Facts
Ernesto Fragante was charged with nine (9) counts of acts of lasciviousness and one (1) count of rape all committed against his own minor daughter AAA. The trial court rendered a decision convicting appellant for the crimes charged. The Court of Appeals also found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes charged. Appellant contends that the Court of Appeals erred in convicting him for the crime of rape since the prosecution failed to overthrow the presumption of innocence. Appellant alleges that (1) AAA’s testimony was full of inconsistencies and improbabilities which cast serious doubts on the truthfulness of her account; (2) the medical findings do not support the charge of rape; (3) AAA’s delayed reporting of the incident renders the charges dubious; and (4) AAA and her mother harbored a grudge against appellant.
Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming appellant’s conviction for nine (9) counts of acts of lasciviousness and one (1) count of rape.
HELD
No. The prosecution sufficiently established appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
“Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. —Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation.
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.”
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, all the essential elements of rape are present in this case. The evidence on record
clearly proves that appellant had carnal knowledge of his own minor daughter AAA. Appellant argues that the Court of Appeals erred in convicting him for nine counts of acts of lasciviousness since the prosecution failed to establish with particularity the
date of the commission of the offense.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, all the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are present here. First, appellant's repeated touching, fondling, and sucking of AAA's breasts and inserting his finger into AAA's vagina with lewd designs undoubtedly constitute lascivious conduct. Second, appellant, as a father having moral ascendancy over his daughter, coerced AAA to engage in lascivious conduct, which is within the purview of sexual abuse. Third, AAA is below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, based on her testimony which was corroborated by her Birth Certificate presented during
the trial.
Since all three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of appellant for acts of lasciviousness was proper.
Sunday, November 15, 2020
Saturday, September 5, 2020
. San Miguel Brewery Sales vs. Ople 170 SCRA 25
FACTS
A collective bargaining agreement (effective on May 1, 1978 until January 31, 1981) was entered into by petitioner San Miguel Corporation Sales Force Union (PTGWO), and the private respondent, San Miguel Corporation, Section 1, of Article IV of which provided as follows:
Art. IV, Section 1. Employees within the appropriate bargaining unit shall be entitled to a basic monthly compensation plus commission based on their respective sales. (p. 6, Annex A; p. 113, Rollo.) September 1979, the company introduced a marketing scheme known as the "Complementary Distribution System" (CDS) whereby its beer products were offered for sale directly to wholesalers through San Miguel's sales offices. The labor union (herein petitioner) filed a complaint for unfair labor practice in the Ministry of Labor, with a notice of strike on the ground that the CDS was contrary to the existing marketing scheme whereby the Route Salesmen were assigned specific territories within which to sell their stocks of beer, and wholesalers had to buy beer products from them, not from the company. It was alleged that the new marketing scheme violates Section 1, Article IV of the collective bargaining agreement because the introduction of the CDS would reduce the take-home pay of the salesmen and their truck helpers for the company would be unfairly competing with them.
ISSUE
(1) Whether or not the CDS scheme is a valid exercise of management prerogatives.
HELD:
1. Yes, public respondent was correct in holding that the CDS is a valid exercise of management prerogatives. Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of work.
Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the process, it may adopt or devise means designed towards that goal.So long as a company's management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold them (LVN Pictures Workers vs. LVN, 35 SCRA 147; Phil. American Embroideries vs. Embroidery and Garment Workers, 26 SCRA 634; Phil. Refining Co. vs. Garcia, 18 SCRA 110). San Miguel Corporation's offer to compensate the members of its sales force who will be adversely affected by the implementation of the CDS by paying them a so-called "back adjustment commission" to make up for the commissions they might lose as a result of the CDS proves the company's good faith and lack of intention to bust their union.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit.
A collective bargaining agreement (effective on May 1, 1978 until January 31, 1981) was entered into by petitioner San Miguel Corporation Sales Force Union (PTGWO), and the private respondent, San Miguel Corporation, Section 1, of Article IV of which provided as follows:
Art. IV, Section 1. Employees within the appropriate bargaining unit shall be entitled to a basic monthly compensation plus commission based on their respective sales. (p. 6, Annex A; p. 113, Rollo.) September 1979, the company introduced a marketing scheme known as the "Complementary Distribution System" (CDS) whereby its beer products were offered for sale directly to wholesalers through San Miguel's sales offices. The labor union (herein petitioner) filed a complaint for unfair labor practice in the Ministry of Labor, with a notice of strike on the ground that the CDS was contrary to the existing marketing scheme whereby the Route Salesmen were assigned specific territories within which to sell their stocks of beer, and wholesalers had to buy beer products from them, not from the company. It was alleged that the new marketing scheme violates Section 1, Article IV of the collective bargaining agreement because the introduction of the CDS would reduce the take-home pay of the salesmen and their truck helpers for the company would be unfairly competing with them.
ISSUE
(1) Whether or not the CDS scheme is a valid exercise of management prerogatives.
HELD:
1. Yes, public respondent was correct in holding that the CDS is a valid exercise of management prerogatives. Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of work.
Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the process, it may adopt or devise means designed towards that goal.So long as a company's management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold them (LVN Pictures Workers vs. LVN, 35 SCRA 147; Phil. American Embroideries vs. Embroidery and Garment Workers, 26 SCRA 634; Phil. Refining Co. vs. Garcia, 18 SCRA 110). San Miguel Corporation's offer to compensate the members of its sales force who will be adversely affected by the implementation of the CDS by paying them a so-called "back adjustment commission" to make up for the commissions they might lose as a result of the CDS proves the company's good faith and lack of intention to bust their union.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit.
Monday, May 25, 2020
Angelita Manzano vs. CA, et al
GR No. 113388
Sept. 5, 1997
FACTS
Petitioner Angelita Manzano filed with the Philippine Patent Office an action for the cancellation of Letters Patent No. UM-4609 for a gas burner registered in the name of respondent Melecia Madolaria who subsequently assigned the letters patent to New United Foundry and Manufacturing Corporation. Petitioner alleged that (a) the utility model covered by the letters patent, in this case, an LPG gas burner, was not inventive, new or useful; (b) the specification of the letters patent did not comply with the requirements of Sec. 14, RA No. 165, as amended; (c) respondent Melecia Madolaria was not the original, true and actual inventor nor did she derive her rights from the original, true and actual inventor of the utility model covered by the letters patent; and, (d) the letters patent was secured by means of fraud or misrepresentation.
The Director of Patents issued Decision No. 86-56 denying the petition for cancellation and holding that the evidence of petitioner was not able to establish convincingly that the patented utility model of private respondent was anticipated. No evidence whatsoever was presented by petitioner to show that the then applicant Melecia Madolaria withheld with intent to deceive material facts which, if disclosed, would have resulted in the refusal by the Philippine Patent Office to issue the Letters Patent under inquiry.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in upholding the decision of the Director of Patents.
RULING: NO. In issuing Letters Patent to respondent Madolaria for an LPG Burner, the PPO found her invention novel and patentable. The issuance of such patent creates a presumption which yields only to clear and cogent evidence that the patentee was the original and first inventor. The burden of proving want of novelty is on him who avers it and the burden is a heavy one which is met only by clear and satisfactory proof which overcomes every reasonable doubt.
As found by the Director of Patents, the standard of evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of legality of the issuance of letters patent to respondent Madolaria was not legally met by petitioner in her action for the cancellation of the patent. The findings and conclusions of the Director of Patent were reiterated and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The rule is settled that the findings of fact of the Director of Patents, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by substantial evidence.
The validity of the patent issued by the PPO in favor of private respondent and the question over the inventiveness, novelty and usefulness of the improved model of the LPG burner are matters which are better determined by the PPO. The technical staff of the Philippine Patent Office composed of experts in their field has by the issuance of the patent in question accepted private respondents model of gas burner as a discovery. There is a presumption that the Office has correctly determined the patentability of the model and such action must not be interfered with in the absence of competent evidence to the contrary.
Petitioner Angelita Manzano filed with the Philippine Patent Office an action for the cancellation of Letters Patent No. UM-4609 for a gas burner registered in the name of respondent Melecia Madolaria who subsequently assigned the letters patent to New United Foundry and Manufacturing Corporation. Petitioner alleged that (a) the utility model covered by the letters patent, in this case, an LPG gas burner, was not inventive, new or useful; (b) the specification of the letters patent did not comply with the requirements of Sec. 14, RA No. 165, as amended; (c) respondent Melecia Madolaria was not the original, true and actual inventor nor did she derive her rights from the original, true and actual inventor of the utility model covered by the letters patent; and, (d) the letters patent was secured by means of fraud or misrepresentation.
The Director of Patents issued Decision No. 86-56 denying the petition for cancellation and holding that the evidence of petitioner was not able to establish convincingly that the patented utility model of private respondent was anticipated. No evidence whatsoever was presented by petitioner to show that the then applicant Melecia Madolaria withheld with intent to deceive material facts which, if disclosed, would have resulted in the refusal by the Philippine Patent Office to issue the Letters Patent under inquiry.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in upholding the decision of the Director of Patents.
RULING: NO. In issuing Letters Patent to respondent Madolaria for an LPG Burner, the PPO found her invention novel and patentable. The issuance of such patent creates a presumption which yields only to clear and cogent evidence that the patentee was the original and first inventor. The burden of proving want of novelty is on him who avers it and the burden is a heavy one which is met only by clear and satisfactory proof which overcomes every reasonable doubt.
As found by the Director of Patents, the standard of evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of legality of the issuance of letters patent to respondent Madolaria was not legally met by petitioner in her action for the cancellation of the patent. The findings and conclusions of the Director of Patent were reiterated and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The rule is settled that the findings of fact of the Director of Patents, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by substantial evidence.
The validity of the patent issued by the PPO in favor of private respondent and the question over the inventiveness, novelty and usefulness of the improved model of the LPG burner are matters which are better determined by the PPO. The technical staff of the Philippine Patent Office composed of experts in their field has by the issuance of the patent in question accepted private respondents model of gas burner as a discovery. There is a presumption that the Office has correctly determined the patentability of the model and such action must not be interfered with in the absence of competent evidence to the contrary.
Creser Precision System Inc. vs. CA
GR No. 118708
Feb. 2, 1998
FACTS
Private respondent was granted by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT), a Letters Patent No. UM-6938 covering an aerial fuze. The respondent discovered that petitioner submitted samples of its patented aerial fuze to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for testing and is claiming the aforesaid aerial fuze as its own and planning to bid and manufacture the same commercially without license or authority from private respondent.
To protect its right respondent, sent a letter to petitioner advising it of its existing patent and its rights thereunder, warning petitioner of a possible court action and/or application for injunction, should it proceed with the scheduled testing by the military. Petitioner averred that they are the first, true and actual inventor of an aerial fuze denominated as Fuze, PDR 77 CB4 which is developed as early as December 1981 under the Self-Reliance Defense Posture Program (SRDP) of the AFP; that sometime in 1986, and that they began supplying the AFP with the said aerial fuze; that private respondents aerial fuze is identical in every respect to the petitioners fuze; and that the only difference between the two fuzes are miniscule and merely cosmetic in nature.
Petitioner prayed that a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining private respondent including all persons acting on its behalf from manufacturing, marketing and/or profiting therefrom, and/or from performing any other act in connection therewith or tending to prejudice and deprive it of any rights, privileges and benefits to which it is duly entitled as the first, true and actual inventor of the aerial fuze. The court issued a TRO in favor of the petitioner.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner has the right to assail the validity of the patented work of the respondent?
HELD
The court finds the argument of the petitioner untenable. Section 42 of the Law on Patent (RA 165) provides that only the patentee or his successors-in-interest may file an action against infringement. What the law contemplates in the phrase “anyone possessing any right, title or interest in and to the patented invention” refers only to the patentee’s successors-in-interest, assignees or grantees since the action on patent infringement may be brought only in the name of the person granted with the patent. There can be no infringement of a patent until a patent has been issued since the right one has over the invention covered by the patent arises from the grant of the patent alone. Therefore, a person who has not been granted letter of patent over an invention has not acquired right or title over the invention and thus has no cause of action for infringement. Petitioner admitted having no patent over his invention. Respondent’s aerial fuze is covered by letter of patent issued by the Bureau of Patents thus it has in his favor not only the presumption of validity of its patent but that of a legal and factual first and true inventor of the invention.
Private respondent was granted by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT), a Letters Patent No. UM-6938 covering an aerial fuze. The respondent discovered that petitioner submitted samples of its patented aerial fuze to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for testing and is claiming the aforesaid aerial fuze as its own and planning to bid and manufacture the same commercially without license or authority from private respondent.
To protect its right respondent, sent a letter to petitioner advising it of its existing patent and its rights thereunder, warning petitioner of a possible court action and/or application for injunction, should it proceed with the scheduled testing by the military. Petitioner averred that they are the first, true and actual inventor of an aerial fuze denominated as Fuze, PDR 77 CB4 which is developed as early as December 1981 under the Self-Reliance Defense Posture Program (SRDP) of the AFP; that sometime in 1986, and that they began supplying the AFP with the said aerial fuze; that private respondents aerial fuze is identical in every respect to the petitioners fuze; and that the only difference between the two fuzes are miniscule and merely cosmetic in nature.
Petitioner prayed that a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining private respondent including all persons acting on its behalf from manufacturing, marketing and/or profiting therefrom, and/or from performing any other act in connection therewith or tending to prejudice and deprive it of any rights, privileges and benefits to which it is duly entitled as the first, true and actual inventor of the aerial fuze. The court issued a TRO in favor of the petitioner.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner has the right to assail the validity of the patented work of the respondent?
HELD
The court finds the argument of the petitioner untenable. Section 42 of the Law on Patent (RA 165) provides that only the patentee or his successors-in-interest may file an action against infringement. What the law contemplates in the phrase “anyone possessing any right, title or interest in and to the patented invention” refers only to the patentee’s successors-in-interest, assignees or grantees since the action on patent infringement may be brought only in the name of the person granted with the patent. There can be no infringement of a patent until a patent has been issued since the right one has over the invention covered by the patent arises from the grant of the patent alone. Therefore, a person who has not been granted letter of patent over an invention has not acquired right or title over the invention and thus has no cause of action for infringement. Petitioner admitted having no patent over his invention. Respondent’s aerial fuze is covered by letter of patent issued by the Bureau of Patents thus it has in his favor not only the presumption of validity of its patent but that of a legal and factual first and true inventor of the invention.
Smith Kline Beckham Corp. vs. CA
GR No. 126627
Aug. 14, 2003
FACTS
Petitioner, Smith Kline Beckman Corporation was granted a patent over an invention entitled "Methods and Compositions for Producing Biphasic Parasiticide Activity Using Methyl 5 Propylthio-2-Benzimidazole Carbamate." The patented invention consisted of a new compound named methyl 5 propylthio-2-benzimidazole carbamate and the methods or compositions utilizing the compound as an active ingredient in fighting infections caused by gastrointestinal parasites and lungworms in animals such as swine, sheep, cattle, goats, horses, and even pet animals.
On the other hand, respondent Tryco Pharma Corporation is a domestic corporation that manufactures, distributes and sells veterinary products including Impregon, a drug that has Albendazole for its active ingredient and is claimed to be effective against gastro-intestinal roundworms, lungworms, tapeworms and fluke infestation in carabaos, cattle and goats.
Petitioner sued private respondent for infringement of patent and unfair competition for advertising and selling as its own the drug Impregon although the same contained petitioner’s patented Albendazole. The respondent averred that that Letters Patent No. 14561 does not cover the substance Albendazole for nowhere in it does that word appear; that even if the patent were to include Albendazole, such substance is unpatentable; that the Bureau of Food and Drugs allowed it to manufacture and market Impregon with Albendazole as it’s known ingredient; that there is no proof that it passed off in any way its veterinary products as those of petitioner; that Letters Patent No. 14561 is null and void, the application for the issuance thereof having been filed beyond the one year period from the filing of an application abroad for the same invention covered thereby, in violation of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 165 (The Patent Law); and that petitioner is not the registered patent.
The court ruled in favor of the respondent. The petitioners filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals but was denied. Hence this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that Albendazole is included in petitioners Letter Pattent No. 14561
HELD
From an examination of the evidence on record, the Court finds nothing infirm in the appellate court’s conclusions with respect to the principal issue of whether Tycho Pharma committed patent infringement to the prejudice of SKBC. The burden of proof to substantiate a charge for patent infringement rests on the plaintiff. In the case at bar, petitioner’s evidence consists primarily of its Letters Patent No. 14561, and the testimony of Dr. Orinion, its general manager in the Philippines for its Animal Health Products Division, by which it sought to show that its patent for the compound methyl 5 propylthio-2- benzimidazole carbamate also covers the substance Albendazole. From a reading of the 9 claims of Letters Patent No. 14561 in relation to the other portions thereof, no mention is made of the compound Albendazole.
When the language of its claims is clear and distinct, the patentee is bound thereby and may not claim anything beyond them. And so are the courts bound which may not add to or detract from the claims matters not expressed or necessarily implied, nor may they enlarge the patent beyond the scope of that which the inventor claimed and the patent office allowed, even if the patentee may have been entitled to something more than the words it had chosen would include. It bears stressing that the mere absence of the word Albendazole in Letters Patent No. 14561 is not determinative of Albendazole’s non-inclusion in the claims of the patent. While Albendazole is admittedly a chemical compound that exists by a name different from that covered in SKBC’s letters patent, the language of Letter Patent No. 14561 fails to yield anything at all regarding Albendazole. And no extrinsic evidence had been adduced to prove that Albendazole inheres in SKBC’s patent in spite of its omission therefrom or that the meaning of the claims of the patent embraces the same. While SKBC concedes that the mere literal wordings of its patent cannot establish Tyco Pharma’s infringement, it urges the Court to apply the doctrine of equivalents.
The doctrine of equivalents provides that an infringement also takes place when a device appropriates a prior invention by incorporating its innovative concept and, although with some modification and change, performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result. Yet again, a scrutiny of SKBC’s evidence fails to convince the Court of the substantial sameness of SKBC’s patented compound and Albendazole. While both compounds have the effect of neutralizing parasites in animals, identity of result does not amount to infringement of patent unless Albendazole operates in substantially the same way or by substantially the same means as the patented compound, even though it performs the same function and achieves the same result.
In other words, the principle or mode of operation must be the same or substantially the same. The doctrine of equivalents thus requires satisfaction of the function-means-and-result test, the patentee having the burden to show that all three components of such equivalency test are met.
Petitioner, Smith Kline Beckman Corporation was granted a patent over an invention entitled "Methods and Compositions for Producing Biphasic Parasiticide Activity Using Methyl 5 Propylthio-2-Benzimidazole Carbamate." The patented invention consisted of a new compound named methyl 5 propylthio-2-benzimidazole carbamate and the methods or compositions utilizing the compound as an active ingredient in fighting infections caused by gastrointestinal parasites and lungworms in animals such as swine, sheep, cattle, goats, horses, and even pet animals.
On the other hand, respondent Tryco Pharma Corporation is a domestic corporation that manufactures, distributes and sells veterinary products including Impregon, a drug that has Albendazole for its active ingredient and is claimed to be effective against gastro-intestinal roundworms, lungworms, tapeworms and fluke infestation in carabaos, cattle and goats.
Petitioner sued private respondent for infringement of patent and unfair competition for advertising and selling as its own the drug Impregon although the same contained petitioner’s patented Albendazole. The respondent averred that that Letters Patent No. 14561 does not cover the substance Albendazole for nowhere in it does that word appear; that even if the patent were to include Albendazole, such substance is unpatentable; that the Bureau of Food and Drugs allowed it to manufacture and market Impregon with Albendazole as it’s known ingredient; that there is no proof that it passed off in any way its veterinary products as those of petitioner; that Letters Patent No. 14561 is null and void, the application for the issuance thereof having been filed beyond the one year period from the filing of an application abroad for the same invention covered thereby, in violation of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 165 (The Patent Law); and that petitioner is not the registered patent.
The court ruled in favor of the respondent. The petitioners filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals but was denied. Hence this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that Albendazole is included in petitioners Letter Pattent No. 14561
HELD
From an examination of the evidence on record, the Court finds nothing infirm in the appellate court’s conclusions with respect to the principal issue of whether Tycho Pharma committed patent infringement to the prejudice of SKBC. The burden of proof to substantiate a charge for patent infringement rests on the plaintiff. In the case at bar, petitioner’s evidence consists primarily of its Letters Patent No. 14561, and the testimony of Dr. Orinion, its general manager in the Philippines for its Animal Health Products Division, by which it sought to show that its patent for the compound methyl 5 propylthio-2- benzimidazole carbamate also covers the substance Albendazole. From a reading of the 9 claims of Letters Patent No. 14561 in relation to the other portions thereof, no mention is made of the compound Albendazole.
When the language of its claims is clear and distinct, the patentee is bound thereby and may not claim anything beyond them. And so are the courts bound which may not add to or detract from the claims matters not expressed or necessarily implied, nor may they enlarge the patent beyond the scope of that which the inventor claimed and the patent office allowed, even if the patentee may have been entitled to something more than the words it had chosen would include. It bears stressing that the mere absence of the word Albendazole in Letters Patent No. 14561 is not determinative of Albendazole’s non-inclusion in the claims of the patent. While Albendazole is admittedly a chemical compound that exists by a name different from that covered in SKBC’s letters patent, the language of Letter Patent No. 14561 fails to yield anything at all regarding Albendazole. And no extrinsic evidence had been adduced to prove that Albendazole inheres in SKBC’s patent in spite of its omission therefrom or that the meaning of the claims of the patent embraces the same. While SKBC concedes that the mere literal wordings of its patent cannot establish Tyco Pharma’s infringement, it urges the Court to apply the doctrine of equivalents.
The doctrine of equivalents provides that an infringement also takes place when a device appropriates a prior invention by incorporating its innovative concept and, although with some modification and change, performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result. Yet again, a scrutiny of SKBC’s evidence fails to convince the Court of the substantial sameness of SKBC’s patented compound and Albendazole. While both compounds have the effect of neutralizing parasites in animals, identity of result does not amount to infringement of patent unless Albendazole operates in substantially the same way or by substantially the same means as the patented compound, even though it performs the same function and achieves the same result.
In other words, the principle or mode of operation must be the same or substantially the same. The doctrine of equivalents thus requires satisfaction of the function-means-and-result test, the patentee having the burden to show that all three components of such equivalency test are met.
Monday, May 18, 2020
SPOUSES YULO V BPI
G.R. No. 217044
January 16, 2019
FACTS
Petitioner spouses Rainer Yulo and Juliet Yulo are both credit card holders of the respondent, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). When the petitioners had been delinquent with their payments, BPI started to send out demand letters and later on filed a complaint for sum of money against the petitioners. Spouses admitted that they used the credit cards issued by the Bank of the Philippine Islands but claimed that their total liability was only P20,000.00. They also alleged that the Bank of the Philippine Islands did not fully disclose to them the Terms and Conditions on their use of the issued credit cards and also, BPI failed to prove their liability. The lower court ruled in favor of BPI and ordered petitioners to pay the bank the sum of P229,378.68. Petitioners filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals but was both denied. The Court of Appeals found that the Yulo Spouses' failure to contest the charges in the monthly Statements of Account signified that they accepted the veracity of the charges. It further noted that Rainier, an insurance underwriter, was familiar with contractual stipulations; hence, he could not feign ignorance over his own contractual obligation to the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners Rainier Jose M. Yulo and Juliet L. Yulo are bound by the Terms and Conditions on their use of credit cards issued by respondent.
RULING
No. As the recipient of an unsolicited credit card, the pre-screened client can then choose to either accept or reject it. When petitioners accepted respondent's credit card by using it to purchase goods and services, a contractual relationship was created between them, "governed by the Terms and Conditions found in the card membership agreement. Such terms and conditions constitute the law between the parties.". However, when issuing a pre-screened or pre-approved credit card, the credit card provider must prove that its client read and consented to the terms and conditions governing the credit card's use. Failure to prove consent means that the client cannot be bound by the provisions of the terms and conditions, despite admitted use of the credit card. With respondent's failure to prove petitioner Rainier's conformity and acceptance of the Terms and Conditions, petitioners cannot be bound by its provisions. The Metropolitan Trial Court ruling was affirmed by both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. Since petitioner did not consent to the Terms and Conditions governing his credit card, there is a need to modify the outstanding balance by removing the interests, penalties, and other charges imposed before.
Petitioner spouses Rainer Yulo and Juliet Yulo are both credit card holders of the respondent, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). When the petitioners had been delinquent with their payments, BPI started to send out demand letters and later on filed a complaint for sum of money against the petitioners. Spouses admitted that they used the credit cards issued by the Bank of the Philippine Islands but claimed that their total liability was only P20,000.00. They also alleged that the Bank of the Philippine Islands did not fully disclose to them the Terms and Conditions on their use of the issued credit cards and also, BPI failed to prove their liability. The lower court ruled in favor of BPI and ordered petitioners to pay the bank the sum of P229,378.68. Petitioners filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals but was both denied. The Court of Appeals found that the Yulo Spouses' failure to contest the charges in the monthly Statements of Account signified that they accepted the veracity of the charges. It further noted that Rainier, an insurance underwriter, was familiar with contractual stipulations; hence, he could not feign ignorance over his own contractual obligation to the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners Rainier Jose M. Yulo and Juliet L. Yulo are bound by the Terms and Conditions on their use of credit cards issued by respondent.
RULING
No. As the recipient of an unsolicited credit card, the pre-screened client can then choose to either accept or reject it. When petitioners accepted respondent's credit card by using it to purchase goods and services, a contractual relationship was created between them, "governed by the Terms and Conditions found in the card membership agreement. Such terms and conditions constitute the law between the parties.". However, when issuing a pre-screened or pre-approved credit card, the credit card provider must prove that its client read and consented to the terms and conditions governing the credit card's use. Failure to prove consent means that the client cannot be bound by the provisions of the terms and conditions, despite admitted use of the credit card. With respondent's failure to prove petitioner Rainier's conformity and acceptance of the Terms and Conditions, petitioners cannot be bound by its provisions. The Metropolitan Trial Court ruling was affirmed by both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. Since petitioner did not consent to the Terms and Conditions governing his credit card, there is a need to modify the outstanding balance by removing the interests, penalties, and other charges imposed before.
IVQ LAND HOLDINGS, INC., VS. REUBEN BARBOSA
G.R. No. 193156
September 26, 2018
FACTS
Respondent Reuben Barbosa claims that he is the owner of the parcel of land which is the subject property of the case that he bought from Therese Vargas. The property was at that time registered in her name. He took possession of the subject property seven days after he bought the same and he employed a caretaker to live therein. Before Therese Vargas, the owner of the property was Kawilihan Corporation, which company was owned by Jorge Vargas. Respondent stated that the subject property remained registered in the name of Therese Vargas as he entrusted her title to another person for custody, but the said person went to Canada. He paid real estate taxes on the subject property in the name of Kawilihan Corporation from 1978 until 2002. From 2003 to 2006, he paid real estate taxes thereon in the name of Therese Vargas. However, he learned that Therese Vargas's name was cancelled and replaced with that of IVQ in the tax declaration of the subject property.
Respondent filed a Petition for Cancellation and Quieting of Titles against Jorge Vargas III, Benito Montinola from IVQ Land Holdings, Inc. (IVQ) and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He prayed for the trial court to issue an order directing the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel Jorge Vargas III's TCT and IVQ's TCT and adjudicating ownership of the subject property to him. The Regional Trial Court ruled granted Barbosa's petition and ordered the cancellation of IVQ's TCT. Petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, but it affirmed the judgment of the trial court as it found that Barbosa was able to prove his ownership of the subject property.
ISSUE
Whether or not IVQ has a right on the subject property.
RULING No. In an action to quiet title, the plaintiffs or complainants must demonstrate a legal or an equitable title to, or an interest in, the subject real property. Likewise, they must show that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that purportedly casts a cloud on their title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. This point is clear from Article 476 of the Civil Code, which reads: "Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title."
"An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein."
Ownership is not the same as a certificate of title. Registering a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.
The lower courts found that Barbosa was able to substantiate his title to the subject property, while IVQ failed to establish its claim of ownership thereto. All told, despite the exceptional opportunity that was granted to it, IVQ again failed to adduce sufficient and creditworthy evidence that would convince the Court to reconsider the previous denial of its petition.
Respondent Reuben Barbosa claims that he is the owner of the parcel of land which is the subject property of the case that he bought from Therese Vargas. The property was at that time registered in her name. He took possession of the subject property seven days after he bought the same and he employed a caretaker to live therein. Before Therese Vargas, the owner of the property was Kawilihan Corporation, which company was owned by Jorge Vargas. Respondent stated that the subject property remained registered in the name of Therese Vargas as he entrusted her title to another person for custody, but the said person went to Canada. He paid real estate taxes on the subject property in the name of Kawilihan Corporation from 1978 until 2002. From 2003 to 2006, he paid real estate taxes thereon in the name of Therese Vargas. However, he learned that Therese Vargas's name was cancelled and replaced with that of IVQ in the tax declaration of the subject property.
Respondent filed a Petition for Cancellation and Quieting of Titles against Jorge Vargas III, Benito Montinola from IVQ Land Holdings, Inc. (IVQ) and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He prayed for the trial court to issue an order directing the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel Jorge Vargas III's TCT and IVQ's TCT and adjudicating ownership of the subject property to him. The Regional Trial Court ruled granted Barbosa's petition and ordered the cancellation of IVQ's TCT. Petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, but it affirmed the judgment of the trial court as it found that Barbosa was able to prove his ownership of the subject property.
ISSUE
Whether or not IVQ has a right on the subject property.
RULING No. In an action to quiet title, the plaintiffs or complainants must demonstrate a legal or an equitable title to, or an interest in, the subject real property. Likewise, they must show that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that purportedly casts a cloud on their title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. This point is clear from Article 476 of the Civil Code, which reads: "Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title."
"An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein."
Ownership is not the same as a certificate of title. Registering a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.
The lower courts found that Barbosa was able to substantiate his title to the subject property, while IVQ failed to establish its claim of ownership thereto. All told, despite the exceptional opportunity that was granted to it, IVQ again failed to adduce sufficient and creditworthy evidence that would convince the Court to reconsider the previous denial of its petition.
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