In re: Atty. Marcial Edillon A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978

FACTS:

The respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding due notice. The Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution; he submitted his comment reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. The core of the respondent’s arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By- Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an “administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.”

ISSUES

Whether the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Whether the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. Whether the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the power of SC to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is valid.

HELD:

1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of Edillon’s constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 2. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 3. Whether the practice of law is a property right, the respondent’s right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. But it must be emphasized that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities. 4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.

DECISION

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. Respondent disbarred.