FACTS:
Anacleto Luison and Fidel A.D Garcia were both candidates for the mayoralty position. The certificate of candidacy of Luison was filed by the Nacionalista Party of the locality duly signed by the chairman and secretary respectively, while the certificate of candidacy of Garcia was filed by the local branch of the Liberal Party but it was merely signed by one who was a candidate for vice mayor. For this reason, the executive secretary of the Nationalista Party impugned the sufficiency of the certificate of candidacy filed in behalf of Garcia, whereupon the Commission on Elections, after making its own investigation, issued Resolution No. 23 declaring Garcia ineligible to run for the Office.
Garcia filed different petitions but was all denied by the court because the issue is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.Notwithstanding the adverse ruling of the Commission on Elections, as well as the dismissal of the petition for prohibition sued out by Garcia, the latter continued with his candidacy and the question of his ineligibility became an issue in the campaign. And when the time came for the counting and appreciation of the ballots, the board inspectors, in spite of the adverse ruling of the Commission on Elections, counted all the votes cast for Garcia as valid and credited him with them in the election returns with the result that he garnered 869 votes as against 675 of his opponent Luison.Consequently, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Garcia as the mayor elect of Tubay, Agusan.
Believing that Garcia is ineligible to hold office, Luison filed a petition of quo warranto in the proper court of first instance for the purpose of disputing his ineligibility and securing his consequent ouster from office, but the petition was dismissed for lack of merit on a motion filed by respondent. After the reception of the evidence, the court found for protestee holding that the certificate of candidacy filed by the latter was in substantial compliance with the law and that the Commission on Elections erred in declaring him legally insufficient. It therefore dismissed the protest with costs against protestant. Hence the present appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the protestee being ineligible and protestant having obtained the next highest number of votes, the latter can be declared entitled to hold the office to be vacated by the former.
HELD:
The court held in the negative. As this Court has held, "The general rule is that the fact a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.
In such case the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity" (Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil., 490). In a subsequent case, this Court also said that where the winning candidate has been declared ineligible, the person who obtained second place in the election cannot be declared elected since our law not only does not contain an express provision authorizing such declaration but apparently seems to prohibit it.
Moreover, a protest to disqualify a protestee on the ground of ineligibility is different from that a protest based on frauds and irregularities where it may be shown that protestant was the one really elected for having obtained a plurality of the legal votes. In the first case, while the protestee may be ousted the protestant will not be seated; in the second case, the protestant may assume office after protestee is unseated. The first case is brought to court by a petition of quo warranto, while the second by instituting an election protest. Thus, the Supreme Court, in defining these two remedies, said: All election disputes may be divided into two distinct classes: (1) those which pertain to the casting and counting of the ballots; and (2) those which pertain to the eligibility of the candidates. If there be cases incapable of being so classified, they have not been suggested.
Considering the fundamental difference existing between the nature of a petition for quo warranto and that of an election protest, it may be said that a candidate who files a protest against one who has been proclaimed as having received the highest number of votes basing his protest cannot disguise his action so as to make his protest a justification to be seated in office. In other words, he cannot convert an action for quo warranto into an election protest. This is because these two cases are fundamentally different in nature and in purpose. In quo warranto, "there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, and the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate", while in a protest, "the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast (Topacio vs. Paredes, supra). The present action therefore, partakes of the nature of quo warranto and as such has no reason to exist.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed. The Court declares that neither protestee nor protestant has been validly elected and so none is entitled to the position of mayor of Tubay, Agusan. No pronouncement as to costs.
Monday, May 20, 2019
Sunday, May 19, 2019
RAMIREZ V COMELEC
GR 112013
MARCH 26,1997
FACTS
The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Gipolos, Eastern Samar proclaimed petitioner Ramirez winner in the vice-mayoralty race over another candidate, private respondent Go based on the results showing that Ramirez obtained more votes than Go.
Go petitioned COMELEC for correction of manifest error claiming that owing to error in addition, he was credited with lesser votes. The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution directing the MBC to reconvene and recompute the votes in the Statement of Votes and proclaim the winning candidate. Acting on separate motions filed by Ramirez and Go, the COMELEC en banc affirmed its earlier resolution.
Ramirez petitioned the Supreme Court to annul the 2 COMELEC en banc resolutions and to reinstate his proclamation as the duly elected vice-mayor. He alleged that the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction over the controversy since it was not yet acted upon by a division of the COMELEC.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act directly on the petition for correction of manifest error filed by private respondent Go?
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, citing Rule 27, Section 5 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules which provides correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of results during the canvassing as one of the pre-proclamation controversies which maybe filed directly with the COMELEC en banc.
The Supreme Court annulled the COMELEC resolutions but directed COMELEC to reconvene the MBC or if this is not feasible, to constitute a new MBC in Gipolos, Eastern Samar and to order it to promptly revise the Statement of Votes based on the election returns from all the precincts of the Municipality and thereafter, proclaim the winning candidate.
Principle/ Doctrine:
Pre-proclamation controversies involving, inter alia, manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results may be filed directly with the COMELEC en banc.
USMAN V COMELEC
G.R.L-33325
DEC 29, 1971
FACTS:
Petitioners petitioned to COMELEC for declaration of nullity of the election returns from 7 municipalities and municipal district precincts. They alleged that that in the said municipalities and barrios, no actual voting took place because of "terrorism and other machinations," and that fictitious election returns were prepared under duress, and the influence of terrorism and/or bribery wherein, it was made to appear that certain favored candidates obtained most, if not all the votes fictitiously cast therein, while petitioners were made to appear as having obtained very few, if no votes at all. They prayed for the holding of a special election in the municipalities and barrios concerned and, ad interim, the suspension of the canvass as well as the proclamation of the winning candidates until after hearing and decision on the merits of the petition.
ISSUE:
WON a mandatory special election in the precincts concerned must be made.
RULING:
No. A reading of section 17 (e) of Republic Act 6132 makes it apparent that Congress has delegated to the Comelec the power to call for a special election — a power essentially legislative in nature, being merely an incident to or an extension or modality of the power to fix the date of the elections. However, in the proper exercise of the delegated power, Congress saw fit to require the Comelec ascertain that (1) no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts because of force majeure, violence or terrorism and (2) that the votes not cast therein suffice to affect the results of the elections. The language of the provision clearly requires the concurrence of the two circumstances to justify the calling of a special election. The Comelec concedes that what transpired in Karomatan constitutes "not merely a simple case of irregularity in the voting but a case of no voting or no election at all. However, the Comelec attributes this to "massive fraud rather than to force majeure, violence or terrorism the — three causes explicitly enumerated by section 17 (e). Unlike section 17 (d) which empowers the Comelec to postpone the election in any political division or subdivision whenever it finds that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election therein is rendered impossible by reason of fraud, violence, coercion, terrorism, or any other serious cause or causes, section 17 (e) excludes the situation where no voting has been held because of fraud. Furthermore, doubt exists whether or not the irregularities committed in Karomatan properly partake of violence or terrorism. This being the case, we find that the first circumstance is not attendant. As to the second circumstance, therefore, we find it unnecessary to indulge in surmises
PRINCIPLE/DOCTRINE:
TWO CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY THE CALLING OF SPECIAL ELECTION
(1) no voting has been held in any precint or precincts because of force majeure, violence or terrorism and
(2) that the votes not cast therein suffice to affect the results of the elections.
Petitioners petitioned to COMELEC for declaration of nullity of the election returns from 7 municipalities and municipal district precincts. They alleged that that in the said municipalities and barrios, no actual voting took place because of "terrorism and other machinations," and that fictitious election returns were prepared under duress, and the influence of terrorism and/or bribery wherein, it was made to appear that certain favored candidates obtained most, if not all the votes fictitiously cast therein, while petitioners were made to appear as having obtained very few, if no votes at all. They prayed for the holding of a special election in the municipalities and barrios concerned and, ad interim, the suspension of the canvass as well as the proclamation of the winning candidates until after hearing and decision on the merits of the petition.
ISSUE:
WON a mandatory special election in the precincts concerned must be made.
RULING:
No. A reading of section 17 (e) of Republic Act 6132 makes it apparent that Congress has delegated to the Comelec the power to call for a special election — a power essentially legislative in nature, being merely an incident to or an extension or modality of the power to fix the date of the elections. However, in the proper exercise of the delegated power, Congress saw fit to require the Comelec ascertain that (1) no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts because of force majeure, violence or terrorism and (2) that the votes not cast therein suffice to affect the results of the elections. The language of the provision clearly requires the concurrence of the two circumstances to justify the calling of a special election. The Comelec concedes that what transpired in Karomatan constitutes "not merely a simple case of irregularity in the voting but a case of no voting or no election at all. However, the Comelec attributes this to "massive fraud rather than to force majeure, violence or terrorism the — three causes explicitly enumerated by section 17 (e). Unlike section 17 (d) which empowers the Comelec to postpone the election in any political division or subdivision whenever it finds that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election therein is rendered impossible by reason of fraud, violence, coercion, terrorism, or any other serious cause or causes, section 17 (e) excludes the situation where no voting has been held because of fraud. Furthermore, doubt exists whether or not the irregularities committed in Karomatan properly partake of violence or terrorism. This being the case, we find that the first circumstance is not attendant. As to the second circumstance, therefore, we find it unnecessary to indulge in surmises
PRINCIPLE/DOCTRINE:
TWO CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY THE CALLING OF SPECIAL ELECTION
(1) no voting has been held in any precint or precincts because of force majeure, violence or terrorism and
(2) that the votes not cast therein suffice to affect the results of the elections.
Sunday, May 5, 2019
ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO v. COMELEC ,GR No. 209835
Facts:
Petitioner... and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. were both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.Private respondent filed a Petition for the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging that the latter made a false representation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor despite being a Canadian citizen and a non-¬resident thereof.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on 2012. On 2013 COMELEC issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu within one year prior to the election.
It found that while petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had taken his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly renounced his Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply with the other requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for those... seeking elective office, i.e., persons who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year residency requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Elections were subsequently held and petitioner won over private respondent was proclaimed Mayor petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC canceling his COC.
Private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation COMELEC En Banc denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution. Private respondent took his Oath of Officeand claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile and he was born and baptized in Uyugan and he was a registered voter and had exercised his right of suffrage and even built his house therein.He also contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling his COC.
Issues:
1.Whether petitioner had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his COC
2. what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?
Ruling:
We are not persuaded. RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law.The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes material.Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately preceding the election day. Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen.
Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment. Petitioner'sreacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile.
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such. Petitioner failed to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections... the period from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one-year residency required by law.
We concluded that material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code.
Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for material misrepresentation.
Petitioner... and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. were both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.Private respondent filed a Petition for the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging that the latter made a false representation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor despite being a Canadian citizen and a non-¬resident thereof.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on 2012. On 2013 COMELEC issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu within one year prior to the election.
It found that while petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had taken his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly renounced his Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply with the other requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for those... seeking elective office, i.e., persons who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year residency requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Elections were subsequently held and petitioner won over private respondent was proclaimed Mayor petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC canceling his COC.
Private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation COMELEC En Banc denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution. Private respondent took his Oath of Officeand claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile and he was born and baptized in Uyugan and he was a registered voter and had exercised his right of suffrage and even built his house therein.He also contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling his COC.
Issues:
1.Whether petitioner had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his COC
2. what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?
Ruling:
We are not persuaded. RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law.The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes material.Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately preceding the election day. Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen.
Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment. Petitioner'sreacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile.
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such. Petitioner failed to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections... the period from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one-year residency required by law.
We concluded that material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code.
Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for material misrepresentation.
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