Monday, December 3, 2018
In re Luis B. TAGORDA
March 23, 1929
FACTS
In 1928, Luis Tagorda was a provincial board member of Isabela. He admits that during his campaign, he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano which, in translation means that he is a lawyer and a notary public; and that as a notary public he can do notarial acts such as execution of deeds of sale, can renew lost documents, and etc.; that as a lawyer, he can help clients collect debts; that he offers free consultation; and that he is willing to serve the poor. The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality advising the latter that even though he was elected as a provincial board member, he can still practice law; that he wants the lieutenant to tell the same to his people; that he is willing to receive works regarding preparations of sales contracts and affidavits etc.; that he is willing to receive land registration cases for a charge of three pesos.
ISSUE Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice.
HELD
Yes. Tagorda admitted doing the foregoing acts. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well- merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.
Tagorda’s liability is however mitigated by the fact that he is a young inexperienced lawyer and that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts. So instead of being disbarred, he was suspended from the practice of law for a month.
DECISION
Respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929.
Sunday, December 2, 2018
TELESFORO A. DIAO, vs. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ
A.C. No. 244. March 29, 1963
FACTS
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar. About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. He prayed that Diao’s name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the “required pre-legal education”.
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
ISSUE
Whether or not Telesforo A. Diao should be disbarred from practice of law
HELD
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be and is hereby revoked.
The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.
DECISION
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer’s diploma within thirty days.
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar. About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. He prayed that Diao’s name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the “required pre-legal education”.
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
ISSUE
Whether or not Telesforo A. Diao should be disbarred from practice of law
HELD
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be and is hereby revoked.
The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.
DECISION
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer’s diploma within thirty days.
IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE
Adm. Case No. 533. September 12, 1974
FACTS
Florencio Mallare was admitted to the Philippine Bar however the court ordered an investigation regarding his citizenship and for the purpose of determining whether his name should be stricken from the roll of persons authorized to practice law in the Philippines. After the investigation, a decision was rendered by the Court, holding that by preponderance of evidence, it appeared that respondent Mallare’s father, Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his mother admittedly being a Chinese, respondent is likewise a Chinese national. Consequently, respondent Florencio Mallare was declared excluded from the practice of law; his admission to the bar was revoked, and he was ordered to return to this Court, the lawyer’s diploma previously issued to him.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision, which was denied by the Court. On February 4, 1969, respondent petitioned the Court for the reopening of the case and for new trial on the ground, inter alia, of newly discovered evidence, the introduction of which could alter the decision previously promulgated. The evidence proposed to be presented consisted of :
(1) an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that Estaben Mallare (respondent’s father) is the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipina; and
(2) testimonies of certain persons who had a known Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetime.
ISSUE
WON the respondent is Filipino citizen.
HELD
The Court finds sufficient grounds to warrant a definite setting aside of its decision and a definitive declaration that respondent Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore with qualification and right to continue the practice of law in the Philippines. With the additional evidence submitted by respondent pursuant to the authority granted by this Court, the aforementioned void in the proof of respondent’s citizenship has been duly filled.
The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person, birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their declaration that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place, and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare.
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship.
DECISION
Upon the foregoing considerations, and on the basis of the original and additional evidence herein adduced the decision of this Court dated April 29, 1968, is hereby definitely set aside, and the complaint in this case is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
Florencio Mallare was admitted to the Philippine Bar however the court ordered an investigation regarding his citizenship and for the purpose of determining whether his name should be stricken from the roll of persons authorized to practice law in the Philippines. After the investigation, a decision was rendered by the Court, holding that by preponderance of evidence, it appeared that respondent Mallare’s father, Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his mother admittedly being a Chinese, respondent is likewise a Chinese national. Consequently, respondent Florencio Mallare was declared excluded from the practice of law; his admission to the bar was revoked, and he was ordered to return to this Court, the lawyer’s diploma previously issued to him.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision, which was denied by the Court. On February 4, 1969, respondent petitioned the Court for the reopening of the case and for new trial on the ground, inter alia, of newly discovered evidence, the introduction of which could alter the decision previously promulgated. The evidence proposed to be presented consisted of :
(1) an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that Estaben Mallare (respondent’s father) is the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipina; and
(2) testimonies of certain persons who had a known Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetime.
ISSUE
WON the respondent is Filipino citizen.
HELD
The Court finds sufficient grounds to warrant a definite setting aside of its decision and a definitive declaration that respondent Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore with qualification and right to continue the practice of law in the Philippines. With the additional evidence submitted by respondent pursuant to the authority granted by this Court, the aforementioned void in the proof of respondent’s citizenship has been duly filled.
The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person, birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their declaration that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place, and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare.
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship.
DECISION
Upon the foregoing considerations, and on the basis of the original and additional evidence herein adduced the decision of this Court dated April 29, 1968, is hereby definitely set aside, and the complaint in this case is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA
August 15, 1961
FACTS
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers:
1. that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolor City,Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage;
2.that he had taken and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior";
3. that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho";
4.that thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain;
5. and that under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition.
ISSUE
Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar.
HELD
The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice the legal in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for reason that the Executive Department may not enroach upon the consitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, and the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers:
1. that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolor City,Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage;
2.that he had taken and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior";
3. that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho";
4.that thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain;
5. and that under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition.
ISSUE
Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar.
HELD
The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice the legal in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for reason that the Executive Department may not enroach upon the consitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, and the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534, MARCH 18, 1954
FACTS
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject."(Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R. A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.
The President requested the views of the court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371 which is an Act to fix the passing marks for bar examinations from nineteen hundred and forty-six up to and including nineteen Hundred and fifty-five, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not.
ISSUE
Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.
HELD
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject."(Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R. A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.
The President requested the views of the court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371 which is an Act to fix the passing marks for bar examinations from nineteen hundred and forty-six up to and including nineteen Hundred and fifty-five, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not.
ISSUE
Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.
HELD
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.
Thursday, November 29, 2018
FERDINAND A. CRUZ v ALBERTO MINA
G.R. No. 154207. April 27, 2007
FACTS
Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner), a third-year law student, filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court and set the case for continuation of trial.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MeTC and RTC) seeking to reverse the Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
The petitioner directly filed to the Supreme Court the petition and contended that the court[s] are clearly ignoring the law when they patently refused to heed to the clear mandate of the Laput, Cantimbuhan and Bulacan cases, as well as bar matter no. 730, providing for the appearance of non-lawyers before the lower courts (MTC’s).
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant
HELD
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
However, in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified: The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer: Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted.—In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance. Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner), a third-year law student, filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court and set the case for continuation of trial.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MeTC and RTC) seeking to reverse the Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
The petitioner directly filed to the Supreme Court the petition and contended that the court[s] are clearly ignoring the law when they patently refused to heed to the clear mandate of the Laput, Cantimbuhan and Bulacan cases, as well as bar matter no. 730, providing for the appearance of non-lawyers before the lower courts (MTC’s).
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant
HELD
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
However, in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified: The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer: Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted.—In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance. Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE v EDWIN L. RANA
Bar Matter No. 1036. June 10, 2003
FACTS
Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. One day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against the respondent. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading wherein the respondent represented himself as counsel for and in be Vice Mayoralty Candidate and signed the pleading as counsel for him. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate. Complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government. In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his “specific assistance” to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that “he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.” Respondent admits signing the pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an “attorney” in the pleading. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
ISSUE
WON respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
HELD
The records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan and has also retained by a mayoralty candidate as her counsel. All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar. In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself “counsel” knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as “counsel” knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.8 Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. One day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against the respondent. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading wherein the respondent represented himself as counsel for and in be Vice Mayoralty Candidate and signed the pleading as counsel for him. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate. Complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government. In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his “specific assistance” to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that “he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.” Respondent admits signing the pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an “attorney” in the pleading. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
ISSUE
WON respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
HELD
The records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan and has also retained by a mayoralty candidate as her counsel. All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar. In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself “counsel” knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as “counsel” knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.8 Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
Tuesday, November 27, 2018
In re: Atty. Marcial Edillon
A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978
FACTS:
The respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding due notice. The Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution; he submitted his comment reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. The core of the respondent’s arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By- Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an “administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.”
ISSUES
Whether the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Whether the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. Whether the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the power of SC to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is valid.
HELD:
1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of Edillon’s constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 2. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 3. Whether the practice of law is a property right, the respondent’s right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. But it must be emphasized that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities. 4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. Respondent disbarred.
The respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding due notice. The Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution; he submitted his comment reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. The core of the respondent’s arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By- Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an “administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.”
ISSUES
Whether the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Whether the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. Whether the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the power of SC to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is valid.
HELD:
1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of Edillon’s constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 2. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 3. Whether the practice of law is a property right, the respondent’s right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. But it must be emphasized that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities. 4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. Respondent disbarred.
JOSELANO GUEVARRA v ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA
A.C. No. 7136. August 1, 2007
FACTS
Joselano Guevarra filed case for disbarment against Atty. Jose Emmanuel “Noli” Eala (6th PBA Commissioner) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the respondent in January 2000 when his then fiancée Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married with whom he had three children. Joselano and Irene got married on October 7, 2000 and soon after, complainant, from January to March 2001, saw that Irene had been receiving calls from Noli, as well as messages some of which read “I love you,” “I miss you,” or “Meet you at Megamall.” He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. Her excuse was that she slept at her parents’ house or she was busy with work. Joselano also saw Irene and Noli together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them after which Irene abandoned the family house. In April 2001, Joselano went uninvited to Irene’s birthday celebration at which he saw her and Noli celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the family house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances. Complainant later found a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to Irene, containing sweet words and vows from the respondent. On his complaint, petitioner contends that: 1. Respondent and Irene were FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together and that adulterous conduct with his wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. 2. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a “piece of paper.” Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant’s bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her. 3. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant’s wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant’s marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession. On the other hand, respondent denied the allegations that the complainant is accussing him. He denied that: 1. they had ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families. And his relationship with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances 2. he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract. Meanwhile, respondent admitted The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family.
ISSUE
WON an illicit affair between a married lawyer and a married woman constitute gross immoral conduct.
HELD
Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him. Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law. Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading: Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."
DECISION
WHEREFORE, Petition is GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Joselano Guevarra filed case for disbarment against Atty. Jose Emmanuel “Noli” Eala (6th PBA Commissioner) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the respondent in January 2000 when his then fiancée Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married with whom he had three children. Joselano and Irene got married on October 7, 2000 and soon after, complainant, from January to March 2001, saw that Irene had been receiving calls from Noli, as well as messages some of which read “I love you,” “I miss you,” or “Meet you at Megamall.” He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. Her excuse was that she slept at her parents’ house or she was busy with work. Joselano also saw Irene and Noli together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them after which Irene abandoned the family house. In April 2001, Joselano went uninvited to Irene’s birthday celebration at which he saw her and Noli celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the family house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances. Complainant later found a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to Irene, containing sweet words and vows from the respondent. On his complaint, petitioner contends that: 1. Respondent and Irene were FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together and that adulterous conduct with his wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. 2. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a “piece of paper.” Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant’s bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her. 3. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant’s wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant’s marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession. On the other hand, respondent denied the allegations that the complainant is accussing him. He denied that: 1. they had ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families. And his relationship with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances 2. he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract. Meanwhile, respondent admitted The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family.
ISSUE
WON an illicit affair between a married lawyer and a married woman constitute gross immoral conduct.
HELD
Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him. Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law. Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading: Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."
DECISION
WHEREFORE, Petition is GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
VELEZ V ATTY DE VERA
A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006
FACTS:
This case involves three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Veras moral fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds: 1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and 2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule with the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the State Bar of California. He also alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the country’s most noble profession. Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President. Respondent, in his comment, stated that the issues raised in Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court. Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata. On the other hand, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent was one for his disqualification. During the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP. On the other hand, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter. In the said letter, he strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due process. On their response, the IBP Board explained to the Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum standards of due process of law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent Attorney Leonard S. Devera commited malpractice which amounted to moral turpitude in the State Bar of California and in the Philippines, in the course of his practice of law. 2. Whether or not the oath of office as lawyer is attached to the person of Attorney Leonard S. Devera wherever he may go and not necessarily bound by the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. 3. Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove the moral turpitude, as basis for disbarment of respondent in an administrative proceeding. 4. Whether or not res judicata applies in this case.
HELD:
1. The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not proof of malpractice. There’s no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign courts action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law. 2. Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paranaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule. The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice. 3. The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. The Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. De Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law for three years. There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude. 4. In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainant’s contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata. In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor. Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. De Vera’s suspension or disbarment.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows: 1. SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts; 2. DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion; 3. AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and 4. DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.
This case involves three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Veras moral fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds: 1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and 2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule with the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the State Bar of California. He also alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the country’s most noble profession. Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President. Respondent, in his comment, stated that the issues raised in Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court. Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata. On the other hand, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent was one for his disqualification. During the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP. On the other hand, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter. In the said letter, he strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due process. On their response, the IBP Board explained to the Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum standards of due process of law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent Attorney Leonard S. Devera commited malpractice which amounted to moral turpitude in the State Bar of California and in the Philippines, in the course of his practice of law. 2. Whether or not the oath of office as lawyer is attached to the person of Attorney Leonard S. Devera wherever he may go and not necessarily bound by the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. 3. Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove the moral turpitude, as basis for disbarment of respondent in an administrative proceeding. 4. Whether or not res judicata applies in this case.
HELD:
1. The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not proof of malpractice. There’s no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign courts action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law. 2. Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paranaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule. The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice. 3. The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. The Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. De Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law for three years. There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude. 4. In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainant’s contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata. In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor. Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. De Vera’s suspension or disbarment.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows: 1. SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts; 2. DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion; 3. AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and 4. DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.
Monday, November 26, 2018
RODOLFO M. BERNARDO v ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA Adm. Case No. 2984. August 31, 2007
FACTS:
Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia of several administrative offenses such as misappropriating and converting to his personal use the money entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on Bernardo’s property; falsification of documents such as the Special Power of Attorney, Deed of Sale and Deed of Assignment and lastly, issuing a check knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from the former in the amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check with others known also to be insufficiently funded. The Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision Per Curiam which found the respondent Atty. Mejia guilty of all the charges against him and imposed on him the penalty of Disbarment. Respondent files a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law however, the Supreme Court En Banc denied his petition for reinstatement. The respondent filed again this present petition for review of his Administrative case with a plea for reinstatement in the practice of law. In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession. At the age of seventy-one, he is begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and he has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent shall be reinstated.
HELD:
The Court granted the respondent’s petition. Fifteen years has passed since he was punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. However, the petitioner is reminded that practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is hereby GRANTED.
Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia of several administrative offenses such as misappropriating and converting to his personal use the money entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on Bernardo’s property; falsification of documents such as the Special Power of Attorney, Deed of Sale and Deed of Assignment and lastly, issuing a check knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from the former in the amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check with others known also to be insufficiently funded. The Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision Per Curiam which found the respondent Atty. Mejia guilty of all the charges against him and imposed on him the penalty of Disbarment. Respondent files a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law however, the Supreme Court En Banc denied his petition for reinstatement. The respondent filed again this present petition for review of his Administrative case with a plea for reinstatement in the practice of law. In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession. At the age of seventy-one, he is begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and he has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent shall be reinstated.
HELD:
The Court granted the respondent’s petition. Fifteen years has passed since he was punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. However, the petitioner is reminded that practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is hereby GRANTED.
Sunday, November 25, 2018
FATHER RANHILIO AQUINO et al V ATTY EDWIN PASCUA A.C. No. 5095, November 28, 2007
FACTS:
Father Ranhilio Aquino, as the Academic head of the Philippine Judiciary Academy, together with other complainants filed a letter-complaint against Attorney Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public for violation of the Notarial Practice Law. In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two notarized documents in which he filed with the Civil Service Commission. Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents, but they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary. The case was referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation. The Office of the Bar Confidant found that Fr. Ranhilio and the other complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Pascua is guilty of Misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints.
HELD:
Yes. After a close review of the records of this case, the court resolved to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. They found that Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff. Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument. Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his commission. In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua’s first offense, court believed that the imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.
Father Ranhilio Aquino, as the Academic head of the Philippine Judiciary Academy, together with other complainants filed a letter-complaint against Attorney Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public for violation of the Notarial Practice Law. In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two notarized documents in which he filed with the Civil Service Commission. Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents, but they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary. The case was referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation. The Office of the Bar Confidant found that Fr. Ranhilio and the other complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Pascua is guilty of Misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints.
HELD:
Yes. After a close review of the records of this case, the court resolved to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. They found that Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff. Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument. Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his commission. In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua’s first offense, court believed that the imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.
IN RE: JUDGE QUITAIN JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007
FACTS:
Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City. Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received confidential information that administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and as a result of which he was dismissed from the service. The Deputy of Court Administrator (DCA) required Judge Quitain to explain the alleged misrepresentation and deception he committed before the JBC.
Judge Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation before the JBC. Respondent explained that during the investigation of his administrative case by the NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc Committee, one of its members suggested to him that if he resigns from the government service, he will no longer be prosecuted; that following such suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable resignation from NAPOLCOM; that he did not disclose the case in his PDS because he was of the honest belief that he had no more pending administrative case by reason of his resignation; that his resignation amounted to an automatic dismissal of his administrative case considering that the issues raised therein became moot and academic; and that had he known that he would be dismissed from the service, he should not have applied for the position of a judge since he knew he would never be appointed.
The court contends that Judge Quitain deliberately did not disclose the fact that he was dismissed from the government service. At the time he filled up and submitted his Personal Data Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, he had full knowledge of the subject administrative case, as well as Administrative Order No. 183 dismissing him from the government service.
ISSUES:
1. WON the resignation of the judge renders the administrative proceedings against him moot and academic.
2. WON the judge be excused of his omission in the PDS.
HELD:
1. No. Respondents contentions utterly lack merit. As a member of the Bar, he should know that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM would not obliterate any administrative liability he may have incurred, much less, would it result to the automatic dismissal of the administrative case filed against him. The acceptance of his resignation is definitely without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative case filed against him. If such would be the case, anyone charged administratively could easily escape from administrative sanctions by the simple expedient of resigning from the service.
Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent acceptance without prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him.
2. No. Respondent is guilty of dishonesty. Dishonesty means disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity. The court cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of all those who are in the service of the Judiciary. They have often stressed that the conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk of court, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. The court condemns, and will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the pendency of this case, he is hereby meted the penalty of a fine of P40,000.00. It appearing that he has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges, if any, the Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all benefits, except earned leave credits which Judge Quitain may be entitled to, and he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and appointment to any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations.
Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City. Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received confidential information that administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and as a result of which he was dismissed from the service. The Deputy of Court Administrator (DCA) required Judge Quitain to explain the alleged misrepresentation and deception he committed before the JBC.
Judge Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation before the JBC. Respondent explained that during the investigation of his administrative case by the NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc Committee, one of its members suggested to him that if he resigns from the government service, he will no longer be prosecuted; that following such suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable resignation from NAPOLCOM; that he did not disclose the case in his PDS because he was of the honest belief that he had no more pending administrative case by reason of his resignation; that his resignation amounted to an automatic dismissal of his administrative case considering that the issues raised therein became moot and academic; and that had he known that he would be dismissed from the service, he should not have applied for the position of a judge since he knew he would never be appointed.
The court contends that Judge Quitain deliberately did not disclose the fact that he was dismissed from the government service. At the time he filled up and submitted his Personal Data Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, he had full knowledge of the subject administrative case, as well as Administrative Order No. 183 dismissing him from the government service.
ISSUES:
1. WON the resignation of the judge renders the administrative proceedings against him moot and academic.
2. WON the judge be excused of his omission in the PDS.
HELD:
1. No. Respondents contentions utterly lack merit. As a member of the Bar, he should know that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM would not obliterate any administrative liability he may have incurred, much less, would it result to the automatic dismissal of the administrative case filed against him. The acceptance of his resignation is definitely without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative case filed against him. If such would be the case, anyone charged administratively could easily escape from administrative sanctions by the simple expedient of resigning from the service.
Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent acceptance without prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him.
2. No. Respondent is guilty of dishonesty. Dishonesty means disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity. The court cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of all those who are in the service of the Judiciary. They have often stressed that the conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk of court, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. The court condemns, and will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the pendency of this case, he is hereby meted the penalty of a fine of P40,000.00. It appearing that he has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges, if any, the Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all benefits, except earned leave credits which Judge Quitain may be entitled to, and he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and appointment to any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations.
IN RE: VICENTE CHING
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
FACTS:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath.
Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Ching did elect Filipino citizenship, but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
HELD:
No. In the present case, Ching was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of CA No. 625 or fourteen years after he had reached the age of majority. The age of majority commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. The Supreme Court noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
DECISION:
The Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath.
Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Ching did elect Filipino citizenship, but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
HELD:
No. In the present case, Ching was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of CA No. 625 or fourteen years after he had reached the age of majority. The age of majority commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. The Supreme Court noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
DECISION:
The Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vs. ATT Y. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
FACTS:
Ruthie Lim-Santiago filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor. The complainant is the daughter of one of the stockholder and former President of Taggat Industries Inc where the respondent worked as a Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel before his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint. They alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations for violation of Article 288 in relation to Article 116 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well and should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees.
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received retainer's fee.
On the other hand, respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, he is no longer part of Taggat. He contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he performed his duty. He points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. Respondent asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat employees or the complainant and he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, after their investigation found that respondent is guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding the labor case filed against the complainant.
2. Whether or not respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
HELD:
1. The court found no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests.
A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
2. The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year. The court finds this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the court finds that respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Ruthie Lim-Santiago filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor. The complainant is the daughter of one of the stockholder and former President of Taggat Industries Inc where the respondent worked as a Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel before his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint. They alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations for violation of Article 288 in relation to Article 116 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well and should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees.
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received retainer's fee.
On the other hand, respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, he is no longer part of Taggat. He contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he performed his duty. He points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. Respondent asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat employees or the complainant and he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, after their investigation found that respondent is guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding the labor case filed against the complainant.
2. Whether or not respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
HELD:
1. The court found no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests.
A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
2. The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year. The court finds this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the court finds that respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
CAYETANO v MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991
FACTS:
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed by President Corazon Aquino as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsod’s appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman of the COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:
1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
2. Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm for one year.
3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held various positions in various foreign corporations.
4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local corporations until 1986.
5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC.
2. What constitutes practice of law?
RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
2. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what is loosely described as business counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.
FALLO:
The petition is DISMISSED.
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed by President Corazon Aquino as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsod’s appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman of the COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:
1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
2. Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm for one year.
3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held various positions in various foreign corporations.
4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local corporations until 1986.
5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC.
2. What constitutes practice of law?
RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
2. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what is loosely described as business counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.
FALLO:
The petition is DISMISSED.
Saturday, July 21, 2018
CHENG v GENATO G.R. No. 129760. December 29, 1998
FACTS
Respondent Ramon B. Genato is the owner of two parcels of land located at Paradise Farms, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. Respondent entered a contract to sell to spouses Da Jose pertaining to his property in Bulacan. The contract made in public document states that the spouses shall pay the down payment and 30 days after verifying the authenticity of the documents, they shall pay the remaining purchase price. The Da Jose spouses, not having finished verifying the titles mentioned in clause 3 as aforequoted, asked for and was granted by respondent Genato an extension of another 30 days or until November 5, 1989. However, according to Genato, the extension was granted on condition that a new set of documents is made seven (7) days from October 4, 1989. This was denied by the Da Jose spouses.
Pending the effectivity of the aforesaid extension period, and without due notice to the Da Jose spouses, Genato executed an Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell, for the vendee has committed a breach of contract for not having complied with the obligation as provided in their Contract.
Petitioner Ricardo Cheng (Cheng) went to Genatos residence and expressed interest in buying the subject properties. On that occasion, Genato showed to Ricardo Cheng copies of his transfer certificates of title and the annotations at the back thereof of his contract to sell with the Da Jose spouses. Genato also showed him the aforementioned Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell which has not been annotated at the back of the titles.
Later on, Da Jose spouses discovered about the affidavit to annul their contract. The latter were shocked at the disclosure and protested against the rescission of their contract. After being reminded that he (Genato) had given them (Da Jose spouses) an additional 30-day period to finish their verification of his titles, that the period was still in effect, and that they were willing and able to pay the balance of the agreed down payment, later on in the day, Genato decided to continue the Contract he had with them. The agreement to continue with their contract was formalized in a conforme letter.
Respondent advised petitioner of his decision to continue his contract with the Da Jose spouses and completely returned to Chengs the checks for their payments and expressed regret for his inability to consummate his transaction with him. After having received the letter of Genato, Cheng, however, returned the said check to the former. Cheng instituted a complaint for specific performance to compel Genato to execute a deed of sale to him of the subject properties plus damages and prayer for preliminary attachment. In his complaint, Cheng averred that the P50,000.00 check he gave was a partial payment to the total agreed purchase price of the subject properties and considered as an earnest money for which Genato acceded. Thus, their contract was already perfected. In Answer, thereto, Genato alleged that the agreement was only a simple receipt of an option-bid deposit, and never stated that it was a partial payment, nor is it an earnest money and that it was subject to the condition that the prior contract with the Da Jose spouses be first cancelled. The Da Jose spouses, in their Answer in Intervention,[18] asserted that they have a superior right to the property as first buyers. They alleged that the unilateral cancellation of the Contract to Sell was without effect and void. They also cited Chengs bad faith as a buyer being duly informed by Genato of the existing annotated Contract to Sell on the titles.
HELD:
The contract between Genato and spouses Da Jose was a contract to sell which is subject to a suspensive condition. Thus, there will be no contract to speak of, if the obligor failed to perform the suspensive condition which enforces a juridical relation. Obviously, the foregoing jurisprudence cannot be made to apply to the situation in the instant case because no default can be ascribed to the Da Jose spouses since the 30-day extension period has not yet expired.
Even assuming that the spouses defaulted, the contract also cannot be validly rescinded because no notice was given to them. Thus, Cheng's contention that the Contract to Sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses was rescinded or resolved due to Genato's unilateral rescission finds no support in this case.
The contract between Genato and Cheng is a contract to sell not a contract of sale. But But even assuming that it should be treated as a conditional contract of sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force since it was subject to a suspensive condition that the earlier contract to sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses should first be cancelled or rescinded.
Art.1544 should apply because for not only was the contract between herein respondents first in time; it was also registered long before petitioner's intrusion as a second buyer (PRIMUS TEMPORE, PORTIOR JURE). (Spouses made annotation on the title of Genato). Since Cheng was fully aware, or could have been if he had chosen to inquire, of the rights of the Da Jose spouses under the Contract to Sell duly annotated on the transfer certificates of titles of Genato, it now becomes unnecessary to further elaborate in detail the fact that he is indeed in bad faith in entering into such agreement.
Respondent Ramon B. Genato is the owner of two parcels of land located at Paradise Farms, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. Respondent entered a contract to sell to spouses Da Jose pertaining to his property in Bulacan. The contract made in public document states that the spouses shall pay the down payment and 30 days after verifying the authenticity of the documents, they shall pay the remaining purchase price. The Da Jose spouses, not having finished verifying the titles mentioned in clause 3 as aforequoted, asked for and was granted by respondent Genato an extension of another 30 days or until November 5, 1989. However, according to Genato, the extension was granted on condition that a new set of documents is made seven (7) days from October 4, 1989. This was denied by the Da Jose spouses.
Pending the effectivity of the aforesaid extension period, and without due notice to the Da Jose spouses, Genato executed an Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell, for the vendee has committed a breach of contract for not having complied with the obligation as provided in their Contract.
Petitioner Ricardo Cheng (Cheng) went to Genatos residence and expressed interest in buying the subject properties. On that occasion, Genato showed to Ricardo Cheng copies of his transfer certificates of title and the annotations at the back thereof of his contract to sell with the Da Jose spouses. Genato also showed him the aforementioned Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell which has not been annotated at the back of the titles.
Later on, Da Jose spouses discovered about the affidavit to annul their contract. The latter were shocked at the disclosure and protested against the rescission of their contract. After being reminded that he (Genato) had given them (Da Jose spouses) an additional 30-day period to finish their verification of his titles, that the period was still in effect, and that they were willing and able to pay the balance of the agreed down payment, later on in the day, Genato decided to continue the Contract he had with them. The agreement to continue with their contract was formalized in a conforme letter.
Respondent advised petitioner of his decision to continue his contract with the Da Jose spouses and completely returned to Chengs the checks for their payments and expressed regret for his inability to consummate his transaction with him. After having received the letter of Genato, Cheng, however, returned the said check to the former. Cheng instituted a complaint for specific performance to compel Genato to execute a deed of sale to him of the subject properties plus damages and prayer for preliminary attachment. In his complaint, Cheng averred that the P50,000.00 check he gave was a partial payment to the total agreed purchase price of the subject properties and considered as an earnest money for which Genato acceded. Thus, their contract was already perfected. In Answer, thereto, Genato alleged that the agreement was only a simple receipt of an option-bid deposit, and never stated that it was a partial payment, nor is it an earnest money and that it was subject to the condition that the prior contract with the Da Jose spouses be first cancelled. The Da Jose spouses, in their Answer in Intervention,[18] asserted that they have a superior right to the property as first buyers. They alleged that the unilateral cancellation of the Contract to Sell was without effect and void. They also cited Chengs bad faith as a buyer being duly informed by Genato of the existing annotated Contract to Sell on the titles.
HELD:
The contract between Genato and spouses Da Jose was a contract to sell which is subject to a suspensive condition. Thus, there will be no contract to speak of, if the obligor failed to perform the suspensive condition which enforces a juridical relation. Obviously, the foregoing jurisprudence cannot be made to apply to the situation in the instant case because no default can be ascribed to the Da Jose spouses since the 30-day extension period has not yet expired.
Even assuming that the spouses defaulted, the contract also cannot be validly rescinded because no notice was given to them. Thus, Cheng's contention that the Contract to Sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses was rescinded or resolved due to Genato's unilateral rescission finds no support in this case.
The contract between Genato and Cheng is a contract to sell not a contract of sale. But But even assuming that it should be treated as a conditional contract of sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force since it was subject to a suspensive condition that the earlier contract to sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses should first be cancelled or rescinded.
Art.1544 should apply because for not only was the contract between herein respondents first in time; it was also registered long before petitioner's intrusion as a second buyer (PRIMUS TEMPORE, PORTIOR JURE). (Spouses made annotation on the title of Genato). Since Cheng was fully aware, or could have been if he had chosen to inquire, of the rights of the Da Jose spouses under the Contract to Sell duly annotated on the transfer certificates of titles of Genato, it now becomes unnecessary to further elaborate in detail the fact that he is indeed in bad faith in entering into such agreement.
ANG YU ASUNCION v CA G.R. No. 109125 December 2, 1994
FACTS:
A complaint for Specific Performance was filed by Ang Yu Asuncion et al., against Bobby Cu Unjieng and Jose Tan. The plaintiffs were tenants or lessees of residential and commercial spaces owned by defendants in Binondo. On several conditions defendants informed the plaintiffs that they are offering to sell the premises and are giving them priority to acquire the same.
During negotiations, Cu Unjieng offered a price of P6- million while plaintiffs made a counter of offer of P5-million.Plaintiff thereafter asked the defendants to put their offer in writing to which the defendants acceded. In reply to defendants’ letter, plaintiffs wrote, asking that they specify the terms and conditions of the offer to sell. When the plaintiffs did not receive any reply, they sent another letter with the same request. Since defendants failed to specify the terms and conditions of the offer to sell and because of information received that the defendants were about to sell the property, plaintiffs were compelled to file the complaint to compel defendants to sell the property to them. Defendants filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and interposing a special defense of lack of cause of action.
The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the parties did not agree upon the terms and conditions of the proposed sale, hence, there was no contact of sale at all. The lower court ruled that should the defendants subsequently offer their property for sale at a price of P11-million or below, plaintiffs will have the right of first refusal. Aggrieved by the decision, plaintiffs appealed to Court of Appeals which ruled that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties concerning the sale of the property. Absent such requirement, the claim for specific performance will not lie. The decision of this Court was brought to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. The Supreme Court denied the appeal for insufficiency in form and substances.
The Cu Unjieng spouses executed a Deed of Sale transferring the property in question to Buen Realty and Development Corporation. Buen Realty, as the new owner of the subject property, wrote to the lessees demanding the latter to vacate the premises. In its reply, it stated that Buen Realty and Development Corporation brought the property subject to the notice of lis pendens. Buen Realty, as the new owner of the subject property, wrote to the lessees demanding the latter to vacate the premises. The lessees filed a Motion for Execution. The court ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the defendants are hereby ordered to execute the necessary Deed of Sale of the property in litigation in favor of plaintiffs Ang Yu Asuncion, Keh Tiong and Arthur Go for the consideration of P15 Million pesos in recognition of plaintiffs' right of first refusal and that a new Transfer Certificate of Title be issued in favor of the buyer and ruled that the issuance of another title to Buen Realty Corporation, has been executed in bad faith.
In its reply, it stated that Buen Realty and Development Corporation brought the property subject to the notice of lis pendens.
ISSUE:
1. WON Buen Realty can be bound by the writ of execution by virtue of the notice of lis pendens, carried over on TCT No. 195816 issued in the name of Buen Realty, at the time of the latter’s purchase of the property on 15 November 1991 from the Cu Unjiengs.
RULING:
Right of first refusal is not a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code In the law on sales, the so-called “right of first refusal” is an innovative juridical relation. Needless to point out, it cannot be deemed a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code.
In a right of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right, however, would be dependent not only on the grantor’s eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with another but also on terms, including the price, that obviously are yet to be later firmed up. Prior thereto, it can at best be so described as merely belonging to a class of preparatory juridical relations governed not by contracts (since the essential elements to establish the vinculum juris would still be indefinite and inconclusive) but by, among other laws of general application, the pertinent scattered provisions of the Civil Code on human conduct.
The proper action for violation of the right of first refysal is to file an action for damages and NOT writ of execution The final judgment in Civil Case No. 87-41058, it must be stressed, has merely accorded a “right of first refusal” in favor of petitioners (Ang Yu et. al). The consequence of such a declaration entails no more than what has heretofore been said. In fine, if, as it is here so conveyed to us, petitioners are aggrieved by the failure of private respondents to honor the right of first refusal, the remedy is not a writ of execution on the judgment, since there is none to execute, but an action for damages in a proper forum for the purpose.
Unconditional mutual promise to buy vs. Accepted unilateral promise An unconditional mutual promise to buy and sell, as long as the object is made determinate and the price is fixed, can be obligatory on the parties, and compliance therewith may accordingly be exacted.
An accepted unilateral promise which specifies the thing to be sold and the price to be paid, when coupled with a valuable consideration distinct and separate from the price, is what may properly be termed a perfected contract of option. This contract is legally binding, and in sales, it conforms with the second paragraph of Article 1479 of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1479. . . . An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price. (1451a)
Observe, however, that the option is not the contract of sale itself. The optionee has the right, but not the obligation, to buy. Once the option is exercised timely, i.e., the offer is accepted before a breach of the option, a bilateral promise to sell and to buy ensues and both parties are then reciprocally bound to comply with their respective undertakings.
Buen Realty cannot be ousted from the ownership and possession of the property Furthermore, whether private respondent Buen Realty Development Corporation, the alleged purchaser of the property, has acted in good faith or bad faith and whether or not it should, in any case, be considered bound to respect the registration of the lis pendens in Civil Case No. 87-41058 are matters that must be independently addressed in appropriate proceedings. Buen Realty, not having been impleaded in Civil Case No. 87-41058, cannot be held subject to the writ of execution issued by respondent Judge, let alone ousted from the ownership and possession of the property, without first being duly afforded its day in court.
A complaint for Specific Performance was filed by Ang Yu Asuncion et al., against Bobby Cu Unjieng and Jose Tan. The plaintiffs were tenants or lessees of residential and commercial spaces owned by defendants in Binondo. On several conditions defendants informed the plaintiffs that they are offering to sell the premises and are giving them priority to acquire the same.
During negotiations, Cu Unjieng offered a price of P6- million while plaintiffs made a counter of offer of P5-million.Plaintiff thereafter asked the defendants to put their offer in writing to which the defendants acceded. In reply to defendants’ letter, plaintiffs wrote, asking that they specify the terms and conditions of the offer to sell. When the plaintiffs did not receive any reply, they sent another letter with the same request. Since defendants failed to specify the terms and conditions of the offer to sell and because of information received that the defendants were about to sell the property, plaintiffs were compelled to file the complaint to compel defendants to sell the property to them. Defendants filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and interposing a special defense of lack of cause of action.
The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the parties did not agree upon the terms and conditions of the proposed sale, hence, there was no contact of sale at all. The lower court ruled that should the defendants subsequently offer their property for sale at a price of P11-million or below, plaintiffs will have the right of first refusal. Aggrieved by the decision, plaintiffs appealed to Court of Appeals which ruled that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties concerning the sale of the property. Absent such requirement, the claim for specific performance will not lie. The decision of this Court was brought to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. The Supreme Court denied the appeal for insufficiency in form and substances.
The Cu Unjieng spouses executed a Deed of Sale transferring the property in question to Buen Realty and Development Corporation. Buen Realty, as the new owner of the subject property, wrote to the lessees demanding the latter to vacate the premises. In its reply, it stated that Buen Realty and Development Corporation brought the property subject to the notice of lis pendens. Buen Realty, as the new owner of the subject property, wrote to the lessees demanding the latter to vacate the premises. The lessees filed a Motion for Execution. The court ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the defendants are hereby ordered to execute the necessary Deed of Sale of the property in litigation in favor of plaintiffs Ang Yu Asuncion, Keh Tiong and Arthur Go for the consideration of P15 Million pesos in recognition of plaintiffs' right of first refusal and that a new Transfer Certificate of Title be issued in favor of the buyer and ruled that the issuance of another title to Buen Realty Corporation, has been executed in bad faith.
In its reply, it stated that Buen Realty and Development Corporation brought the property subject to the notice of lis pendens.
ISSUE:
1. WON Buen Realty can be bound by the writ of execution by virtue of the notice of lis pendens, carried over on TCT No. 195816 issued in the name of Buen Realty, at the time of the latter’s purchase of the property on 15 November 1991 from the Cu Unjiengs.
RULING:
Right of first refusal is not a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code In the law on sales, the so-called “right of first refusal” is an innovative juridical relation. Needless to point out, it cannot be deemed a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code.
In a right of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right, however, would be dependent not only on the grantor’s eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with another but also on terms, including the price, that obviously are yet to be later firmed up. Prior thereto, it can at best be so described as merely belonging to a class of preparatory juridical relations governed not by contracts (since the essential elements to establish the vinculum juris would still be indefinite and inconclusive) but by, among other laws of general application, the pertinent scattered provisions of the Civil Code on human conduct.
The proper action for violation of the right of first refysal is to file an action for damages and NOT writ of execution The final judgment in Civil Case No. 87-41058, it must be stressed, has merely accorded a “right of first refusal” in favor of petitioners (Ang Yu et. al). The consequence of such a declaration entails no more than what has heretofore been said. In fine, if, as it is here so conveyed to us, petitioners are aggrieved by the failure of private respondents to honor the right of first refusal, the remedy is not a writ of execution on the judgment, since there is none to execute, but an action for damages in a proper forum for the purpose.
Unconditional mutual promise to buy vs. Accepted unilateral promise An unconditional mutual promise to buy and sell, as long as the object is made determinate and the price is fixed, can be obligatory on the parties, and compliance therewith may accordingly be exacted.
An accepted unilateral promise which specifies the thing to be sold and the price to be paid, when coupled with a valuable consideration distinct and separate from the price, is what may properly be termed a perfected contract of option. This contract is legally binding, and in sales, it conforms with the second paragraph of Article 1479 of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1479. . . . An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price. (1451a)
Observe, however, that the option is not the contract of sale itself. The optionee has the right, but not the obligation, to buy. Once the option is exercised timely, i.e., the offer is accepted before a breach of the option, a bilateral promise to sell and to buy ensues and both parties are then reciprocally bound to comply with their respective undertakings.
Buen Realty cannot be ousted from the ownership and possession of the property Furthermore, whether private respondent Buen Realty Development Corporation, the alleged purchaser of the property, has acted in good faith or bad faith and whether or not it should, in any case, be considered bound to respect the registration of the lis pendens in Civil Case No. 87-41058 are matters that must be independently addressed in appropriate proceedings. Buen Realty, not having been impleaded in Civil Case No. 87-41058, cannot be held subject to the writ of execution issued by respondent Judge, let alone ousted from the ownership and possession of the property, without first being duly afforded its day in court.
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES PHILIPPINES, INC v HUANG G.R. No. 137290. July 31, 2000
FACTS
Petitioner San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the purchase and sale of real properties. Part of its inventory are two parcels of land totalling 1,738 square meters at the corner of Meralco Avenue and General Capinpin Street, Barrio Oranbo, Pasig City and was duly registered with Register of Deeds of Pasig City.
The properties were offered for sale for P52,140,000.00 in cash. The offer was made to Atty. Helena M. Dauz who was acting for respondent spouses as undisclosed principals. Atty. Dauz signified her clients interest in purchasing the properties for the amount for which they were offered by petitioner, which Isidro A. Sobrecarey, petitioner’s Vice-President and Operations Manager for corporate real estate, indicated his conformity to the offer by affixing his signature to the letter and accepted the "earnest deposit" of P1 million. Upon request of respondent spouses, Sobrecarey ordered the removal of the "FOR SALE" sign from the properties.
Atty. Dauz and Sobrecarey then commenced negotiations. Sobrecarey informed Atty. Dauz that petitioner was willing to sell the subject properties on a 90-day term. Atty. Dauz countered with an offer of six months within which to pay. Atty. Dauz asked for an extension of 45 days adding that within that period, they hope to finalize the agreement on the matter."Her request was granted.
However, petitioner, through its president and chief executive officer, Federico Gonzales, wrote Atty. Dauz informing her that because the parties failed to agree on the terms and conditions of the sale despite the extension granted by petitioner, the latter was returning the amount of P1 million given as "earnest-deposit." Respondent spouses, through counsel, wrote petitioner demanding the execution within five days of a deed of sale covering the properties. Respondents attempted to return the "earnest-deposit" but petitioner refused on the ground that respondent’s option to purchase had already expired. Respondent spouses filed a complaint for specific performance against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. Within the period for filing a responsive pleading, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that (1) the alleged "exclusive option" of respondent spouses lacked a consideration separate and distinct from the purchase price and was thus unenforceable and (2) the complaint did not allege a cause of action because there was no "meeting of the minds" between the parties and, therefore, no perfected contract of sale.
The trial court granted petitioners motion and dismissed the action. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the trial court. They then appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision reversing the judgment of the trial court on the ground that that all the requisites of a perfected contract of sale had been complied. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision, but its motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not there’s a perfected contract of sale between the petitioner and respondents.
RULING
No. With regard to the alleged payment and acceptance of earnest money, the Court holds that respondents did not give the P1 million as "earnest money" as provided by Art. 1482 of the Civil
Code because at the time when petitioner accepted the terms of respondents offer, their contract had not yet been perfected. They presented the amount merely as a deposit of what would eventually become the earnest money or downpayment should a contract of sale be made by them. The amount was thus given not as a part of the purchase price and as proof of the perfection of the contract of sale but only as a guarantee that respondents would not back out of the sale.
The first condition for an option period of 30 days sufficiently shows that a sale was never perfected. All that respondents had was just the option to buy the properties which privilege was not, however, exercised by them because there was a failure to agree on the terms of payment. No contract of sale may thus be enforced by respondents. Furthermore, even the option secured by respondents from petitioner was fatally defective. Under the second paragraph of Art. 1479, an accepted unilateral promise to buy or sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promisor only if the promise is supported by a distinct consideration. Consideration in an option contract may be anything of value, unlike in sale where it must be the price certain in money or its equivalent. There is no showing here of any consideration for the option. Lacking any proof of such consideration, the option is unenforceable.
Equally compelling as proof of the absence of a perfected sale is the second condition that, during the option period, the parties would negotiate the terms and conditions of the purchase. The stages of a contract of sale are as follows: (1) negotiation, covering the period from the time the prospective contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to the time the contract is perfected; (2) perfection, which takes place upon the concurrence of the essential elements of the sale which are the meeting of the minds of the parties as to the object of the contract and upon the price; and (3) consummation, which begins when the parties perform their respective undertakings under the contract of sale, culminating in the extinguishment thereof. In the present case, the parties never got past the negotiation stage. While the parties already agreed on the real properties which were the objects of the sale and on the purchase price, the fact remains that they failed to arrive at mutually acceptable terms of payment, despite the 45-day extension given by petitioner. The manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element before a valid and binding contract of sale can exist. Thus, it is not the giving of earnest money, but the proof of the concurrence of all the essential elements of the contract of sale which establishes the existence of a perfected sale. In the absence of a perfected contract of sale, it is immaterial whether Isidro A. Sobrecarey had the authority to enter into a contract of sale in behalf of petitioner.
CIR V CA G.R. No. 115349. April 18, 1997
FACTS
The Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), is auxiliary unit of private respondent ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY and accepts sponsorships for its research activities from international organizations, private foundations and government agencies. Private respondent received from petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) demand letters for alleged deficiency contractors tax and alleged deficiency income tax, Denying said tax liabilities, private respondent sent petitioner a letter-protest and subsequently filed with the latter a memorandum contesting the validity of the assessments.
Petitioner rendered a letter-decision canceling the assessment for deficiency income tax but modifying the assessment for deficiency contractors tax by increasing the amount due. Unsatisfied, private respondent requested for a reconsideration or reinvestigation of the modified assessment. At the same time, it filed in the respondent court a petition for review of the said letter-decision of the petitioner. While the petition was pending before the respondent court, petitioner issued a final decision reducing the assessment for deficiency contractors tax from P193,475.55 to P46,516.41, exclusive of surcharge and interest.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue and affirmed the assailed decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Unfazed, petitioner now asks us to reverse the CA through this petition for review.
ISSUE
Is Ateneo de Manila University, through its auxiliary unit or branch -the Institute of Philippine Culture- performing the work of an independent contractor and, thus, subject to the three percent contractors tax levied by then Section 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code?
RULING
The petition is unmeritorious. Section 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code provides that business agents and other independent contractors, except persons, associations and corporations under contract for embroidery and apparel for export, as well as their agents and contractors, and except gross receipts of or from a pioneer industry registered with the Board of Investments under the provisions of Republic Act No. 5186. The term independent contractors include persons (juridical or natural) not enumerated above (but not including individuals subject to the occupation tax under Section 12 of the Local Tax Code) whose activity consists essentially of the sale of all kinds of services for a fee regardless of whether or not the performance of the service calls for the exercise or use of the physical or mental faculties of such contractors or their employees.
Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue erred in applying the principles of tax exemption without first applying the well-settled doctrine of strict interpretation in the imposition of taxes. To fall under its coverage, Section 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code requires that the independent contractor be engaged in the business of selling its services. Hence, to impose the three percent contractors tax on Ateneos Institute of Philippine Culture, it should be sufficiently proven that the private respondent is indeed selling its services for a fee in pursuit of an independent business.
And it is only after private respondent has been found clearly to be subject to the provisions of Sec. 205 that the question of exemption therefrom would arise. Only after such coverage is shown does the rule of construction -- that tax exemptions are to be strictly construed against the taxpayer -- come into play, contrary to petitioner’s position.
After reviewing the records of this case, court found no evidence that Ateneos Institute of Philippine Culture ever sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in a business apart from and independently of the academic purposes of the university. The records do not show that Ateneos IPC in fact contracted to sell its research services for a fee. Clearly then, as found by the Court of Appeals and the Court of Tax Appeals, petitioners theory is inapplicable to the established factual milieu obtaining in the instant case. In the first place, the petitioner has presented no evidence to prove its bare contention that, indeed, contracts for sale of services were ever entered into by the private respondent.
Moreover, the Court of Tax Appeals accurately and correctly declared that the funds received by the Ateneo de Manila University are technically not a fee. They may however fall as gifts or donations which are tax-exempt as shown by private respondents compliance with the requirement of Section 123 of the National Internal Revenue Code providing for the exemption of such gifts to an educational institution. Therefore, it is clear that the funds received by Ateneos Institute of Philippine Culture are not given in the concept of a fee or price in exchange for the performance of a service or delivery of an object. Rather, the amounts are in the nature of an endowment or donation given by IPCs benefactors solely for the purpose of sponsoring or funding the research with no strings attached. As found by the two courts below, such sponsorships are subject to IPCs terms and conditions. No proprietary or commercial research is done, and IPC retains the ownership of the results of the research, including the absolute right to publish the same.
In the case at bench, it is clear from the evidence on record that there was no sale either of objects or services because, as adverted to earlier, there was no transfer of ownership over the research data obtained or the results of research projects undertaken by the Institute of Philippine Culture. Furthermore, it is clear that the research activity of the Institute of Philippine Culture is done in pursuance of maintaining Ateneos university status and not in the course of an independent business of selling such research with profit in mind.
EDRADA V RAMOS G.R. No. 154413, August 31, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Eduardo and Carmencita Ramos (respondents) are the owners of two (2) fishing vessels, the Lady Lalaine and the Lady Theresa. On 1 April 1996, respondents and petitioners executed an untitled handwritten document pertaining to the sale of the said vessels. Upon the signing of the document, petitioners delivered to respondents four (4) postdated Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) checks payable to cash drawn by petitioner Rosella Edrada, in various amounts totaling One Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P140,000.00). On 3 June 1996, respondents filed an action against petitioners for specific performance with damages before the RTC, praying that petitioners be obliged to execute the necessary deed of sale of the two fishing vessels and to pay the balance of the purchase price.
In their Complaint, respondents alleged that petitioners contracted to buy the two fishing vessels for the agreed purchase price of Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos (P900,000.00), which according to them evinced a contract to buy. However, despite delivery of said vessels and repeated oral demands, petitioners failed to pay the balance, so respondents further averred. On the other hand, petitioners averred that the document sued upon merely embodies an agreement brought about by the loans they extended to respondents. According to petitioners, respondents allowed them to manage or administer the fishing vessels as a business on the understanding that should they find the business profitable, the vessels would be sold to them for Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos (P900,000.00). But petitioners decided to call it quits after spending a hefty sum for the repair and maintenance of the vessels which were already in dilapidated condition.
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. Both parties appealed the RTC Decision. However, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision, affirmed the same and dismissed both appeals. Only petitioners elevated the controversy to this Court. Hence this petition for reversal.
ISSUE
Whether or not there’s perfected contract of sale between the petitioners and respondents.
RATIO
The SC disagreed with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the document is a perfected contract of sale. A contract of sale is defined as an agreement whereby one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent. It must evince the consent on the part of the seller to transfer and deliver and on the part of the buyer to pay.
An examination of the document reveals that there is no perfected contract of sale. The agreement may confirm the receipt by respondents of the two vessels and their purchase price. However, there is no equivocal agreement to transfer ownership of the vessel, but a mere commitment that documents pertaining to the sale and agreement of payments to follow. Evidently, the document or documents which would formalize the transfer of ownership and contain the terms of payment of the purchase price, or the period when such would become due and demandable, have yet to be executed. But no such document was executed and no such terms were stipulated upon.
A contract is perfected when there is concurrence of the wills of the contracting parties with respect to the object and the cause of the contract. In this case, the agreement merely acknowledges that a purchase price had been agreed on by the parties. There was no mutual promise to buy on the part of petitioners and to sell on the part of respondents. The agreement in question does not create any obligatory force either for the transfer of title of the vessels, or the rendition of payments as part of the purchase price.
TOYOTA SHAW INC V CA G.R. No. L-116650, May 23, 1995
FACTS
Luna L. Sosa and her son, wanted to purchase a Toyota Lite Ace with Toyota Shaw which they will use in their provincial visit. There they met Popong Bernardo, a sales representative. Sosa emphasized to Bernardo that he needed the Lite Ace not later than 17 June 1989. Bernardo assured Sosa that a unit would be ready for pick up on the specified date. An agreement between Bernardo and the respondent was signed. It was also agreed upon by the parties that the balance of the purchase price would be paid by B.A. Finance, a credit financing company. The next day, a Vehicle Sales Proposal (VSP) was accomplished by Bernardo in lieu of the delivery of the P 100,000 downpayment containing the aforementioned manner of payment and was approved by the sales supervisor.
However come June 17, 1989, the Lite Ace car was not delivered because it was sold to another customer. Toyota contends, however, it was not delivered because of the disapproval by B.A. Finance of the credit financing application of Sosa. It further alleged that a particular unit had already been reserved and earmarked for him but could not be released due to the uncertainty of payment of the balance of the purchase price. Toyota then gave Sosa the option to purchase the unit by paying the full purchase price in cash but the latter refused Private respondent then asked for the refund of his P 100,000 downpayment which the petitioner did so on the same day by issuing a check then signed by the former with reservation as to future claims for damages. The trial court found that there was a valid perfected contract of sale between Sosa and Toyota which bound the latter to deliver the vehicle and that Toyota acted in bad faith in selling to another the unit already reserved for Sosa, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision.
Thereafter, petitioner refused to accede to the demands contained in private respondent’s two letters, prompting the latter to file a complaint. The trial court resolved in favor of the latter and was subsequently affirmed by public respondent Court of Appeals in toto hence the instant case.
Issue: WON the Agreement, executed and signed by petitioner’s sales representative, a perfected contract of sale, binding upon the petitioner?
Held: The Court resolved in the negative. This Court had already ruled that a definite agreement on the manner of payment of the price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. This is so because the agreement as to the manner of payment goes into the price such that a disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price.
There was no obligation on the part of Toyota to transfer ownership of a determinate thing to Sosa and no correlative obligation on the part of the latter to pay therefor a price certain appears in the Agreement. The provision on the downpayment made no specific reference to a sale of a vehicle. If it was intended for a contract of sale, it could only refer to a sale on installment basis, as the VSP executed the following day confirmed.
Moreover, there was absence of a meeting of minds between Toyota and Sosa. Knowing that Bernardo was only a sales representative, hence a mere agent of petitioner, it was incumbent upon Sosa to act with ordinary prudence and reasonable diligence to know the extent of Bernardo’s authority in respect of contracts to sell Toyota’s vehicles. A person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the authority of the agent.
Accordingly, in a sale on installment basis which is financed by a financing company, the financing company is subrogated in the place of the seller, as the creditor of the installment buyer. Since B.A. Finance did not approve Sosa’s application, there was then no meeting of minds on the sale on installment basis.
The VSP was a mere proposal which was aborted in lieu of subsequent events. It follows that the VSP created no demandable right in favor of Sosa for the delivery of the vehicle to him, and its non-delivery did not cause any legally indemnifiable injury.
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