DOCTRINE
The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care."
When an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.
FACTS
Petitioner Jessica Maitim and respondent Maria Theresa P. Aguila were residents of Grand Pacific Manor Townhouse. Their respective townhouse units are approximately nine meters apart, separated only by a driveway jointly used by the townhouse unit owners.
On April 25, 2006, Maitim was on board her vehicle, a Ford W-150 Chateau Wagon registered under her name, which was being driven by Restituto Santos, her driver for 12 years. While they were driving along the common driveway, Angela, the six-year old daughter of Aguila, was sideswiped by Maitim's vehicle. Angela was dragged for about three meters resulting to her right leg being fractured.
Maitim and Santos did not immediately take Angela to the hospital after the incident; she was only brought to St. Luke's Medical Center after the insistence of Angela's grandmother, Lirio Aguila. Angela was diagnosed to have suffered swelling, hematoma,multiple abrasions, and displaced, complete fracture on the right leg. Thus, she underwent operation at Asian Hospital and was in a wheelchair from April 25, 2006 to July 18, 2006.
The incident was referred to the barangay for conciliation but only Aguila appeared. At this point, Aguila's actual expenses amounted to P169,187.32. Aguila then sent demand letters to Maitim and Santos to no avail. Thus, Aguila filed the instant action for damages based on quasi-delict before the RTC.
In her defense, Maitim denied Aguila's accusations and claimed that on, while she was in her vehicle being driven slowly by Santos, Angela suddenly came running and due to this, the latter's right leg was sideswiped and got fractured. Maitim alleged that her vehicle was covered by a comprehensive insurance that included third-party liability, but she was not able to file for insurance claim due to Aguila's refusal to submit the necessary documents, i.e., police report, medical report, and receipts of actual expenses. Furthermore, Maitim maintained that Santos, who was her driver for 12 years, was driving with care at the time of the incident, and thus, Maitim should not be made liable for vicarious liability because she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employee.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Aguila. The RTC held that Santos was presumed to be negligent, applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and that Maitim was vicariously liable for her failure to prove that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employee, Santos.
CA denied Maitim's appeal and affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Maitim and Santos are solidarily liable for damages, and that there was no contributory negligence on the part of Aguila and her daughter. Aguila did not commit any negligence in allowing Angela to exit
their door towards the car garage since they were still within the premises of their residence, and not on the street where vehicles ordinarily drive by. Moreover, the CA cited the case of Jarco Marketing Corporation v. CA which established that children under nine years of age are conclusively presumed in our jurisdiction to be incapable of contributory negligence. This supported its conclusion that Angela, being merely six-years old at the time of the incident, cannot be liable for contributory negligence as she is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence.
1. Whether Maitim is solidarily liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability.
2. Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of Aguila.
RULING
1. YES. First, the RTC correctly applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when it ruled that Santos should be presumed negligent, and thus, had the burden of proving such presumption otherwise.
In UPCB General Insurance Co. v. Pascual Liner, Inc., this Court reiterated the applicability of res ipsa loquitur in vehicular accidents, wherein it is sufficient that the accident itself be established, and once established through the admission of evidence,
whether hearsay or not, the rule on res ipsa loquitur already starts to apply.
As applied in the instant case, the fact that Angela was hit by a moving vehicle owned by Maitim and driven by Santos is undisputed, and the same is supported by the Traffic Accident Investigation Report dated April 25, 2006. The fact that Angela sustained injuries in her collision with Maitim's vehicle is also not in question. Thus, since it is clearly established that there was a vehicular accident that caused injuries, then the rule on res ipsa loquitur shall apply. An inference of negligence on the part of Santos, the person who controls the instrumentality (vehicle) causing the injury, arises, and he has the burden of presenting proof to the contrary.
As will be discussed below, this Court finds that the lower courts justly held that Santos failed to discharge this burden and consequently, the presumption of negligence lodged towards him shall stand. Ordinarily, driving inside a relatively narrow driveway shared by two houses would not result to children being hit and their bones fractured. This is because a reasonably prudent man, especially an alleged experienced driver, would have foreseen that the residents of the houses may exit towards the common driveway anytime, including young and playful children who may suddenly run across or along said driveway. Thus, a reasonably prudent man is expected to drive with utmost caution when traversing the said driveway, even if given a "clear" signal by a guard.
In fact, Maitim herself admits that there is a natural tendency to drive at a slow speed when in a narrow driveway. However, her allegation that Santos was driving at a slow speed, which is admittedly "natural," contradicts the circumstances surrounding Angela's injury. If Santos truly drove slowly and with care, he should have been able to have ample opportunity to brake or otherwise steer the vehicle out of trouble, both of which did not happen in this case.
Sunday, August 6, 2023
Ruperta Palaganas vs. Ernesto Palaganas
GR. No. 169144, January 26, 2011, J. ABAD
DOCTRINE: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution
CASE TITLE: Ruperta Palaganas vs. Ernesto Palaganas GR. No. 169144, January 26, 2011, J. ABAD
FACTS
Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament, she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S. Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.1 On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate. The RTC issued an order:2 (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. The CA rendered a decision, affirming the assailed order of the RTC,5 holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. ISSUE Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed. HELD Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country. Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. Therefore, the rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
CASE TITLE: Ruperta Palaganas vs. Ernesto Palaganas GR. No. 169144, January 26, 2011, J. ABAD
FACTS
Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament, she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S. Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.1 On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate. The RTC issued an order:2 (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. The CA rendered a decision, affirming the assailed order of the RTC,5 holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. ISSUE Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed. HELD Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country. Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. Therefore, the rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)