Furthermore, there was no sufficient proof that the damage to the shipment was solely and proximately caused by bad weather. It must be emphasized that not all instances of bad weather may be categorized as "storms" or "perils of the sea" within the meaning of the provisions of the Civil Code and COGSA on common carriers. To be considered absolutory causes under either statute, bad weather conditions must reach a certain threshold of severity. Nonetheless, to our mind it would not be enough to categorize the weather condition at the time as a "storm" within the absolutory causes enumerated in the law. Significantly, no typhoon was observed within the Philippine area of responsibility during that period.
In this case, the documentary and testimonial evidence cited by petitioner indicates that M/V Meryem Ana faced winds of only up to 40 knots while at sea. This wind force clearly fell short of the 48 to 55 knots required for "storms" under Article 1734(1) of the Civil Code based on the threshold established by PAGASA. Petitioner also failed to prove that the inclement weather encountered by the vessel was unusual, unexpected, or catastrophic. In particular, the strong winds and waves, which allegedly assaulted the ship, were not shown to be worse than what should have been expected in that particular location during that time of the year. Consequently, this Court cannot consider these weather conditions as "perils of the sea" that would absolve the carrier from liability. The Supreme Court emphasized that common carriers are automatically presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods they were transporting were lost, destroyed or damaged while in transit. Therefore, the Court cannot absolve petitioner from liability for the shortage incurred by the shipment.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution dated 27 August 2009 and 10 November 2009, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
On 21 May 1996, M/V Meryem Ana received a shipment of Prilled Urea Fertilizer from Helm Duengemittel GMBH at Odessa, Ukraine. The shipment was covered by two separate bills of lading and consigned to Fertiphil for delivery to two ports - one in Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union; and the other in Tabaco, Albay. Fertiphil insured the cargo against all risks under Marine Risk Note issued by respondent.
The present controversy involves only this second delivery. When the cargo was subsequently weighed, it was discovered that there is an alleged shortage of 349.65 metric tons. In line with this, Fertiphil filed a claim with respondent for P1,617,527.37 which was found compensable. After paying the claim of Fertiphil, respondent demanded reimbursement from petitioner based on the right of subrogation. The claim was denied, prompting respondent to file a Complaint with the RTC for recovery of sum of money. In support of its claim, respondent presented a Report of Survey and a Certification from David Cargo Survey Services to prove the shortage. In the report, the adjuster also stated that the shortage was attributable to the melting of the fertilizer while inside the hatches, when the vessel took on water because of the bad weather experienced at sea.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to pay the claim based on the reason that there was indeed a shortage in the cargo delivered, for which the common carrier must be held responsible under Article 1734 of the Civil Code. To excuse a common carrier fully of any liability, Article 1739 of the Civil Code requires that the fortuitous event must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. Moreover, it should have exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after the occurrence of the fortuitous event.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but was denied and it affirmed the ruling of the RTC. In the present case, defendants-appellants did not present proof that the "bad weather" they encountered was a "storm" as contemplated by Article 1734(1). Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision, but the motion was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether the transaction is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers or by the provisions of Carriage of Goods at Sea Act (COGSA)
2. Whether petitioner is liable for the loss or damage sustained by the cargo because of bad weather.
RATIO
1. The provision of the Civil Code governs. Supreme Court upholds the ruling of the CA with respect to the applicable law. As expressly provided in Article 1753 of the Civil Code, "[t]he law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration." Since the cargo in this case was transported from Odessa, Ukraine, to Tabaco, Albay, the liability of petitioner for the alleged shortage must be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers.
2. Yes,petitioner is liable for the shortage incurred by the shipment. petitioner failed to prove the existence of a storm or a peril of the sea within the context of Article 1734(1) of the Civil Code or Section 4(2)(c) of COGSA. Furthermore, there was no sufficient proof that the damage to the shipment was solely and proximately caused by bad weather. It must be emphasized that not all instances of bad weather may be categorized as "storms" or "perils of the sea" within the meaning of the provisions of the Civil Code and COGSA on common carriers. To be considered absolutory causes under either statute, bad weather conditions must reach a certain threshold of severity. Nonetheless, to our mind it would not be enough to categorize the weather condition at the time as a "storm" within the absolutory causes enumerated in the law. Significantly, no typhoon was observed within the Philippine area of responsibility during that period.
In this case, the documentary and testimonial evidence cited by petitioner indicates that M/V Meryem Ana faced winds of only up to 40 knots while at sea. This wind force clearly fell short of the 48 to 55 knots required for "storms" under Article 1734(1) of the Civil Code based on the threshold established by PAGASA. Petitioner also failed to prove that the inclement weather encountered by the vessel was unusual, unexpected, or catastrophic. In particular, the strong winds and waves, which allegedly assaulted the ship, were not shown to be worse than what should have been expected in that particular location during that time of the year. Consequently, this Court cannot consider these weather conditions as "perils of the sea" that would absolve the carrier from liability. The Supreme Court emphasized that common carriers are automatically presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods they were transporting were lost, destroyed or damaged while in transit. Therefore, the Court cannot absolve petitioner from liability for the shortage incurred by the shipment.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution dated 27 August 2009 and 10 November 2009, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL v. JOSE G. DE VERA
GR No. 205703, Mar 07, 2016
FACTS
Petitioner Industrial Personnel & Management Services, Inc. (IPAMS) is a local placement agency duly organized and existing under Philippine laws. Petitioner SNC Lavalin Engineers & Contractors, Inc. (SNC-Lavalin) is the principal of IPAMS, a Canadian company with business interests in several countries.
Respondent Alberto Arriola, a licensed general surgeon in the Philippines, was hired by SNC-Lavalin, through its local manning agency, IPAMS, as a safety officer in its Ambatovy Project site in Madagascar. After three months, Arriola received a notice of pre-termination of employment due to diminishing workload in the area of his expertise and the unavailability of alternative assignments. Consequently, Arriola was repatriated and he filed a complaint against the petitioners for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, vacation leave and sick leave pay before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
He claimed that SNC-Lavalin still owed him unpaid salaries equivalent to the three-month unexpired portion of his contract and asserted that the latter never offered any valid reason for his early termination and that he was not given enough notice regarding the same. He also insisted that the petitioners must prove the applicability of Canadian law before the same could be applied to his employment contract.
The petitioner denied the charge of illegal dismissal against them. They relied on a copy of the Employment Standards Act (ESA) of Ontario, which was duly authenticated by the Canadian authorities and certified by the Philippine Embassy. They insisted that all of Arriola's employment documents were processed in Canada, not to mention that SNC Lavalin's office was in Ontario, the principle of lex loci celebrationis was applicable. Hence, they insisted that Canadian laws governed the contract.
The said foreign law did not require any ground for early termination of employment, and the only requirement was the written notice of termination. Even if Philippine laws should apply, Arriola would still be validly dismissed because domestic law recognized retrenchment and redundancy as legal grounds for termination.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint of Arriola, while the NLRC reversed the LA's ruling stating the Filipino workers are protected by our labor laws wherever they may be working. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA arguing that it should be the ESA, or the Ontario labor law, that should be applied in Arriola's employment contract, but the Court of Appeals affirmed NLRC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
ISSUE Whether or not Canadian law shall be applied to this case.
RATIO
No, the foreign law invoked is contrary to the Constitution and the Labor Code. As a rule, Philippine laws apply even to overseas employment contracts. This rule is rooted in the constitutional provision of Section 3, Article XIII that the State shall afford full protection to labor, whether local or overseas. Hence, even if the OFW has his employment abroad, it does not strip him of his rights to security of tenure, humane conditions of work and a living wage under our Constitution. As an exception, the parties may agree that a foreign law shall govern the employment contract. A synthesis of the existing laws and jurisprudence reveals that this exception is subject to the following requisites:
1. That it is expressly stipulated in the overseas employment contract that a specific foreign law shall govern;
2.That the foreign law invoked must be proven before the courts pursuant to the Philippine rules on evidence;
3.That the foreign law stipulated in the overseas employment contract must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy of the Philippines; and
4.That the overseas employment contract must be processed through the POEA.
The Court is of the view that these four (4) requisites must be complied with before the employer could invoke the applicability of a foreign law to an overseas employment contract. With these requisites, the State would be able to abide by its constitutional obligation to ensure that the rights and well-being of our OFWs are fully protected. Lacking any one of the four requisites would invalidate the application of the foreign law, and the Philippine law shall govern the overseas employment contract.
In the present case, as correctly held by the CA, even though an authenticated copy of the ESA was submitted, it did not mean that said foreign law could be automatically applied to this case. The petitioners miserably failed to adhere to the two other requisites. The petitioners failed to comply with the first requisite because no foreign law was expressly stipulated in the overseas employment contract with Arriola. The petitioners did not directly cite any specific provision or stipulation in the said labor contract which indicated the applicability of the Canadian labor laws or the ESA. They failed to show on the face of the contract that a foreign law was agreed upon by the parties. Rather, they simply asserted that the terms and conditions of Arriola’s employment were embodied in the Expatriate Policy, Ambatovy Project - Site, Long Term.
The provisions of the ESA are patently inconsistent with the right to security of tenure.Both the Constitution and the Labor Code provide that this right is available to any employee. In a host of cases, the Court has upheld the employee's right to security of tenure in the face of oppressive management behavior and management prerogative. Security of tenure is a right which cannot be denied on mere speculation of any unclear and nebulous basis. Furthermore, not only do these provisions collide with the right to security of tenure, but they also deprive the employee of his constitutional right to due process by denying him of any notice of termination and the opportunity to be heard.
In fine, as the petitioners failed to meet all the four (4) requisites on the applicability of a foreign law, then the Philippine labor laws must govern the overseas employment contract of Arriola.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 24, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 118869 is AFFIRMED in toto.
CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC. v GEORGE E. OMELIO
G.R. No. 189102
June 07, 2017
FACTS
On August 31, 1993, thousands of banana plantation workers from over 14 countries instituted class suits for damages in the United States against 11 foreign corporations which includes the petitioner. The banana plantation workers claimed to have been exposed to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a pesticide used against roundworms and threadworms that thrive on and damage tropical fruits such as bananas and pineapples as a result, these workers suffered serious and permanent injuries to their reproductive systems. Unfortunately, the United States courts dismissed the actions on the ground of forum non conveniens and directed the claimants to file actions in their respective home countries.
Filipino claimants filed a complaint for damages against the same foreign corporations before the Regional Trial Court in Davao City. Before pre-trial these foreign companies entered into a worldwide settlement in the United States with all the banana plantation workers. The parties executed a document denominated as the "Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement" (Compromise Agreement). The Compromise Agreement provided, among others, that the settlement amount should be deposited in an escrow account, which should be administered by a mediator. After the claimants execute individual releases, the mediator shall give the checks representing the settlement amounts to the claimants' counsel, who shall then distribute the checks to each claimant.
The RTC of Panabo approved the compromised agreement and dismissed the petition of the claimant. Several claimants moved for the execution of the judgment on compromise but Chiquita, Dow, Occidental, Shell, and Del Monte opposed the execution on the ground of mootness. They argued that they had already complied with their obligation under the Compromise Agreement by depositing the settlement amounts into an escrow account, which was administered by the designated mediator. Hence, there was nothing left for the court to execute.Chiquita pointed out that the claimants' execution of individual quitclaims was an acknowledgement that they had received their respective share in the settlement amount.
After dismissal of the civil claim the claimants moved for the execution of the compromise agreement. The petitioner opposed the execution on the ground of mootness; they argued that they had already complied with their obligation by depositing the settlement amount into an escrow account. However, RTC of Panabo granted the motion for execution because there was no proof that they have fulfilled their obligation.
On May 2003 petitioner filed a motion to suspend the execution and be allowed to present evidence on their behalf. During the hearing of the case, the claimants picketed outside the court room and accused the RTC judge of Panabo as a corrupt official who delayed the execution. Petitioner requested for change of venue and was granted.
The case was transferred and now under the jurisdiction of the RTC of Davao city. On July 2009, the RTC of Davao city through Judge Omelio ordered the execution of the compromised agreement. Aggrieved by the RTC’s decision, the petitioner filed for a petition for certiorari even without a prior appeal to the CA.
Petitioner allege that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of execution and ordering them to directly pay each of the claimant contrary to the compromise agreement between petitioner and claimant.
ISSUES
1. Whether the hierarchy of courts was violated when the petitioner filed for certiorari to the Supreme Court without appealing first to the CA.
2. Whether or not Judge Omelio committed grave abuse of discretion.
RATIO
1. No. Under the principle of hierarchy or courts, direct recourse to the Supreme Court is improper because Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions. Nonetheless, the invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as, 1. When dictated by public welfare and advancement of public policy, 2. When demanded by broader interest of justice, 3. Where the challenged orders were patent nullities or 4. When analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case.
The Supreme Court took cognizance of this case in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency. The records of this case are enough for this Court to decide on the issues raised by the parties. Any further delay would unduly prejudice the parties.
2. Yes. Courts can neither amend nor modify the terms and conditions of a compromise validly entered into by the parties. In any case, a compromise validly entered has the authority and effect of res judicata as between the parties. A writ of execution that varies the respective obligation of the parties under a judicially approved compromise settlement is void. Under the judicially approved Compromise Agreement, petitioners are obliged to deposit the settlement amount in escrow within 10 business days after they receive a signed Compromise Agreement from the counsel of the claimants. There was nothing in the Compromise Agreement that required petitioners to ensure the distribution of the settlement amount to each claimant. Petitioners' obligation under the Compromise Agreement was limited to depositing the settlement amount in escrow. On the other hand, the actual distribution of the settlement amounts was delegated to the chosen mediator, Mr. Mills.
Consequently, the Omnibus Order dated December 14, 2006, which directed the implementation of the Writ of Execution, is likewise void. Ordinarily, courts have the ministerial duty to grant the execution of a final judgment.230 The prevailing party may immediately move for execution of the judgment, and the issuance of the writ follows as a matter of course.
A writ of execution may be stayed or quashed when "facts and circumstances transpire" after judgment has been rendered that would make "execution impossible or unjust." the Compromise Agreement did not impose solidary liability on the parties' subsidiaries, affiliates, controlled, and related entities, successors, and assigns but merely allowed them to benefit from its effects. Thus, respondent Judge Omelio gravely abused his discretion in holding that the petitioners' subsidiaries and affiliates were solidarily liable under the Compromise Agreement. Furthermore, there is no reason for respondent court to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. There is hardly any evidence to shew that petitioners abused their separate juridical identity to evade their obligation under the Compromise Agreement.
Hence Judge Omelio committed grave abuse of discretion.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed orders and writs are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
On August 31, 1993, thousands of banana plantation workers from over 14 countries instituted class suits for damages in the United States against 11 foreign corporations which includes the petitioner. The banana plantation workers claimed to have been exposed to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a pesticide used against roundworms and threadworms that thrive on and damage tropical fruits such as bananas and pineapples as a result, these workers suffered serious and permanent injuries to their reproductive systems. Unfortunately, the United States courts dismissed the actions on the ground of forum non conveniens and directed the claimants to file actions in their respective home countries.
Filipino claimants filed a complaint for damages against the same foreign corporations before the Regional Trial Court in Davao City. Before pre-trial these foreign companies entered into a worldwide settlement in the United States with all the banana plantation workers. The parties executed a document denominated as the "Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement" (Compromise Agreement). The Compromise Agreement provided, among others, that the settlement amount should be deposited in an escrow account, which should be administered by a mediator. After the claimants execute individual releases, the mediator shall give the checks representing the settlement amounts to the claimants' counsel, who shall then distribute the checks to each claimant.
The RTC of Panabo approved the compromised agreement and dismissed the petition of the claimant. Several claimants moved for the execution of the judgment on compromise but Chiquita, Dow, Occidental, Shell, and Del Monte opposed the execution on the ground of mootness. They argued that they had already complied with their obligation under the Compromise Agreement by depositing the settlement amounts into an escrow account, which was administered by the designated mediator. Hence, there was nothing left for the court to execute.Chiquita pointed out that the claimants' execution of individual quitclaims was an acknowledgement that they had received their respective share in the settlement amount.
After dismissal of the civil claim the claimants moved for the execution of the compromise agreement. The petitioner opposed the execution on the ground of mootness; they argued that they had already complied with their obligation by depositing the settlement amount into an escrow account. However, RTC of Panabo granted the motion for execution because there was no proof that they have fulfilled their obligation.
On May 2003 petitioner filed a motion to suspend the execution and be allowed to present evidence on their behalf. During the hearing of the case, the claimants picketed outside the court room and accused the RTC judge of Panabo as a corrupt official who delayed the execution. Petitioner requested for change of venue and was granted.
The case was transferred and now under the jurisdiction of the RTC of Davao city. On July 2009, the RTC of Davao city through Judge Omelio ordered the execution of the compromised agreement. Aggrieved by the RTC’s decision, the petitioner filed for a petition for certiorari even without a prior appeal to the CA.
Petitioner allege that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of execution and ordering them to directly pay each of the claimant contrary to the compromise agreement between petitioner and claimant.
ISSUES
1. Whether the hierarchy of courts was violated when the petitioner filed for certiorari to the Supreme Court without appealing first to the CA.
2. Whether or not Judge Omelio committed grave abuse of discretion.
RATIO
1. No. Under the principle of hierarchy or courts, direct recourse to the Supreme Court is improper because Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions. Nonetheless, the invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as, 1. When dictated by public welfare and advancement of public policy, 2. When demanded by broader interest of justice, 3. Where the challenged orders were patent nullities or 4. When analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case.
The Supreme Court took cognizance of this case in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency. The records of this case are enough for this Court to decide on the issues raised by the parties. Any further delay would unduly prejudice the parties.
2. Yes. Courts can neither amend nor modify the terms and conditions of a compromise validly entered into by the parties. In any case, a compromise validly entered has the authority and effect of res judicata as between the parties. A writ of execution that varies the respective obligation of the parties under a judicially approved compromise settlement is void. Under the judicially approved Compromise Agreement, petitioners are obliged to deposit the settlement amount in escrow within 10 business days after they receive a signed Compromise Agreement from the counsel of the claimants. There was nothing in the Compromise Agreement that required petitioners to ensure the distribution of the settlement amount to each claimant. Petitioners' obligation under the Compromise Agreement was limited to depositing the settlement amount in escrow. On the other hand, the actual distribution of the settlement amounts was delegated to the chosen mediator, Mr. Mills.
Consequently, the Omnibus Order dated December 14, 2006, which directed the implementation of the Writ of Execution, is likewise void. Ordinarily, courts have the ministerial duty to grant the execution of a final judgment.230 The prevailing party may immediately move for execution of the judgment, and the issuance of the writ follows as a matter of course.
A writ of execution may be stayed or quashed when "facts and circumstances transpire" after judgment has been rendered that would make "execution impossible or unjust." the Compromise Agreement did not impose solidary liability on the parties' subsidiaries, affiliates, controlled, and related entities, successors, and assigns but merely allowed them to benefit from its effects. Thus, respondent Judge Omelio gravely abused his discretion in holding that the petitioners' subsidiaries and affiliates were solidarily liable under the Compromise Agreement. Furthermore, there is no reason for respondent court to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. There is hardly any evidence to shew that petitioners abused their separate juridical identity to evade their obligation under the Compromise Agreement.
Hence Judge Omelio committed grave abuse of discretion.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed orders and writs are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
Monday, May 20, 2019
LUISON V GARCIA
103 PHIL 453
APRIL 25,1958
FACTS:
Anacleto Luison and Fidel A.D Garcia were both candidates for the mayoralty position. The certificate of candidacy of Luison was filed by the Nacionalista Party of the locality duly signed by the chairman and secretary respectively, while the certificate of candidacy of Garcia was filed by the local branch of the Liberal Party but it was merely signed by one who was a candidate for vice mayor. For this reason, the executive secretary of the Nationalista Party impugned the sufficiency of the certificate of candidacy filed in behalf of Garcia, whereupon the Commission on Elections, after making its own investigation, issued Resolution No. 23 declaring Garcia ineligible to run for the Office.
Garcia filed different petitions but was all denied by the court because the issue is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.Notwithstanding the adverse ruling of the Commission on Elections, as well as the dismissal of the petition for prohibition sued out by Garcia, the latter continued with his candidacy and the question of his ineligibility became an issue in the campaign. And when the time came for the counting and appreciation of the ballots, the board inspectors, in spite of the adverse ruling of the Commission on Elections, counted all the votes cast for Garcia as valid and credited him with them in the election returns with the result that he garnered 869 votes as against 675 of his opponent Luison.Consequently, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Garcia as the mayor elect of Tubay, Agusan.
Believing that Garcia is ineligible to hold office, Luison filed a petition of quo warranto in the proper court of first instance for the purpose of disputing his ineligibility and securing his consequent ouster from office, but the petition was dismissed for lack of merit on a motion filed by respondent. After the reception of the evidence, the court found for protestee holding that the certificate of candidacy filed by the latter was in substantial compliance with the law and that the Commission on Elections erred in declaring him legally insufficient. It therefore dismissed the protest with costs against protestant. Hence the present appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the protestee being ineligible and protestant having obtained the next highest number of votes, the latter can be declared entitled to hold the office to be vacated by the former.
HELD:
The court held in the negative. As this Court has held, "The general rule is that the fact a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.
In such case the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity" (Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil., 490). In a subsequent case, this Court also said that where the winning candidate has been declared ineligible, the person who obtained second place in the election cannot be declared elected since our law not only does not contain an express provision authorizing such declaration but apparently seems to prohibit it.
Moreover, a protest to disqualify a protestee on the ground of ineligibility is different from that a protest based on frauds and irregularities where it may be shown that protestant was the one really elected for having obtained a plurality of the legal votes. In the first case, while the protestee may be ousted the protestant will not be seated; in the second case, the protestant may assume office after protestee is unseated. The first case is brought to court by a petition of quo warranto, while the second by instituting an election protest. Thus, the Supreme Court, in defining these two remedies, said: All election disputes may be divided into two distinct classes: (1) those which pertain to the casting and counting of the ballots; and (2) those which pertain to the eligibility of the candidates. If there be cases incapable of being so classified, they have not been suggested. Considering the fundamental difference existing between the nature of a petition for quo warranto and that of an election protest, it may be said that a candidate who files a protest against one who has been proclaimed as having received the highest number of votes basing his protest cannot disguise his action so as to make his protest a justification to be seated in office. In other words, he cannot convert an action for quo warranto into an election protest. This is because these two cases are fundamentally different in nature and in purpose. In quo warranto, "there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, and the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate", while in a protest, "the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast (Topacio vs. Paredes, supra). The present action therefore, partakes of the nature of quo warranto and as such has no reason to exist.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed. The Court declares that neither protestee nor protestant has been validly elected and so none is entitled to the position of mayor of Tubay, Agusan. No pronouncement as to costs.
Anacleto Luison and Fidel A.D Garcia were both candidates for the mayoralty position. The certificate of candidacy of Luison was filed by the Nacionalista Party of the locality duly signed by the chairman and secretary respectively, while the certificate of candidacy of Garcia was filed by the local branch of the Liberal Party but it was merely signed by one who was a candidate for vice mayor. For this reason, the executive secretary of the Nationalista Party impugned the sufficiency of the certificate of candidacy filed in behalf of Garcia, whereupon the Commission on Elections, after making its own investigation, issued Resolution No. 23 declaring Garcia ineligible to run for the Office.
Garcia filed different petitions but was all denied by the court because the issue is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.Notwithstanding the adverse ruling of the Commission on Elections, as well as the dismissal of the petition for prohibition sued out by Garcia, the latter continued with his candidacy and the question of his ineligibility became an issue in the campaign. And when the time came for the counting and appreciation of the ballots, the board inspectors, in spite of the adverse ruling of the Commission on Elections, counted all the votes cast for Garcia as valid and credited him with them in the election returns with the result that he garnered 869 votes as against 675 of his opponent Luison.Consequently, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Garcia as the mayor elect of Tubay, Agusan.
Believing that Garcia is ineligible to hold office, Luison filed a petition of quo warranto in the proper court of first instance for the purpose of disputing his ineligibility and securing his consequent ouster from office, but the petition was dismissed for lack of merit on a motion filed by respondent. After the reception of the evidence, the court found for protestee holding that the certificate of candidacy filed by the latter was in substantial compliance with the law and that the Commission on Elections erred in declaring him legally insufficient. It therefore dismissed the protest with costs against protestant. Hence the present appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the protestee being ineligible and protestant having obtained the next highest number of votes, the latter can be declared entitled to hold the office to be vacated by the former.
HELD:
The court held in the negative. As this Court has held, "The general rule is that the fact a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.
In such case the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity" (Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil., 490). In a subsequent case, this Court also said that where the winning candidate has been declared ineligible, the person who obtained second place in the election cannot be declared elected since our law not only does not contain an express provision authorizing such declaration but apparently seems to prohibit it.
Moreover, a protest to disqualify a protestee on the ground of ineligibility is different from that a protest based on frauds and irregularities where it may be shown that protestant was the one really elected for having obtained a plurality of the legal votes. In the first case, while the protestee may be ousted the protestant will not be seated; in the second case, the protestant may assume office after protestee is unseated. The first case is brought to court by a petition of quo warranto, while the second by instituting an election protest. Thus, the Supreme Court, in defining these two remedies, said: All election disputes may be divided into two distinct classes: (1) those which pertain to the casting and counting of the ballots; and (2) those which pertain to the eligibility of the candidates. If there be cases incapable of being so classified, they have not been suggested. Considering the fundamental difference existing between the nature of a petition for quo warranto and that of an election protest, it may be said that a candidate who files a protest against one who has been proclaimed as having received the highest number of votes basing his protest cannot disguise his action so as to make his protest a justification to be seated in office. In other words, he cannot convert an action for quo warranto into an election protest. This is because these two cases are fundamentally different in nature and in purpose. In quo warranto, "there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, and the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate", while in a protest, "the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast (Topacio vs. Paredes, supra). The present action therefore, partakes of the nature of quo warranto and as such has no reason to exist.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed. The Court declares that neither protestee nor protestant has been validly elected and so none is entitled to the position of mayor of Tubay, Agusan. No pronouncement as to costs.
Sunday, May 19, 2019
RAMIREZ V COMELEC
GR 112013
MARCH 26,1997
FACTS
The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Gipolos, Eastern Samar proclaimed petitioner Ramirez winner in the vice-mayoralty race over another candidate, private respondent Go based on the results showing that Ramirez obtained more votes than Go.
Go petitioned COMELEC for correction of manifest error claiming that owing to error in addition, he was credited with lesser votes. The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution directing the MBC to reconvene and recompute the votes in the Statement of Votes and proclaim the winning candidate. Acting on separate motions filed by Ramirez and Go, the COMELEC en banc affirmed its earlier resolution.
Ramirez petitioned the Supreme Court to annul the 2 COMELEC en banc resolutions and to reinstate his proclamation as the duly elected vice-mayor. He alleged that the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction over the controversy since it was not yet acted upon by a division of the COMELEC.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act directly on the petition for correction of manifest error filed by private respondent Go?
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, citing Rule 27, Section 5 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules which provides correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of results during the canvassing as one of the pre-proclamation controversies which maybe filed directly with the COMELEC en banc.
The Supreme Court annulled the COMELEC resolutions but directed COMELEC to reconvene the MBC or if this is not feasible, to constitute a new MBC in Gipolos, Eastern Samar and to order it to promptly revise the Statement of Votes based on the election returns from all the precincts of the Municipality and thereafter, proclaim the winning candidate.
Principle/ Doctrine:
Pre-proclamation controversies involving, inter alia, manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results may be filed directly with the COMELEC en banc.
USMAN V COMELEC
G.R.L-33325
DEC 29, 1971
FACTS:
Petitioners petitioned to COMELEC for declaration of nullity of the election returns from 7 municipalities and municipal district precincts. They alleged that that in the said municipalities and barrios, no actual voting took place because of "terrorism and other machinations," and that fictitious election returns were prepared under duress, and the influence of terrorism and/or bribery wherein, it was made to appear that certain favored candidates obtained most, if not all the votes fictitiously cast therein, while petitioners were made to appear as having obtained very few, if no votes at all. They prayed for the holding of a special election in the municipalities and barrios concerned and, ad interim, the suspension of the canvass as well as the proclamation of the winning candidates until after hearing and decision on the merits of the petition.
ISSUE:
WON a mandatory special election in the precincts concerned must be made.
RULING:
No. A reading of section 17 (e) of Republic Act 6132 makes it apparent that Congress has delegated to the Comelec the power to call for a special election — a power essentially legislative in nature, being merely an incident to or an extension or modality of the power to fix the date of the elections. However, in the proper exercise of the delegated power, Congress saw fit to require the Comelec ascertain that (1) no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts because of force majeure, violence or terrorism and (2) that the votes not cast therein suffice to affect the results of the elections. The language of the provision clearly requires the concurrence of the two circumstances to justify the calling of a special election. The Comelec concedes that what transpired in Karomatan constitutes "not merely a simple case of irregularity in the voting but a case of no voting or no election at all. However, the Comelec attributes this to "massive fraud rather than to force majeure, violence or terrorism the — three causes explicitly enumerated by section 17 (e). Unlike section 17 (d) which empowers the Comelec to postpone the election in any political division or subdivision whenever it finds that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election therein is rendered impossible by reason of fraud, violence, coercion, terrorism, or any other serious cause or causes, section 17 (e) excludes the situation where no voting has been held because of fraud. Furthermore, doubt exists whether or not the irregularities committed in Karomatan properly partake of violence or terrorism. This being the case, we find that the first circumstance is not attendant. As to the second circumstance, therefore, we find it unnecessary to indulge in surmises
PRINCIPLE/DOCTRINE:
TWO CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY THE CALLING OF SPECIAL ELECTION
(1) no voting has been held in any precint or precincts because of force majeure, violence or terrorism and
(2) that the votes not cast therein suffice to affect the results of the elections.
Petitioners petitioned to COMELEC for declaration of nullity of the election returns from 7 municipalities and municipal district precincts. They alleged that that in the said municipalities and barrios, no actual voting took place because of "terrorism and other machinations," and that fictitious election returns were prepared under duress, and the influence of terrorism and/or bribery wherein, it was made to appear that certain favored candidates obtained most, if not all the votes fictitiously cast therein, while petitioners were made to appear as having obtained very few, if no votes at all. They prayed for the holding of a special election in the municipalities and barrios concerned and, ad interim, the suspension of the canvass as well as the proclamation of the winning candidates until after hearing and decision on the merits of the petition.
ISSUE:
WON a mandatory special election in the precincts concerned must be made.
RULING:
No. A reading of section 17 (e) of Republic Act 6132 makes it apparent that Congress has delegated to the Comelec the power to call for a special election — a power essentially legislative in nature, being merely an incident to or an extension or modality of the power to fix the date of the elections. However, in the proper exercise of the delegated power, Congress saw fit to require the Comelec ascertain that (1) no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts because of force majeure, violence or terrorism and (2) that the votes not cast therein suffice to affect the results of the elections. The language of the provision clearly requires the concurrence of the two circumstances to justify the calling of a special election. The Comelec concedes that what transpired in Karomatan constitutes "not merely a simple case of irregularity in the voting but a case of no voting or no election at all. However, the Comelec attributes this to "massive fraud rather than to force majeure, violence or terrorism the — three causes explicitly enumerated by section 17 (e). Unlike section 17 (d) which empowers the Comelec to postpone the election in any political division or subdivision whenever it finds that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election therein is rendered impossible by reason of fraud, violence, coercion, terrorism, or any other serious cause or causes, section 17 (e) excludes the situation where no voting has been held because of fraud. Furthermore, doubt exists whether or not the irregularities committed in Karomatan properly partake of violence or terrorism. This being the case, we find that the first circumstance is not attendant. As to the second circumstance, therefore, we find it unnecessary to indulge in surmises
PRINCIPLE/DOCTRINE:
TWO CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY THE CALLING OF SPECIAL ELECTION
(1) no voting has been held in any precint or precincts because of force majeure, violence or terrorism and
(2) that the votes not cast therein suffice to affect the results of the elections.
Sunday, May 5, 2019
ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO v. COMELEC ,GR No. 209835
Facts:
Petitioner... and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. were both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.Private respondent filed a Petition for the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging that the latter made a false representation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor despite being a Canadian citizen and a non-¬resident thereof.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on 2012. On 2013 COMELEC issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu within one year prior to the election.
It found that while petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had taken his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly renounced his Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply with the other requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for those... seeking elective office, i.e., persons who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year residency requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Elections were subsequently held and petitioner won over private respondent was proclaimed Mayor petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC canceling his COC.
Private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation COMELEC En Banc denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution. Private respondent took his Oath of Officeand claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile and he was born and baptized in Uyugan and he was a registered voter and had exercised his right of suffrage and even built his house therein.He also contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling his COC.
Issues:
1.Whether petitioner had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his COC
2. what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?
Ruling:
We are not persuaded. RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law.The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes material.Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately preceding the election day. Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen.
Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment. Petitioner'sreacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile.
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such. Petitioner failed to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections... the period from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one-year residency required by law.
We concluded that material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code.
Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for material misrepresentation.
Petitioner... and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. were both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.Private respondent filed a Petition for the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging that the latter made a false representation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor despite being a Canadian citizen and a non-¬resident thereof.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on 2012. On 2013 COMELEC issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu within one year prior to the election.
It found that while petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had taken his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly renounced his Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply with the other requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for those... seeking elective office, i.e., persons who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year residency requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Elections were subsequently held and petitioner won over private respondent was proclaimed Mayor petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC canceling his COC.
Private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation COMELEC En Banc denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution. Private respondent took his Oath of Officeand claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile and he was born and baptized in Uyugan and he was a registered voter and had exercised his right of suffrage and even built his house therein.He also contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling his COC.
Issues:
1.Whether petitioner had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his COC
2. what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?
Ruling:
We are not persuaded. RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law.The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes material.Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately preceding the election day. Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen.
Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment. Petitioner'sreacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile.
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such. Petitioner failed to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections... the period from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one-year residency required by law.
We concluded that material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code.
Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for material misrepresentation.
Thursday, January 3, 2019
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ (G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957)
FACTS
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
• It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.
• The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
• The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
Issue/s: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. RULING
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
• It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.
• The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
• The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
Issue/s: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. RULING
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
Ramon Gonzales vs Rufino Hechanova (G.R. No. L-21897 October 22, 1963)
FACTS
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.
Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.
Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
CO KIM CHAM VS VALDEZ TAN KEH (G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945)
FACTS
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated during the time of the Japanese occupation.The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. Respondent additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation were no de facto government.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts.
3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them, if the said judicial acts and proceedings were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.
Rulings:
1. The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.
2. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.
3. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient character.
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated during the time of the Japanese occupation.The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. Respondent additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation were no de facto government.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts.
3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them, if the said judicial acts and proceedings were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.
Rulings:
1. The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.
2. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.
3. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient character.
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