SPS OCAMPO V DIONISIO G.R. No. 191101, October 1, 2014

FACTS Bernardino U. Dionisio filed a complaint for forcible entry with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cardona, Rizal against Mario Ocampo and Felix Ocampo. Respondent sought to recover the possession of a portion of his property, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. M-4559, situated in Dalig, Cardona, Rizal, alleging that Mario and Felix built a piggery thereon without his consent. In his answer, Mario denied Dionisio’s allegation, claiming that the disputed parcel of land is owned by his wife, Carmelita Ocampo, who inherited the same from her father. Mario further claimed that they have been in possession of the said parcel of land since 1969. The MTC rendered a decision, which dismissed the complaint for forcible entry filed by Dionisio. The MTC opined that Dionisio failed to establish his prior possession of the disputed parcel of land. Dionisio’s notice of appeal was denied by the MTC for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. Consequently, the heirs of Dionisio, filed a complaint for recovery of possession with the MTC, against petitioners. The respondents sought to recover the same portion of the parcel of land. The respondents averred that the subject property was acquired by Dionisio on February 10, 1945 when he purchased the same from Isabelo Capistrano. That Dionisio thereafter took possession of the subject property and was able to obtain a free patent covering the subject property. The respondents further claimed that sometime in 1995, Mario constructed a piggery on a portion of the subject property without their consent. In their answer, the petitioners maintained that the subject parcel of land is owned by Carmelita, having acquired the same through inheritance and that they have been in possession thereof since 1969. Additionally, the petitioners claimed that the respondents’ complaint for recovery of possession of the subject property is barred by res judicata in the light of the finality of the decision in the forcible entry case. MTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for recovery of possession filed by the respondents on the ground of res judicata. The petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in setting aside the MTC Decision. They maintained that the finality of the decision in the forcible entry case constitutes res judicata, which would warrant the outright dismissal of the respondents’ complaint for recovery of possession; that the respondents were not able to sufficiently prove their ownership of the subject property. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision. The petitioners sought a reconsideration of the decision but it was denied by the CA. Hence, the instant petition ISSUES (1) Whether or not the finality of the decision in the forcible entry case constitutes res judicata, which would warrant the dismissal of the respondents’ complaint for recovery of possession; (2) Whether or not the respondents were able to establish their ownership of the subject property; (3) Whether or not the respondents’ cause of action is already barred by laches. RULING 1. For res judicata under the first concept, bar by prior judgment, to apply, the following requisites must concur, viz: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action The first three requisites are present in this case. The Decision dated September 12, 1997 in the forcible entry case rendered by the MTC, a court which has jurisdiction over the subject property and the parties, had long become final. The said MTC decision is an adjudication on the merits. However, the fourth requisite is not present. Although there is identity of parties and subject matter as between the forcible entry case and recovery of possession case, there is no identity of causes of action. As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the forcible entry case only involves the issue of possession over the subject property while the recovery of possession case puts in issue the ownership of the subject property and the concomitant right to possess the same as an attribute of ownership. In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the only issue is possession in fact, or physical possession of real property, independently of any claim of ownership that either party may put forth in his pleading. If plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner, but, on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property. Determination is only limited to the issue of who has "actual prior possession" of the subject property regardless of the ownership of the same. The decision in the forcible entry case is conclusive only as to the MTC’s determination that the petitioners are not liable for forcible entry since the respondents failed to prove their prior physical possession; it is not conclusive as to the ownership of the subject property. Besides, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a "judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land." 2. The respondents were able to prove that they have a superior right over the subject property as against the petitioners.1âwphiIt is undisputed that the subject property is indeed covered by OCT No. M-4559, which is registered in the name of Dionisio, the respondents’ predecessor-in-interest. Between the petitioners’ unsubstantiated and self-serving claim that the subject property was inherited by Carmelita from her father and OCT No. M-4559 registered in Dionisio’s name, the latter must prevail. The respondents’ title over the subject property is evidence of their ownership thereof. That a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein and that a person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to the possession thereof are fundamental principles observed in this jurisdiction. It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of Title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title. Accordingly, the petitioners may not assail the validity of the issuance of OCT No. M-4559 in the name of Dionisio in their answer to the complaint filed by the respondents for recovery of possession of the subject property; it is a collateral attack to the validity of OCT No. M-455. 3. As owners of the subject property, the respondents have the right to recover the possession thereof from any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Assuming arguendo that the petitioners indeed have been occupying the subject property for a considerable length of time, the respondents, as lawful owners, have the right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. Jurisprudence consistently holds that "prescription and laches cannot apply to registered land covered by the Torrens system" because "under the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.